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Abstract 
 
Following the dramatic takeoff of contemporary China-Africa relationship in the late 1990s, 
this once neglected international phenomenon has become one of the most topical themes 
over the past decade. This new popularity is due not only to the growing importance of both 
China and Africa on the global stage, but also China's rapidly increasing foreign aid on the 
continent. However, whilst most scholars are focusing on the financial side of the story – the 
massive concessional loan deals, the generous investments in natural resources and so forth, 
the primary purpose of this foreign aid – assisting African recipient countries' economic and 
welfare development – has only generated minimal interest. Little is known regarding how 
China delivers its foreign aid, and even less about how this foreign aid actually works in the 
African recipient countries. In light of this situation, this study asks: How has China's foreign 
aid been assisting Africa's development? 
 
On the basis of drawing specific attention to the effectiveness and sustainability of China's 
foreign aid in Africa, this study also explores the factors that affect these outcomes. Which, 
as this study finds out in the end, friendship – a factor that is often overlooked by Western 
scholars and patriotically examined by Chinese scholars. Not only has it continuously played 
a substantial role in shaping the development of China's foreign aid in Africa, but it is also 
frequently the most influential underlying consideration that practically undermines China's 
foreign aid outcomes. All in all, whilst purposed to promote China's foreign aid outcomes, 
this study improves our understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa. As well it delves into 
the development of China's foreign aid in Africa, assesses its performance, this study finds 
the shortcomings of China's foreign aid at present and searches for practical solutions that 
may contribute to its future development. 
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Author's Note 
 
1. Unless otherwise specified, the term China's foreign aid in this study refers to China's 
Official Bilateral Development Assistance. It therefore differs from China's other foreign 
aid activities such as Military Aid, Humanitarian Aid, Peacekeeping and participation in 
International Multilateral Aid. 
 
2. Whilst this study adopts official translations for titles and policies that were originally 
introduced in Chinese, not all of these have an official English translation. Whilst some 
of the interviewees spoke English as their first or second language, the majority of the 
interviews in this study were conducted in Chinese. 
 
In these situations, the information obtained in Chinese has been translated into English 
by the author. Important titles, events, documents and quotations are accordingly noted 
in the body of content and footnotes in their original language for further clarification, 
or should additional references be required. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
"我以为中国对非洲就是为了友谊" 
 
"I deem China in Africa is for friendship" (Xinhua, 2011), the Vice Minister of the Ministry of 
Commerce Fu Ziying1 was quoted as saying in reply to a question regarding the motivation 
of China's foreign aid in Africa. Indeed, it was the answer to a question insinuating that China 
is scrambling for natural resources on the continent. The question was raised during the 
media conference on the release of China's first official foreign aid publication – The White 
Paper on China's Foreign Aid (The White Paper). 
 
Over the past two decades, the rapid development of China-Africa relationship has attracted 
tremendous attention worldwide. In view of China's continuously growing foreign aid input, 
increasing investments, and its steadily deepening cooperation with African countries, every 
move that China has taken on the continent becomes topical. Particularly after the launch of 
the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, along with the theme of African 
development coming back to the centre of global debates, the relationship between China 
and Africa has also made headlines. However, what this study has found to be intriguing is 
that whilst all African recipient countries welcome China's foreign aid, many Western voices, 
on the other hand, have been tirelessly criticising China's real motivations on the continent. 
Not only has China therefore been accused of scrambling for African natural resources, but it 
also further blamed for worsening corruption in African recipient countries, hampering 
Western efforts in establishing African democracies, as well as causing serious environmental 
problems (Brautigam, 2009). 
 
In particular Western media sources and reports, regardless of the repeated clarifications 
and explanations made in academic research (see Woods, 2008; Cotula et al., 2009; Dreher 
and Fuchs, 2012; Yan and Sautman, 2013), continuous news and articles are still being widely 
published condemning China for violating human rights in African recipient countries (see 
Dasgupta, 2015), allowing African presidents to use Chinese foreign aid for patronage politics 
(see Anderson, 2014), and arguing that, "China often gives aid directly to state leaders and 
regimes", and as a result, the receiving African government become more violent towards its 
citizens (see Kishi and Raleigh, 2015). Further, by completely ignoring the non-interference 
principle – one of the most symbolic and well-discussed feature of China's foreign aid (see 
Taylor, 2008; Hess and Aidoo, 2010; Condon, 2012; Grimm, 2014, and many others), one 
recent report from Financial Times even went as far as suggesting that, "few policymakers in 
the developing world trust China's advice" (see Donnan, 2015) – whilst it is broadly 
understood that China do not give any (development) advices at all.2 
 
                                                          
1
 Fu Ziying was appointed Vice Minister of the MOC in between 2008 and 2011. 
2
 For further discussion regarding this particular report, see 
http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2015/11/ft-story-on-chinese-aid-bias-or.html, accessed 9 November 2015. 
2 
 
In fact, despite recent international interest in China's foreign aid in Africa, China has a long 
foreign aid history that is no less than any so-called traditional foreign aid donor country. To 
provide some historical context: from 1950s onwards, China has successively brought about 
three foreign aid objectives in assisting African recipient countries' development. Through 
the implementation of these objectives, China has extended its foreign aid to 51 African 
countries, and improved its foreign aid approaches to include three main funding methods 
and six implementation methods. However, regardless of these valuable experiences as a 
foreign aid donor country, detailed accounts of China's foreign aid exercises in Africa are still 
largely absent from existing studies. In the light of this situation, apart from continuously 
looking for China's real motivations in Africa through different perspectives of international 
relations theories, or adopting estimated figures criticise China's involvements on the African 
continent, this study asks, shouldn't we focus on improving our understanding of China's 
foreign aid in Africa before making claims? 
 
It is from this query that this study strives to find out: How does China deliver its foreign aid 
to Africa? How has China's foreign aid impacted upon Africa's development? And, how can 
the performance of China's foreign aid in Africa be further improved? 
 
A Brief on Previous Studies 
 
There is a developing literature on contemporary China's foreign aid to Africa. A few scholars 
such as Kragelund (2008) and Brautigam (2008) as well as the recently released work by the 
AidData3 project, have attempted estimates of China's foreign aid to Africa, bearing in the 
mind the absence and lack of transparency within this sector, which this study itself 
highlights. Nonetheless, both Kragelund and Brautigam concur that, even though China is 
one of Africa's major aid donor, aid flows from China are relatively small when compared to 
the aid flows from OECD DAC countries. Especially through her 2009 book, The Dragon's Gift, 
Brautigam discusses the differences between Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 
Other Official Flows (OOF), stating that most Western foreign aid is ODA while most China's 
foreign aid is OOF. Brautigam's work however seems strongly influenced by her extensive 
cooperation with Chinese officials and is in some ways too optimistic about the efficacy of 
China's foreign aid. 
 
Some Western scholars (see Brautigam, 2009; Youde, 2010; Jiang, 2014) have questioned the 
motivation of China's foreign aid to Africa. For them, China gains both economic and political 
benefits; that is, China obtains more opportunities on trade projects and access to natural 
resources through giving aid, and its image in the African continent is enhanced, and 
friendship and goodwill are improved at the same time (see Askouri, 2007; Marks, 2007; 
Naim, 2007; Rotberg, 2008; Youde, 2010; Brautigam, 2011b). Scholars such as Pehnelt (2007) 
have been very critical of Chinese policies with regards to the nature, modalities and 
composition of Beijing's foreign aid. Pehnelt is particularly concerned about China's 
non-interference policy which allegedly prompt China not to take into consideration at all the 
                                                          
3
 See http://aiddata.org/, accessed 6 June 2015. 
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quality of governance in the recipient countries. This is a familiar criticism, usually implying 
that China is willing to provide foreign aid to unstable, problematic and rogue countries 
without taking into consideration issues such as human rights. Kaplinsky and Morris (2006) 
also point to several examples of China's significant involvement in fragile states. It should be 
pointed out here however that thus far no one has attempted to provide a proven 
correlation to strengthen claims that China provides foreign aid with little or no regards on 
the recipient quality of governance. 
 
At a 2007 conference hosted by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and 
others, the subsequent conference report, U.S. and Chinese Engagement in Africa: Prospects 
for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation discusses Chinese engagement in Kenya, Nigeria 
and Angola. Out of that discussion, themes on areas for cooperation between the US and 
China emerged. CSIS proposes that the US and China work together to further their interests 
in Africa, drawing on CSIS research and a CSIS delegation to China to support their notion 
that both countries have mutual interests. As with Brautigam, CSIS has a slightly altered 
viewpoint due to extensive cooperation with Chinese officials. 
 
Shinn (2009) primarily compares US and Chinese interests in Africa. Shinn discusses the 
interests of the US and China in Africa, concluding that they are similar despite popular 
opinion that they are not. He concludes that the human rights challenges faced by each 
country drive them closer to China and away from Western influence. Shinn suggests that 
the similarities between US and Chinese interests in Africa create a base for broader 
cooperation. As a Foreign Service Officer, Shinn has served in numerous African posts 
including Ambassador to Ethiopia. Thus, his viewpoint is rooted mainly in his experiences in 
east African countries. 
 
Despite the above criticism, scholars such as Davies et al. (2008), whilst acknowledging some 
of the controversial aspects of China's foreign aid to Africa, the front role played by China in 
the economic development of recipient countries such as Angola and Sudan. They conclude 
that China's ongoing relations with both Angola and Sudan are mutual beneficial. To further 
support this position, Nour (2010) argues that even though there are some lapses within the 
parameters of China's foreign aid to Sudan, China's funding and implementation of projects 
aid in Sudan has had a positive impact for instance, increasing the availability of services, 
increases in skill levels, increases or growth in production levels, increases in the transfer of 
knowledge, increased availability of machinery, equipment and raw materials, increases in 
employment opportunities, improved training and capacity building in these projects and 
increases in technology transfer especially for multipurpose development tasks. Guloba et 
al.'s (2010) research on China's foreign aid to Uganda further supports some tentative 
impacts of China's foreign aid to Uganda. However, this study highlights some major 
concerns surrounding China's foreign aid which includes the marginal employment of locals 
and the continuous utilisation of Chinese expatriates where these projects are effectuated. 
Nonetheless, their findings indicate that China's foreign aid (which is mainly in the form of 
technical assistance through training in Chinese institutions, grants, interest-free loans, 
preferential loans, debt relief etc) have all gone towards reducing Uganda's external burden 
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and hence, have had a positive impact on the Ugandan peoples' welfare. Wang (2010) for 
their part further delineate some positive impacts of China's foreign aid by making 
references to China's substantial funding of multipurpose development project in sectors 
such as power supply (hydropower) and transportation (railways and motorways) which are 
sectors within recipient countries that attracts relatively small assistance from the traditional 
(Western) donors. 
 
Most studies on China's foreign aid mainly emphasise the viewpoints of decision-makers, 
relevant policies and the performance of governments in China and African countries (see 
Youde, 2010; Lu, 2012; Wang et al., 2012; Shen and Fan, 2014). There are very few studies 
that focus on the experiences of African recipients or have detailed case studies. Researching 
an event or one country's diplomatic behaviour in a certain period is the character of a case 
study (Yan and Sun, 2001, p.131). A case study not only can work out particular conclusions 
but also summarises universalistic conclusions towards one international event or one 
country's diplomatic behaviour (ibid., p.131). It is not practical for a PhD study to research 
China's foreign aid to Africa in every African country due to the high economic and time costs, 
thus, a case study or two is really needed. The advantages of a case study are that there are 
deep understandings towards the object of study and the research cost is relevant low. The 
limitation is that any universal generalisations in the experiences of receiving China's foreign 
aid is not very strong (ibid., p.132). 
 
Aim, Scope and Objectives 
 
Having in mind the fundamental purpose of promoting China's foreign aid outcomes so that 
it could contribute further to African countries' development, this study aims to improve our 
understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa. It builds on the findings of earlier foreign aid 
studies and shares in part with "the 'mainstream' assumptions that underdevelopment and 
poverty are objective, measureable phenomena, and that foreign aid, when designed and 
implemented appropriately in a supportive policy and institutional environment in recipient 
countries, can further development" (Lancaster, 1999, p.10). In addition to this, on the basis 
of noting Brautigam's caveat that, "politics in the receiving country determine much of the 
sustainability of aid once it is received" (1998, p.3), this study is thus carried out on the 
assumption that whilst the recipient countries' conditions are pre-existing (may these be 
institutional deficiencies or a lack of human resources), the donor country, as a foreign aid 
provider, is responsible for adjusting its foreign aid accordingly to these conditions in order 
for its foreign aid to perform effectively and sustainably in these recipient countries. 
 
Based on this assumption, this study draws particular attention to China's traditional foreign 
aid, which is the part of China's foreign aid that is solely funded by the foreign aid budget of 
the Chinese government, and it is "provided primarily to serve China's political interests"4. By 
definition, in accordance with the DAC, this is the part of foreign aid that is "administered 
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its 
                                                          
4
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2 September 2011. 
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main objective";5 and, in the words of Chinese foreign aid officials, this is the part of foreign 
aid that is "with a view of building friendly foreign relationships"6, and it is "sincerely aimed 
at helping African countries' development"7. In line with these definitions, to further clarify 
this part of China's foreign aid and integrating it with the information provided by The White 
Paper (2011), this is the part of China's foreign aid that uses the funding methods8 of Grant 
and Interest-free Loan (and Low-interest Loan9), and is delivered via the implementation 
methods10  of Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid, Goods and Materials Aid, Human 
Resource Development Cooperation, Medical Teams and Overseas Volunteer Programs.11 
 
This part of China's foreign aid has been chosen as the focus of this study because China's 
traditional foreign aid conforms to the general understanding of the "aid-for-development" 
norm (Lancaster, 2006, p.7), and, albeit not in great detail, its amount can be easily identified 
via China's official publications.12 Whereas regarding the other part of China's foreign aid – 
the Concessional Loan (including Preferential Buyer's Credits, and all other China EXIM Bank 
operated funding methods – also known as contemporary foreign aid13 in this study), not 
only does it to some extent deviate from the foreign aid norm given that it is provided only if 
the proposed project is profitable,14 but these contemporary foreign aid methods also often 
touch on fundamental questions such as "One is Aid (Concessional Loans), the Other is Not 
(Preferential Buyer's Credits)" (Brautigam, 2009, p.173) and cause controversy in calculations 
(see Lum et al., 2009; Paulo and Reisen, 2010)15. In addition, China's traditional foreign aid is 
                                                          
5
 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm, accessed 11 
February 2015. 
6
 The original phrase utilised by the Chinese officials interviewed for this study was "为了建立友好关系的援助". 
Interviews with Chinese officials, Freetown, Sierra Leone; Accra, Ghana; Beijing, China, 2011 and 2012. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 The term of "funding methods" is utilised in this study to replace China's official term "financial resources" for 
clarification purposes. 
9
 Low-interest Loan is a former funding method of China's foreign aid, which was terminated at the end of the 
1980s. Although it seems rather identical to China's contemporary Concessional Loans, Low-interest Loans is 
established solely relying on China's government foreign aid budget, and it was only utilised with the intention to 
sustain China's foreign aid while China's economic capacity was extremely limited. More detailed discussion 
regarding this particular funding method can be find in both chapter three and four. 
10
 The term of "implementation methods" is utilised in this study to replace China's official term "forms [of 
foreign aid]" for clarification purposes. 
11
 More detailed discussions regarding these funding and implementation methods are inserted throughout 
chapter three and four along with their inaugurations. A collective discussion is also located at the second half of 
chapter four in the "China's Foreign Aid in Africa: The Current Planning and Implementation Approaches" section. 
12
 Unlike China's contemporary foreign aid, the amount of China's traditional foreign aid can be easily found 
either in The White Paper of China's Foreign Aid, or China Statistical Yearbook. More detailed discussion regarding 
the calculation of China's foreign aid is located at the second half of chapter four in the "How China Calculates Its 
Foreign Aid" section. 
13
 The terms of "traditional foreign aid" and "contemporary foreign aid" are utilised in this study to differentiate 
the two divergent types of China's current foreign aid in Africa. Whilst "traditional foreign aid" is referred to the 
part of China's foreign aid that is solely funded by China's government foreign aid budget, "contemporary foreign 
aid" is referred to the part of China's foreign aid that is also utilising commercial capital. More detailed discussion 
regarding the differences of these two types of China's foreign aid is inserted throughout chapter four along with 
the inauguration of the Concessional Loan. 
14
 According to the loan regulation for the Concessional Loan, concessional loan funded foreign aid project must 
meet the requirement of "具有还本付息能力" – the ability to repay capital and interests. Concessional loans "不再投
向社会福利性项目, 有经济效益的除外" – are no longer applicable to social charitable projects unless they have 
economic benefits. Unpublished government document, The Loan Regulations of the EXIM Bank, obtained on 1 
September 2011. 
15
 More detailed discussion regarding the calculation of China's foreign aid is located at the second half of 
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also appropriate considering that it has "a broad range of flexibility"16 in practice, which is 
essential to the purpose of this study – to improve China's foreign aid outcomes. 
 
It is build on this practical foundation, that this study attaches specific importance to China's 
traditional foreign aid. Whilst improving our understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa, it 
attempts to find the ways in which this particular part of China's foreign aid could further 
benefit African countries' development. In order to achieve these, this study now proposes 
three objectives to set out the understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa: understanding 
the development of China's foreign aid in Africa, assessing the performance of China's 
foreign aid in Africa, and investigating the successes and failures of China's foreign aid in 
approaching the factors that affect its outcomes in Africa. To elaborate on this sequence: the 
first objective is particularly aimed at providing an overview of China's foreign aid in Africa. 
In the interests of establishing a foundation for the following assessment and investigation of 
China's foreign aid, this objective explores the foreign aid objectives that China has 
successively implemented in Africa, as well as the foreign aid planning and implementation 
approaches it accordingly developed to secure these objectives. 
 
After grasping the development of China's foreign aid on paper, the second objective is then 
followed to take our understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa to the practical grounds. 
With the view of learning the effectiveness and sustainability of China's foreign aid in Africa, 
this objective observes and assesses three foreign aid packages that China delivered to Africa 
according to its foreign aid objectives, and attempts to find out the factors that affect their 
outcomes. Moving to the third objective, this study investigates the successes and failures of 
China's foreign aid in approaching the factors that affect its outcomes. In order to bring our 
understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa further to its substance, this objective leads 
this study back to the development of China's foreign aid in Africa and identifies the hidden 
problems that have resulted in current outcomes. In addition to this, whilst going into details 
regarding the decision-making processes of China's foreign aid objectives, the planning and 
implementation approaches of China's foreign aid projects and programs, it also searches for 
possible solutions that may improve the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa. 
 
In short, improving our understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa is achieved in six steps: 
 
1. Understanding the development of China's foreign aid in Africa 
2. Exploring China's foreign aid objectives, planning and implementation approaches 
3. Assessing the performance of China's foreign aid in Africa 
4. Finding out the factors that affect China's foreign aid effectiveness and sustainability 
5. Investigating how China's foreign aid approached the factors that affect its outcomes 
6. Identifying the shortcomings of China's foreign aid at present 
 
Analytical Approach 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
chapter four in the "How China Calculates Its Foreign Aid" section. 
16
 Discussion with senior Chinese officials, Beijing, China, 19 November 2011. 
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As a donor country centred foreign aid study, the above outlined scope of China's foreign aid, 
one that is driven by political interests has seemingly made the theoretical approach of this 
study straightforward – it almost completely reflects the realist argument that foreign aid is 
an instrument of the donor countries for pursuing their national interests. However, whilst 
this study applies the greater realist framework in understanding China's foreign aid – after 
all, foreign aid is an instrument of diplomacy, and diplomacy serves national interests, there 
are two points that need to be addressed. First, as Liu asserted, "Albeit national interest is 
consistently underpinning the motivation of providing foreign aid in the real world, it is never 
the only consideration that determines foreign aid"17. Undoubtedly, being one of the most 
important diplomatic instruments, foreign aid is driven by complex motivations (Brautigam, 
2009). Not only does this vary from donor to donor, it also evolves over time, as Lancaster 
pointed out in a study of five donor countries:18 "No one theory can adequately explain this 
twentieth-century innovation in relations between states" (2006, p.212). 
 
Particularly in the research on China's foreign aid in Africa, apart from the obvious political 
and economic interests (such as fulfilling the obligations of proletarian internationalism 
during the 1950s and 1970s, seeking mutually beneficial economic cooperation during the 
1980s and early 2000s, and promoting China-Africa strategic partnership more recently), 
considering the repeated mentioning of building friendly foreign relationships – are these 
claims only rhetoric that hides China's real national interests in providing foreign aid, or are 
these as well appropriate explanations of China's foreign aid in Africa given that China is 
actually building hospitals in African recipient countries and training African human 
resources? With an eye to this situation, and for the sake of not complicating this study with 
another international relations theory that builds on completely different grounds, this study 
on this account introduces the concept of friendship – a typical moral value of the Chinese 
philosophy – as an aspect of China's political considerations to further complement the 
understanding provided by realism on China's foreign aid in Africa.19 
 
As one of the core essence of the ancient Eastern philosophy of Confucianism (儒学, founded 
by Confucius, 孔子 , 551-479 BC), friendship is the modern-day interpretation of the 
Confucian conception of harmony (和). Which, in accordance with Confucianism, "should be 
the highest pursuit of inter-state relations" (Zhang, 2012b, p.56).20  Instead of solely 
                                                          
17
 Interview with Prof. Liu Liyun, Renmin University, Beijing, China, 27 November 2011. 
18
 This study excludes China. 
19
 Albeit the concept of friendship so far has not been sufficiently discussed in Western studies on China's foreign 
aid, there is a developing literature on friendship in the broader context of Western international relations studies. 
Whilst there are no fundamental differences between the friendship per se discussed in the Western 
international relations studies and Confucianism – they both share the emphasis on consideration for others, one 
more significant difference is that Western studies tends to make distinction between friendship between states 
and friendship between peoples, see LU, C. 2009. Political Friendship Among Peoples. Journal of International 
Political Theory, 5, 41-58; KELLER, S. Against Friendship Between Countries. Journal of International Political 
Theory, 5, 59-74. Whereas Confucianism regards state and people as an integration (in the pursuit of friendship), 
"… 国之本在家, 家之本在身", "… the state has its basis in the family, and the family has its basis in oneself". See 
p.84, DE BARY, W. T. (ed.) 2008. Sources of East Asian Tradition: Premodern Asia: Columbia University Press. 
Hence in the Chinese language, a state is called "国家", which directly translate as: "state-family". 
20
 See "论语·学而: 礼之用, 和为贵. 先王之道斯为美, 小大由之". "In the practice of li [a broad range of behaviour], 
Harmony is the key. In the Dao [the principle of practice] of the kings of old, This was the beauty. In all affairs, 
great and small, follow this", p.3, ENO, R. 2015. The Analects of Confucius [2.2]. Available at: 
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emphasising power, security and such self-interest (私利), Confucianism believes that a 
stable international status is achieved through the emphases on both self-interest and 
consideration for others (宏义) – harmony, and further points out that even in disagreement, 
consideration for others should be given the utmost priority (Zhang and Qin, 2012). On the 
basis of stressing the balance between self-interest and consideration for others, as 
illustrated by the moral imperative: "Do not do to others what you would not wish done to 
you"21 (Eno, 2015, p.59), not only has Confucianism suggested that one government should 
be "embarrassed if their way of governing would involve naked self-interest" (Lengauer, 2011, 
p.43), but also overly stresses that self-interest often leads to instability.22 
 
In light of this philosophy, whilst it completely differs from traditional Western concepts such 
as "alliance" in the eyes of the realists (Lebow, 2007, pp.55-60), or, as Poncet attempted to 
make equal, "charity" (although she did point out that China's foreign aid tends to focus on 
countries with "long-established relationships") (2012, p.7), it is Lancaster's interpretation of 
"creating warm relations with developing countries" (2007, p.1), and Li's reading of "the 
substance of a win-win situation is not only a simple share of benefits, but requires caring for 
and supporting poor and developing countries" (2010, p.26) that aptly grasps the essence of 
this friendship in China's foreign aid. In addition, what needs to be clarified here is that 
although this study regards friendship as an integral part of China's national interests (it is 
always referred to by the Chinese foreign aid officials as a "political interest"23) and in order 
to incorporate this concept with traditional Western understanding, friendship should be 
considered as a moral pursuit that is rooted in Chinese culture rather than a national interest 
that is built on Western values.24 
 
Second, there are limitations to realism, indeed, limitations to all the donor country centred 
approaches in interpreting how foreign aid influences the recipient countries' development, 
as well as in explaining the contents of foreign aid projects and programs, and the variety of 
implementation methods favoured by different donor countries.25 Leaving aside the manner 
in which foreign aid influences the recipient countries' development is the central question 
of all foreign aid studies that concerned about the development of the recipient countries, 
following the realist argument that the effectiveness of foreign aid should be measured on 
the basis of how it contributed to the donor countries' interests (Deng, 2009), this study 
additionally suggests that when the foreign aid is also contributing to the recipient countries' 
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf [Accessed: 20 July 2015]. 
21
 "论语·颜渊: 己所不欲, 勿施于人". 
22
 See "论语·里仁: 放于利而行, 多怨". "If one allows oneself to follow profit in one's behaviour, there will be many 
with cause for complaint", p.15, ENO, R. 2015. The Analects of Confucius [2.2]. Available at: 
http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf [Accessed: 20 July 2015]. 
23
 Interviews with Chinese officials, Freetown, Sierra Leone; Accra, Ghana; Beijing, China, 2011 and 2012. 
24
 Interview with Prof. Liu Liyun, Renmin University, Beijing, China, 27 November 2011. There is also a wide range 
of research specifically studied the influences of Confucianism in China's development, and adopted 
Confucianism understanding the decision-making of China's foreign policy, see FENG, H. 2007. Chinese Strategic 
Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-making: Confucianism, Leadership and War: Routledge; CHEN, C.-C. & LEE, Y.-T. 
(eds.) 2008. Leadership and Management in China: Philosophies, Theories, and Practices: Cambridge University 
Press. 
25
 More detailed discussion regarding the issues related to the donor country centred approach to understand 
foreign aid, as well as the recipient country centred approach to understand foreign aid is located in chapter two 
in the "The Interpretations of Foreign Aid" section. 
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interests, shouldn't it then improves the donor countries' chances in achieving its intended 
interests? It is on this ground, while equal importance is given to the understanding of how 
China's foreign aid influences its recipient countries' development, that this study further 
integrates observation into the understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa. 
 
Thus this study takes up Bobiash's proposal that "it is essential to analyse aid as it is… aid is 
intertwined with the activities of states, institutions, and diverse processes of development; 
its analysis is enriched when researchers draw upon diverse strands of the social sciences" 
(1992, pp.1-2). In addition to observing and assessing the performance of China's foreign aid 
in Africa with the conventionally considered political and economic factors in mind, so as to 
maximise our understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa, this study also takes into account 
other social science subjects concerned with social, institutional and technological factors 
that likewise influence China's foreign aid performance in Africa. In all, based on the realist 
framework of foreign aid serving national interests, this study understands China's foreign 
aid in Africa with two further integrated elements: first, friendship is introduced as an aspect 
of China's political considerations to aid the conventional realist understanding of national 
interests of power, security and as such; second, observation is applied to explain how 
China's foreign aid influenced the recipient countries' development. 
 
Reading, Fieldwork and Concerns 
 
In view of Brautigam's earlier warning that "the Chinese do not publish any official reports, 
figures, or evaluation of their aid" (2009, p.20), and the limited and vague information stated 
in the published The White Paper (2011), this study has utilised various methods to piece 
together the information required for the above proposed objectives. To be specific, in the 
understanding of the development of China's foreign aid in Africa, a desktop research was 
first conducted utilising both English and Chinese language based academic studies. In order 
to get as close as possible to the original thoughts of Beijing in putting forward foreign aid 
objectives and adjusting foreign aid planning and implementation approaches, this study 
then consulted with well-established personal connections within the Chinese government 
for government documents, elite statements, and files that are not in the public domain for 
detailed record of the evolvement of China's foreign aid. Particularly in the interpretation of 
China's current foreign aid development, the majority of information included in this study 
are based on internally circulated government documents. 
 
Then, in meeting the second objective of this study, the assessment of China's foreign aid 
performance in Africa is based on fieldwork carried out in Sierra Leone and Ghana in 2011. 
Where funding and access allowed, this study went onsite and observed the operation of 
eight of China's foreign aid projects. In Sierra Leone, this study went to the Magbass Sugar 
Complex, the Friendship Hospital, the National Stadium and the Youyi (friendship) Building; 
and in Ghana, this study went to the National Theatre, the Lekma Hospital, the Bui Dam and 
the Asogli Power Plant. Whilst onsite, this study interviewed 26 Chinese and local foreign aid 
workers, as well as 4 groups of Chinese and local employees working in the Magbass Sugar 
Complex. In addition, this study interviewed one medical team in each of these two recipient 
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countries, and 21 foreign aid officials and participants (including 2 African development 
planning officials, 2 African foreign affairs officials, and 12 Chinese officials) to complement 
the information collected onsite. Further, this study also conducted research using China's 
government website for comparable projects and programs. 
 
To achieve the third objective of this study, which is to investigate the successes and failures 
of China's foreign aid in approaching the factors that affect its outcomes in Africa, this study 
went to China for insights. Apart from conducting interviews and discussions with scholars in 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Renmin University, Zhejiang Normal University and 
China Agricultural University, this study carried out interviews and discussions with some 
twenty Chinese foreign aid officials and researchers in all main departments involved in the 
planning and implementation of China's foreign aid. These were, namely, the Department of 
Aid to Foreign Countries of the MOC, the Department of Western Asian and African Affairs of 
the MOC, the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, the 
Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation, the China International Centre for 
Economic and Technical Exchanges and the Academy for International Business Officials. In 
addition, in the writing process of this study, supplementary interviews with Chinese officials 
were conducted via telephone and Internet. 
 
Nevertheless, even though this study benefits from exclusive access to China's foreign aid 
officials, participants, projects and programs in Africa, it has its limitations. These limitations 
are apparent particularly when it comes to choosing examples for the assessment of China's 
foreign aid performance in Africa. Despite multiple efforts to overcome the risk of "selection 
bias" (Achen and Snidal, 1989, cited in Li, 2008b, p.121), such as conducting interviews with 
Chinese foreign aid officials who were stationed in multiple African recipient countries, and 
researching on government websites for more comparable projects and programs, this study 
has not found all the contributing factors to China's foreign aid outcomes in Africa, nor does 
it explain China's entire foreign aid activity on the continent. Yet, while quantitative data are 
important in studying foreign aid, especially in assessing foreign aid performance, this study 
adopts an in-depth, case study based approach, that is appropriate to the aim of improving 
our understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa, and the complexity of investigating how 
China's foreign aid can be improved in assisting Africa's development. 
 
Structural Layout 
 
With a view to providing a legend for this study, as well as situating it in existing knowledge, 
following the introduction of this chapter, chapter two investigates the diverse discussions of 
the term foreign aid, and reviews existing literature on China's foreign aid in Africa. Whilst 
aimed at bringing the different definitions, categorisations and interpretations of foreign aid 
to the same ground so as to find the links that connect existing studies, the first section of 
this chapter delves into the various definitions of foreign aid utilised by different foreign aid 
research and participating parties. Building on an organised foundation, the second section 
then looks into a range of Chinese and English language based studies on the topic from both 
official and academic sources. On the basis of examining these studies in three groups based 
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on the objectives proposed by this study for a more coherent understanding (the studies that 
understood China's foreign aid development, the studies that assessed China's foreign aid 
performance and the studies that investigated China's foreign aid shortcomings), this section 
finds the gaps and confusing areas that remain. 
 
Subsequent to contextualising this study with previous knowledge, the following chapters 
begin to pursue the objectives set to improve our understanding of China's foreign in Africa. 
Purposed to identify China's foreign aid objectives in Africa, and the foreign aid planning and 
implementation approaches it accordingly developed, the first objective of understanding 
China's foreign aid development in Africa is carried out chronologically through chapter three 
and four. Of these, chapter three focuses on the emergence and the early development of 
China's foreign aid in Africa. Beginning with 1955, when the Bandung Conference promoted 
the first modern contact of China and Africa, and ending with 1993, when China's planned 
economic system was exploited to the limit, this chapter studies the development of China's 
foreign aid in four periods: The Beginning (1955-1963), The Development (1963-1970), The 
Outrageous (1971-1978), and The Initial Reform (1979-1993), and investigates how China's 
foreign aid objectives evolved from building African industrial and agricultural foundations to 
reducing expenditure while consolidating foreign aid outcomes. 
 
After grasping the initial development of China's foreign aid in Africa in chapter three, with 
the same purpose of identifying China's foreign aid objectives in Africa and its accordingly 
developed foreign aid planning and implementation approaches, chapter four focuses on the 
contemporary development of China's foreign aid in Africa. Beginning with 1994, when the 
new market economic system brought along the funding method of the Concessional Loan, 
and ending with 2012, when the latest FOCAC meeting held in Beijing proposed to open up 
new prospects for a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership, this chapter examines 
the development of China's foreign aid in two periods: The Further Reform (1994-2004), and 
The Return (2005-present). Whilst exploring how China's traditional foreign aid worked with 
its contemporary foreign aid, chapter four investigates China's current foreign aid objective 
of improving people's livelihoods. In addition to surveying the contemporary development of 
China's foreign aid in Africa, the second half of chapter four presents a detailed breakdown 
of China's current foreign aid setup. 
 
Upon identifying the objectives of China's foreign aid in Africa, and the foreign aid planning 
and implementation approaches it accordingly developed to secure these objectives, chapter 
five brings this study to the implementation sites of China's foreign aid in Africa with a view 
to achieving the second objective of this study: to assess the performance of China's foreign 
aid in Africa. Purposed to demonstrate the effectiveness and sustainability of China's foreign 
aid in assisting African recipient countries' development, and finding the factors that affect 
these outcomes, chapter five visits three foreign aid packages that China delivered to Africa 
according to its successively implemented foreign aid objectives in the past 60 years. To be 
specific, these are: the Magbass Sugar Complex (Sierra Leone, 1982), the National Theatre 
(Ghana, 1992), and the Lekma Hospital (Ghana, 2010). Apart from bringing forth a practical 
view to the development of China's foreign aid in Africa, this chapter compares and searches 
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for the factors that affect the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa in the focusing areas 
of industry, agriculture, social infrastructure, and medicine and public health. 
 
Subsequent to revealing the rather disappointing outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa, 
and finding the factors that affect its performance, chapter six turns the focus back to the 
development of China's foreign aid in Africa with the aim of fulfilling the third objective of 
this study – to investigate the successes and failures of China's foreign aid in approaching the 
factors that affect its outcomes in Africa. Purposed to identify the hidden factors within the 
development of China's foreign aid itself that undermine its foreign aid outcomes in Africa, 
and therefore shed light on the development of China's foreign aid, this chapter individually 
surveys the decision-making processes of China's foreign aid objectives, the allocation and 
packaging of China's foreign aid projects and programs, and the handling and supervision 
arrangements of China's foreign aid implementation. Not only does it offer an in-depth study 
of the current operation and arrangement of China's foreign aid, but upon understanding the 
underlying Chinese characteristics of China's foreign aid, chapter six also explores practical 
solutions that may improve the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa. 
 
As a result of meeting the objectives aimed at understanding China's foreign aid in Africa, 
chapter seven concludes this study by recapping the development of China's foreign aid in 
Africa centred around the intention to build friendly foreign relationships. In addition to 
highlighting China's largely unimproved foreign aid outcomes in assisting African recipient 
countries' development, and the shortcomings that China's foreign aid must overcome, it 
summarises the ways in which China's foreign aid may make more contributions to African 
recipient countries' development. 
 
Original Contributions 
 
Benefiting from exclusive, first-hand data and the ability to read both Chinese and English, 
this study contributes to the current research on foreign aid, indeed, the understanding of 
China's foreign aid in Africa in three main aspects. As such: first, this study brings important 
interviews with key decision-makers of China's foreign aid and new case studies of China's 
foreign aid projects and programs. In the attempt to understand China's foreign aid in Africa, 
this study goes into detail both the places where it began (the Ministry of Commerce of the 
PRC) and where it is duly implemented (the African recipient countries). Second, this study 
integrates the concept of friendship into the Western study of China's foreign aid. Being one 
of the most fundamental interests of Beijing for providing foreign aid, friendship is frequently 
overlooked by Western researchers, and patriotically interpreted by Chinese researchers. On 
the basis of exclusive interviews and case studies, not only does this study provide empirical 
evidences that China's (traditional) foreign aid is driven by friendship, but it also critically 
examines how this friendship influenced the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa. 
 
Third, this study proposes a new framework assessing the performance of China's foreign aid 
in Africa. Instead of the previously adopted frameworks which were either based on specific 
projects or programs, or an individual development area, with a view to maximise the scope 
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of the assessment on China's foreign aid, this study assesses China's foreign aid performance 
according to each of its distinct foreign aid objectives in Africa. In doing so, not only is this 
study thus enabled to provide an alternative view of how the development of China's foreign 
aid is related to its foreign aid outcomes, but by reaching four main focusing areas of China's 
foreign aid (industry, agriculture, social infrastructure26, and medicine and public health), and 
all of China's foreign aid implementation methods (Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid, 
Goods and Materials Aid, Human Resource Development Cooperation, Medical Teams) bar 
the recent Overseas Volunteer Programs, it also presents a comparative view of how China's 
foreign aid is performed in different focusing areas, as well as a clearer understanding of how 
China's foreign aid implementation methods worked with and influenced each other. 
 
On the whole, this study in understanding China's foreign aid in Africa finds China's foreign 
aid in Africa as simple yet complicated. It is simple because for most of the time there is only 
one goal that the Chinese government is aimed to pursuit – friendship. At the same time, it is 
complicated because this friendship has been secured through miscellaneous projects and 
programs that are planned and implemented according to various foreign aid objectives. In 
essence, this study suggests that whilst aimed at helping African recipient countries achieve 
self-reliance, China's foreign aid is driven by the underlying political consideration of building 
friendly foreign relationships. Although on the one hand, this friendship is bringing China's 
foreign aid both the uniqueness that is welcomed by all African recipient countries and the 
largely unconstrained planning framework, on the other hand, it is also undermining China's 
foreign aid outcomes in Africa. In the end, as this study points out, if China could attach as 
much importance to the improvement of its foreign aid capacity as it is now emphasising on 
friendship, China's foreign aid may make more impact on Africa's development. 
 
 
                                                          
26
 Categorised as "public facilities" in The White Paper. See p.23, GOVERNMENT OF CHINA 2011. China's Foreign 
Aid, Beijing: People's Press. 
14 
 
 
Chapter Two: Foreign Aid – Measurements and Studies 
 
Subsequent to drawing the blueprint for this study, as an initial step towards improving our 
understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa, chapter two first looks into the terminology of 
foreign aid and existing literature. In the interests of establishing a legend and a landscape 
for this study, as well as integrating it with prior knowledge and indicating its whereabouts, 
this chapter is arranged in two sections inquiring: What is foreign aid? And how has China's 
foreign aid in Africa been researched? Of these, the first question was particularly aroused 
during the desktop research of this study. Whilst looking through a large number of studies 
that individually investigated Bilateral Aid, Development Aid, Agricultural Aid and so on, what 
was the linkage between these books and journals? Do these studies correspond to different 
sub-categories of researching foreign aid, or were these studies simply carried out utilising 
different language interpretations and recognitions of foreign aid? Or further to the essence 
of this disorientation – in the realm of foreign aid, is there a common ground that suits all 
these differences and provides an universal understanding? 
 
Undoubtedly, to give a definitive description to such international behaviour that is driven by 
complex motivations is not a straightforward task. Even amongst the noted international 
organisations such as the DAC, the WB and the IMF, different criteria summarises different 
scopes of foreign aid – development assistance. Provided this tangled situation, should one's 
research rely on the donor country's description of foreign aid? This can be problematic. For 
instance, in The White Paper, it stated, "Concessional Loans are mainly used to help recipient 
countries to undertake productive projects generating both economic and social benefits and 
large and medium-sized infrastructure projects" (2011, p.8); then two pages over, it wrote in 
the "Forms of Foreign Aid" section, "Complete projects refer to productive or civil projects 
constructed in recipient countries with the help of financial resources provided by China as 
Grants or Interest-free Loans" (2011, p.10). In light of these official definitions, what is then 
the form of foreign aid employed that happen to be delivering a productive project financed 
by Concessional Loan, for instance, the Bui Dam project in Ghana?1 
 
To shed light on the confusions created by different foreign aid research and participating 
parties, and finding the linkage to these prior understandings, the first section of this chapter 
is sorted with a deconstruction of foreign aid. By exploring the diverse criteria, perspectives 
and approaches adopted by different governments, organisations and research, it provides a 
scheme for understanding China's foreign aid in Africa. After drawing the preferences of prior 
knowledge to the same basis, the second section then reviews existing studies conducted in 
both Chinese and English languages. To put this review into a learning sequence that echoes 
the objectives proposed by this study, these existing studies are thus organised into three 
groups according to the emphases of these objectives. Specifically, understanding China's 
                                                          
1
 In particular this confusion raised by The White Paper on China's Foreign Aid (2011), the second release of The 
White Paper on China's Foreign Aid (2014) also did not manage to clarify. See 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2014-07/10/content_2715467.htm, accessed 6 June 2015. 
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foreign aid development, assessing China's foreign aid performance and investigating China's 
foreign aid shortcomings. In sum, chapter two serves as a literature review of this study and 
preludes the understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa. On the basis of integrating prior 
knowledge, it identifies the gaps and confusing areas of the literature that still remain. 
 
What is Foreign Aid 
关于对外援助的理解 
 
In the understanding of this most distinguished international behaviour of the 20th century, 
foreign aid is usually recognised in many different ways. Whilst generally speaking, according 
to the Oxford Dictionary, "Foreign Aid" is plainly defined as "Money, food, or other resources 
given or lent by one country to another",2 in the exploration of international relations, the 
understanding of foreign aid is noticeably more complicated. Besides this study particularly 
concerned foreign aid – development assistance, or as the DAC coined: Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), in reference to the nature of the foreign aid, indeed that is the intention of 
providing this money, food, or other resources, foreign aid can also be regarded as: Military 
Aid (usually delivered in the interest of promoting military capacities of the recipient country 
or group), Humanitarian Aid (usually aimed to help the recipient country or group to recover 
from emergency situations such as conflicts or natural disasters), Peacekeeping (intended to 
establish conditions that favour lasting peace) and participations in International Multilateral 
Aid (usually utilised by International Multilateral Aid agencies for various intentions).3 
 
With particular concerns to the ODA, in spite of that it is clearly defined by the DAC as: The 
official and concessional part of resource flows to developing countries that is administered 
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its 
main objective,4 considering the substance of these parts of resource flows, it is yet farther 
diversely recognised. Not only based on varied criteria, the scope of these parts of resource 
flows is individually outlined by different foreign aid research and participating parties, but 
depending on the various perspectives adopted by these parties, such as the participants, 
the financial resources of these parts of resource flows and so forth, they are also frequently 
put into different categories. Even considering the research that are aimed to help explaining 
this international behaviour, diversified approaches also lead to different interpretations. In 
view of this situation, for the purpose of providing an overview of the theme of this study, 
this section first delves into the broadly accepted criteria, perspectives and approaches to 
find out where China's foreign aid resides in these miscellaneous understandings. 
 
The Scopes of Foreign Aid 
At first, this study surveys the varied criteria introduced by different foreign aid research and 
participating parties in recognising the scope of foreign aid. On the basis of the above stated 
ODA definition given by the DAC, there are two internationally accepted criteria. To be exact, 
                                                          
2
 See http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/foreign-aid?q=foreign+aid, accessed 11 February 
2015. 
3
 Interview with senior Chinese researcher, Beijing, China, 22 November 2011. 
4
 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm, accessed 11 
February 2015. 
16 
 
the DAC's criteria (for recognising the scope of foreign aid to ODA recipients and ODA eligible 
organisations5), and the WB and IMF's criteria (for recognising the scope of foreign aid to 
Low-income Country[ies], LICs6): 
 
1. The DAC's Criteria 
In accordance with the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, foreign aid (ODA) is the part of resource flows to developing 
countries that is provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by 
their executive agencies, and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at 
least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).7 
 
2. The WB and the IMF's Criteria 
Based on the revision implemented in October 2013, the WB and the IMF currently adopt a 
single, fixed and unified rate of discount to calculate the grant element of the resource flows 
(foreign aid) to LICs. In contrast to the previous rate of discount based on currency-specific 
Commercial Interest Reference Rates (CIRRs)8, the new rate of discount is set at 5 per cent 
and will be calculated based only on the USD value of the resource flows only. 
 
The Categories of Foreign Aid 
Secondly, this study looks into the perspectives adopted by different foreign aid research and 
participating parties in categorising foreign aid. Apart from the earlier introduced greater 
categories, which determined by the nature of the foreign aid, with regards to development 
assistance in particular, there also are four broadly adopted perspectives used for classifying 
its conduct. Namely: the participants of the foreign aid, the financial resources of the foreign 
aid, the packaging of the foreign aid and the focusing area of the foreign aid.9 
 
1. The Participants of the Foreign Aid 
According to the channel of circulation of the foreign aid, the exercise of foreign aid is usually 
divided into two main categories: Bilateral Aid and Multilateral Aid. 
 
Bilateral Aid 
双边援助 
                                                          
5
 For the DAC List of ODA Recipients, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm; for List of ODA eligible 
organisations, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/annex2-procedure.htm, accessed 11 February 2015. 
6
 For List of Low-income Country[ies], see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups, 
accessed 11 February 2015. 
7
 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm, accessed 11 
February 2015. 
8
 Commercial Interest Reference Rates only applies to the currencies of the participating countries of the OECD, 
which excludes China. See http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/rates.htm, accessed 11 February 2015. 
9
 See LI, X., TANG, L. & WU, J. 2009. International Development Assistance: Evolution, Management and 
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Bilateral Aid refers to the foreign aid that the donor country directly transfers resources to its 
recipient countries. Although in recent years, there has been an increase in participation in 
International Multilateral Aid, provided that "around 70% of ODA from the DAC participating 
countries are Bilateral Aid at any given time" (Zhang, 2012b, p.27), Bilateral Aid remains the 
primary practice in development assistance. As far as implementation is concerned, Bilateral 
Aid is considerably easier to process than International Multilateral Aid, more importantly, 
whilst Bilateral Aid only involves the donor and the recipient country as the participants, it 
also "grants the donor country much greater flexibility in terms of integrating particular aims 
to its foreign aid so that the donor country can achieve its national interests and establish its 
national image" (Ding, 2010, p.19). 
 
Multilateral Aid 
多边援助 
On the basis of that participations in International Multilateral Aid are generally not regarded 
as development assistance, in the study of China's foreign aid, the term of Multilateral Aid is 
recognised differently from traditional English language based foreign aid studies. Instead of 
referring to donations to International Multilateral Aid agencies, Multilateral Aid, particularly 
in Chinese language based literatures, refers only to "China's foreign aid to multiple recipient 
countries"10. For example, one training program that China organised enrolling participants 
from several recipient countries. With the view of separating China's Multilateral Aid from its 
participations in International Multilateral Aid, as one senior Chinese researcher suggested, 
"All of China's participations in International Multilateral Aid are detailed and stated as it is in 
Chinese language based literatures, including official publications"11. 
 
2. The Financial Resources of the Foreign Aid 
On the ground of the financial resources of the foreign aid, the majority of foreign aid can be 
classified into two main categories: Grand Aid and Loan Aid. 
 
Grant Aid 
无偿援助 
Grant Aid is the type of foreign aid in which the donor country transfers resources to its 
recipient countries without any financial reservations. With Grant Aid, the recipient country 
is not held responsible for compensating the resources received, meaning that it can use the 
resources free of charge and need not repay the principal or interest. As for the recipient 
country, this is one of the most enjoyable types of foreign aid, although towards the donor 
country, since Grant Aid is practically organised on a donation basis, the scale of Grand Aid is 
generally small in comparison to Loan Aid. 
 
Loan Aid 
贷款援助 
In contrast to Grant Aid, Loan Aid refers to the foreign aid which the recipient country is held 
responsible for compensating the resources received. Although this is the most challenging 
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 Interview with senior Chinese official, Beijing, China, 16 November 2011. 
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 Interview with senior Chinese researcher, Beijing, China, 22 November 2011. 
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type of foreign aid to determine – based on varied criteria, one could be regarded as foreign 
aid and the other is not, given the opportunity of receiving both principal and interests, Loan 
Aid is the preferred practice by most donor countries. Considering the recipient country, 
while the resources borrowed from donor countries complement the domestic shortage, the 
lower interest rate and longer repayment period also are acceptable in favour. 
 
3. The Packaging of the Foreign Aid 
Depending on the ways of how the foreign aid is utilised, indeed that is the contents of the 
foreign aid packages, foreign aid is primarily studied in two categories. In particular: Project 
Aid and Programme Aid. 
 
Project Aid 
项目援助 
Project Aid concerns the foreign aid which the donor country applies its foreign aid budget 
directly in the assistance of particular development projects in the recipient countries. Other 
than constructing development facilities such as factories, roads and hospitals, the programs 
organised for training human resources, medical assistances and so on are also regarded as 
Project Aid. At present, Project Aid is the most common type of foreign aid utilised by both 
emerging and traditional donor countries. 
 
Programme Aid 
方案援助 
Programme Aid refers to the foreign aid that is supporting particular development plans in 
the recipient countries. Instead of building or organising specific foreign aid projects, it is in 
general utilised for import allocations, budget subsidies, allowance for balance of payments, 
debt repayment and regional development planning. Besides frequently employed by the UN 
Development System for International Multilateral Aid, Programme Aid is especially favoured 
by traditional foreign aid donor countries. 
 
4. The Focusing Area of the Foreign Aid 
In reference to the development areas that the foreign aid is intended to assist, foreign aid is 
also often put into several different categories. Of which, the most common categories are: 
Industrial Aid and Agricultural Aid. 
 
Industrial Aid 
工业援助 
As the name suggests, Industrial Aid mainly involves the foreign aid that is aimed to promote 
the recipient country's industrial development. Provided the scale and complexities of most 
industrial projects, this particular type of foreign aid is usually financed by Loan Aid, and it is 
delivered through Project Aid including a combination of the construction of the project and 
training programs. Where the recipient country require, Industrial Aid at times also include 
the marketing of the final product. 
 
Agricultural Aid 
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农业援助 
Similar to Industrial Aid, Agricultural Aid is referred to the foreign aid that is aimed to assist 
the recipient country's agricultural development. Owing to the relatively longer period of 
investment, Agricultural Aid is also commonly financed by Loan Aid, and it is delivered via 
Project Aid generally involving the dispatch of agricultural experts, the building of farmland, 
irrigation stations, agricultural technology demonstration centres and the supply of related 
agricultural machineries, implements and materials. 
 
The Interpretations of Foreign Aid 
At last, this study investigates the diversified approaches employed by different foreign aid 
research and participating parties in understanding foreign aid. Principally concerned for the 
intentions, influences as well as the applications of foreign aid, the understandings of foreign 
aid are mainly carried out through two pathways at the suggestions of mainstream political 
theories, to be exact: the donor country centred approach and the recipient country centred 
approach. 
 
1. The Donor Country Centred Approach 
The donor country centred approach is derived from the research of international relations. 
On the basis of addressing the central question of why foreign aid is provided (Wang, 2004a), 
this approach is primarily focused on the donor countries' foreign aid motives, exercises and 
how their foreign aid performed in accordance with their own development interests. Of this 
approach, Idealism and Realism are the most commonly adopted theories to interpret this 
donor-recipient relationship.12 Concentrated on the role of moral consciousness and public 
opinions in the decision-making of foreign aid, idealism sees foreign aid the obligation of rich 
countries. Whilst suggesting "the citizens of developed countries have a moral responsibility 
to support the poor peoples in developing countries" (Liu, 2005, p.85), idealism believes that 
foreign aid is a genuine gift to the developing countries and therefore should not be tied up 
with specific interests of the donor countries. In addition to attaching importance to the 
promotion of international cooperation, it also calls upon the application of International 
Multilateral Aid (Zhang, 2012a). 
 
Realism on the other hand stresses on the national interests of donor countries through the 
implementations of foreign aid. Based upon the argument that all states are struggling for 
power in an anarchic international system, it considers foreign aid as an instrument of the 
donor countries for pursuing their national interests, particularly under the circumstances 
where national interests cannot be secured by military means and traditional methods of 
diplomacy are only in part appropriate. In the research for a political theory of foreign aid, 
Morgenthau identified six types of foreign aid, namely: humanitarian foreign aid, subsistence 
foreign aid (for the prevention of potential breakdowns of order and the disintegration of 
organised society), military foreign aid, bribery (for purchasing favours), prestige foreign aid 
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 See for example, ARNOLD, G. 1985. Aid and the Third World: The North-South Divide, London: Robert Royce Ltd; 
STOKKE, O. 1989. Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute; RIDDELL, R. 1987. Foreign 
Aid Reconsidered, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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(for the illusion of economic development) and foreign aid for economic development (1962, 
pp.301-304). Of these distinct types of foreign aid, while humanitarian aid is the only one per 
se non-political, as his theory indicated, within a political context, it as well is in the nature of 
bribes like all other types of foreign aid and is purposed for national interests (ibid.). 
 
Further to Morgenthau's interpretation of foreign aid, Waltz pointed out that in the state of 
anarchy where the great powers of the world compete and striving for security, foreign aid is 
a tool for pursuing hegemony (2010). Whilst military aid directly strengthens the security of a 
bipolar world, economic aid secures alliances and particularly aid to the cause of "make and 
maintain world order" (ibid., p.200). Moreover, as a more radical realism argued, via "the use 
of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid… if conditions are not met 
by the recipient. Foreign aid is used as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor which 
the recipient government would not otherwise have agreed to" (Stokke, 2013, pp.11-12). 
Nonetheless, despite how foreign aid is used in an anarchic world, while it essentially serves 
national interests, as realists suggested, the effectiveness of foreign aid should be measured 
in terms of how it benefited the donor country's interests rather than how it contributed to 
the recipient country's development, and when donor countries plan foreign aid, primary 
considerations should be given to their own circumstances and interests (Deng, 2009). 
 
2. The Recipient Country Centred Approach 
Instead of focusing on how donor countries' various intentions and exercises shaped foreign 
aid, the recipient country centred approach emphasises on the recipient country's intentions 
in receiving the foreign aid, as well as how different foreign aid influenced its development. 
Even though foreign aid begins from the donor countries, these theories believe that when 
the recipient country receives the foreign aid, it is not entirely situated in a passive position. 
Meaning that the recipient country has the freedom to accept or reject the foreign aid, or 
indeed to combine its domestic development demands with its relationship with the donor 
countries to determine which donor country's foreign aid to receive (Zhang, 2012a). From 
this standpoint, given the assumption that foreign aid "is simply a resource at the disposal of 
governments, like any other resource" at the time when it arrived at the recipient countries 
(White, 1974, p.132), as these theories pointed out, "The aid 'contract' should thus seek to 
improve the [foreign aid] agents' incentives to use aid effectively, given the circumstances of 
the developing country" (Paul, 2006, p.1). 
 
China's Foreign Aid 
 
All in all, on the ground of the above identified definitions of foreign aid, with exceptions of a 
margin of government foreign aid budget being utilised for Military Aid, Humanitarian Aid, 
Peacekeeping and participation in International Multilateral Aid, it can be found that based 
on the information given by The White Paper (2011), China's foreign aid is primarily arranged 
as bilateral development assistance following the aim of helping recipient countries achieve 
self-reliance. Whilst China's Grand Aid and Loan Aid (Interest-free Loan; Concessional Loan) 
measure up to both the DAC and the UN and IMF's criteria, it is comprehensively focused on 
improving the recipient countries' development capacities in industry, agricultural, economic 
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infrastructure, public facilities, education, medicine and public health, and clean energy and 
coping with climate change. In the delivery of these development assistance to developing 
countries, China's foreign aid is overall packaged as Project Aid assorting six implementation 
methods of Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid, Goods and Materials Aid, Human Resource 
Development Cooperation, Medical Teams and Overseas Volunteer Programs. 
 
With particular attention given to the interpretation of China's foreign aid, whilst neither the 
donor country centred approach nor the recipient country centred approach is able to supply 
a comprehensive understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa – the former only took into 
account the donor countries' interests in providing the foreign aid, but failed to consider how 
it influenced the recipient countries' development; the latter only grasped how the recipient 
countries utilised the foreign aid, but not answering why the foreign aid is given in the first 
place. This study first adopts the donor country centred approach as a basic framework to 
understand this relation in between China and Africa, so as to explain why China provides 
foreign aid to African countries. And then, in the interest of completing this understanding 
and exploring how China's foreign aid can be further improved in assisting African recipient 
countries' development, this study supplements this donor country centred approach with 
observations on China's foreign aid projects and programs to find out how China's foreign aid 
influenced African recipient countries' development at the domestic level. 
 
How has China's Foreign Aid in Africa been Researched 
关于中国对非援助的研究 
 
After looking into the term of foreign aid and identifying its various definitions, this section 
reviews existing literature on the topic. Ever since the swift takeoff of modern China-Africa 
relationship in the late-1990s, the interest in this arguably the most important international 
relations of the 21st century has along grew dramatically. With an eye to China's more than 
doubled foreign aid input, and its massively increased investment in Africa, every step that 
China has taken on this promising continent attracts tremendous attention. However, in spite 
of this great interest, whilst the studies on foreign aid13, and indeed, China-Africa relations14 
are fast expanding, the studies that particularly focused on China's foreign aid in Africa are 
still remaining noticeably limited. Besides only some efforts were made to understand the 
development and the practices of China's foreign aid in Africa, even less is known about how 
it benefited Africa's development. Having in mind this situation, in the interest of specifying 
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the gaps and confusing areas in prior knowledge and situating this study, this section now 
investigates what have we already learnt about China's foreign aid in Africa. 
 
Before reviewing the existing literature, there is one point and two books that need to be 
first mentioned. First, with regard to the structure of this literature review, even though this 
study attempts to organise these literatures into three groups – according to the objectives 
purposed by this study for a more coherent understanding – the existing body of literature is 
nonetheless diverse and multi-dimensional. Similar to the various discussions of foreign aid 
delved into earlier, on that basis of that there are no fixed model for studying foreign aid, the 
existing studies surrounding China's foreign aid in Africa have been carried out on different 
grounds and set out for miscellaneous objectives. Although the intention to provide a linear 
way of categorising existing literatures is tempting, this is proven to be a difficult task. Hence 
to avoid arbitrary categorisation for the sake of linear categorisation, this study reviews and 
discusses existing literatures based on the objectives they have chosen understanding the 
development, the performance and the shortcomings of China's foreign aid in Africa, as well 
as the approaches they utilised to achieve these objectives. 
 
Secondly, on the basis of this complicated situation, which involved with diverse approaches 
and objectives, towards a greater view of China's foreign aid in Africa, there are two arguably 
comprehensive books: namely, Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries (对外经济合作, 
石林, 1989) by Shi Lin, and The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (2009) by 
Deborah Brautigam. Having practically founded the Chinese study of China's foreign aid, Shi 
has extensively recorded the development of China's foreign aid before the 1990s. Albeit not 
specifically aimed at understanding China's foreign aid in Africa, but benefited from being 
one of the primary decision-makers of China's foreign aid the author himself,15 not only has 
Shi observed and assessed the performance of China's foreign aid with exclusive figures, field 
reports and government documents, but he also objectively criticised the works of China's 
foreign aid and proposed practical development suggestions. Unique to the study of China's 
foreign aid during the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976), Economic Cooperation with 
Foreign Countries is arguably the only Chinese resource available to the public. 
 
Whereas concerning Brautigam's book – completed upon her valuable insights and extensive 
fieldwork carried out in both China and Africa, The Dragon's Gift has scholarly brought the 
understanding of China' foreign aid in Africa to the West, and clarified a number of prevalent 
myths via a realist approach (Marks, 2010). Whilst aimed at revealing China's real foreign aid 
activities, it also aptly extended to the greater scope of the whole of China's involvement on 
the continent – the investments, the immigrants and other various by-products that China's 
foreign aid has brought along to its recipient countries. Especially in an attempt to figure out 
China's foreign aid expenditure, Brautigam has made notable effort in distinguishing China's 
foreign aid input and its government investment. Additionally, she has also placed particular 
focus on China's industrial and agricultural aid. In all, as Brautigam suggests, China's foreign 
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aid serves its national interests like any other foreign aid and is based on the development 
experience of itself; and the investments, trades and technologies that this foreign aid along 
brings, "may be the dragon's ultimate, ambiguous gift" to Africa (2009, p.312). 
 
Still, even though these two important literatures built a solid foundation for understanding 
China's foreign aid in Africa, whilst Shi's study is completely out of date, Brautigam's study 
remains a Western approach – it only to some extent understood China's foreign aid from 
the Chinese perspective. In particular the drive of China's foreign aid in Africa, on the basis of 
arguing that it is provided for three reasons: "strategic diplomacy, commercial benefit, and as 
a reflection of society’s ideologies and values" (ibid., p.15), she almost automatically deemed 
friendship – which at least is one of the primary interests of Beijing, a "rosy picture" (ibid., 
p.3). Furthermore, in the assessment of China's foreign aid outcomes, despite Brautigam did 
survey how China's domestic politics, ideologies and various other factors shaped its foreign 
aid, upon going into details China's current institutional setup for foreign aid, she only 
broadly discussed how this arrangement influenced China's foreign aid outcomes in Africa. 
Nevertheless, in addition to these two arguably all sided literatures, how have other studies 
understood the development, the performance and the shortcomings of China's foreign aid? 
 
Studies that Understood the Development of China's Foreign Aid 
In reference to the studies that surveyed the development of China's foreign aid, one recent 
Chinese publication needs to be first mentioned – Zhang Yuhui's Research of China's Foreign 
Aid 1950-2010 (中国对外援助研究 1950-2010, 张郁慧, 2012). Based on her PhD thesis and 
her expertise in History Studies, Zhang has thoroughly investigated into the evolution of the 
motivations, objectives and practices of China's foreign aid over the past six decades, and 
introduced a great amount of first hand data regarding the scales and distributions of China's 
foreign aid in different development periods. Although similar to Economic Cooperation with 
Foreign Countries (Shi, 1989), Zhang's study is not specifically focused on China's foreign aid 
in Africa, but built on a theoretical foundation which integrated with Chinese ideologies and 
Western understandings, Zhang has successfully brought our understanding to an academic 
ground and carried it to the present day. However, a lack of empirical evidences to practically 
examine the development of China's foreign aid and to support her arguments for improving 
China's foreign aid is the main shortcoming of this otherwise inclusive study. 
 
Apart from this dedicated literature on China's foreign aid development, the development of 
China's foreign aid in Africa has been surveyed with various intentions in mind. Whilst a small 
number of Chinese studies delved into the development of China's foreign aid in Africa for 
the purpose of grasping China's economic cooperation with foreign countries (see Li, 2003; 
Liu, 2009), and enhancing an understanding on China-Africa relations (see Zhang, 2006a; Li, 
2006a), the majority of these studies are carried out for two objectives – exploring China's 
motivations for providing foreign aid and investigating how China delivers its foreign aid. 
With regard to the studies that read China's motivations, most of these studies have come to 
the conclusion that China's foreign aid is driven by national interests – whether political or 
economic, or both, depending on the development period (see Sun, 2007; Davies et al., 2008; 
Wang and Zhu, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Li, 2010; Zhang, 2010). In addition to some Chinese 
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studies (see Bin, 2008; Zhang, 2012b), Lengauer's China's Foreign Aid Policy: Motive and 
Method (2011) is one of the rare English studies which also surveyed the development of 
China's foreign aid in Africa taking into account its cultural influences. 
 
Whereas concerning the studies that surveyed how China delivers its foreign aid, Economic 
Cooperation with Foreign Countries (Shi, 1989) remains the only literature that demonstrated 
the development of all the aspects of China's foreign aid arrangement (including institutions, 
operating mechanisms, planning and implementation approaches). Albeit much dated, whilst 
recent studies attempted to update this understanding, the majority of these only captured 
the evolvement of some aspects of China's foreign aid arrangement (see Chaponniere, 2009; 
He, 2011). Amongst the scholars who focused on China's foreign aid arrangement, Huang 
Meibo (黄梅波) is one of the most noteworthy given that he has consistently followed the 
development of China's foreign aid institutions, operating mechanisms, and implementation 
approaches (see Huang, 2007; Huang and Hu, 2009; Huang and Lang, 2010). Besides these 
studies which particularly surveyed the development of China's foreign aid arrangement, 
there also are studies that looked into its current setup (see Lancaster, 2007; Mao, 2012), 
and provided diagrams illustrating its administrating and funding processes (see Chin and 
Frolic, 2007; Zhou, 2008b; Davies et al., 2008; Brautigam, 2009). 
 
However, whilst most of these studies are limited in explaining the development of all the 
aspects of China's foreign aid arrangement but to some extent complement each other, two 
studies need to be specifically pointed out given that they have provided inaccurate and 
inappropriate understandings. To be specific, How China Delivers Development Assistance to 
Africa (Davies et al., 2008) first inappropriately examined "grant aid & technical assistance" 
(ibid., p.11) together – as the former is a funding method and the latter is an implementation 
method of China's foreign aid. Within the same section, it also inaccurately suggested that 
"technical assistance from China is often in the form of turnkey joint ventures" (ibid., p.11), 
since technical assistance16 is mainly carried out as onsite training courses;17 Secondly, on 
the basis of again improperly grouping "concessional finance & interest-free loans" (ibid., 
p.12) – as the former is funded mostly by commercial funding from China EXIM Bank and the 
latter is entirely relied on China's government foreign aid budget, it is incorrect by asserting 
that "these are medium to long-term loans with an emphasis on the profitability of projects" 
(ibid., p.12), whilst the latter is emphasised only on promoting development.18 
 
The other problematic study that gave inaccurate understandings regarding China's foreign 
aid arrangement is Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The China 
Case (Chin and Frolic, 2007). Whilst arguing that this is study is built on complete imagination 
may be a (small) step too far, the legitimate information in this study is indeed scarce. To give 
some examples, this study was instituted on a misleading ground by indicating that the grant 
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 Technical assistance is known as Technical Aid in this study. 
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 More detailed discussion regarding the funding and implementation methods of China's foreign aid is located 
at the second half of chapter four in the "China's Foreign Aid in Africa: The Current Planning and Implementation 
Approaches" section. 
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chapter four in the "The Funding Methods of China's Foreign Aid" section. 
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portion of China's foreign aid is managed by four organisations – "Ministry of Commerce 
(known as MOFCOM in this study), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, select line ministries19, and 
the International Liaison Office of the CCP Central Committee" (ibid., p.6) – its management 
should be led by the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of 
Finance, and jointly participated by 19 other government institutions.20 Then, while placing 
a specific emphasis on China's "Support for Research for Development" (ibid., p.9), this study 
even went as far as claiming that "MOFCOM administers 90 percent of all grant aid, while 
MOST [Ministry of Science and Technology] controls 10 percent" (ibid., p.8) – neither with a 
reference nor is remotely true at any given point in the history of China's foreign aid.21 
 
Nevertheless, despite the contributions that these existing studies have made to improve our 
understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa, on the basis of only a small number of them 
were especially concerned about explaining the development of China's foreign aid in Africa 
with the impact of Chinese characteristics in mind, and most of them insufficiently illustrated 
the development of China's foreign aid arrangement, the main gap amongst these studies is 
a lack of empirical evidences to practically examine the development of China's foreign aid in 
Africa. Regardless of whether aimed at exploring China's motivations for providing foreign 
aid or investigating how it delivers foreign aid, the majority of these studies only managed to 
survey the development of China's foreign aid in Africa through theoretical approaches and 
policy analyses. Apart from only few studies integrated with recent case studies (see Davies 
et al., 2008) and brief case studies (see Liu, 1998; Zhang, 2012b), it is again the two arguably 
all sided literatures (Shi, 1989, and Brautigam, 2009) additionally provided a practical view to 
the development of China's foreign aid in Africa. 
 
Studies that Assessed the Performance of China's Foreign Aid 
With regard to the studies that assessed the performance of China's foreign aid, the majority 
of these studies are based on specific projects or programs, or an individual focusing area of 
China's foreign aid in Africa. Besides some studies such as Grimm et al.'s Coordinating China 
and DAC Development Partners: Challenges to the Aid Architecture in Rwanda (2010) which 
assessed the performance of China's foreign aid with a view to find out the possibilities of 
cooperation in between China and traditional foreign aid donor countries, most of these 
studies are emphasised on two objectives – assessing how China's foreign aid influenced the 
recipient countries' development, and investigating how the outcomes of China's foreign aid 
are being affected. Concerning the studies that assessed the effectiveness and sustainability 
of China's foreign aid in Africa, these studies are primarily carried out by academic scholars. 
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Whilst specific projects or programs are plenty (see Li, 2009; Yu and Yuan, 2010; Niu, 2011; 
Buckley, 2011), there are studies looked into the focusing areas of agriculture, education, 
and medicine and public health of China's foreign aid in Africa (see Brautigam, 1998; Zhang 
et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2015). 
 
Amongst the studies that focused on specific projects or programs of China's foreign aid in 
Africa, one of the most chosen case study is the Tanzam railway22. While remaining the single 
largest foreign aid project ever undertaken by China, the Tanzam railway has been studied all 
the way from the 1970s (see Yu, 1971) when it was still under construction to now where it is 
still connecting China's two oldest friends on the continent – Tanzania and Zambia (see Chen, 
2012). Not only there are studies particularly surveyed the decision-making (see Lu, 2006; 
Wu, 2008), the implementation (see Bailey, 1976; Jin, 1996), and the operation of the project 
(see Jin, 1987; Anon., 1988c), there also are studies assessed its prospective development 
(see Hu, 2000; Zhang, 2006c). Of these, Jamie Monson's Africa's Freedom Railway: How A 
Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania (2009) is arguably 
one of the most noteworthy studies which specifically and continuously investigated the 
influences of the Tanzam Railway. On the basis of observing that The Eight Principles23 were 
fully realised in the implementation of the project, it pointed out that China's foreign aid is 
aimed at promoting African self-reliance rather than making Africa dependent. 
 
Whereas in reference to the studies that investigated how the outcomes of China's foreign 
aid are being affected, these studies are primarily conducted by foreign aid participants and 
engineering specialists in regard to their working projects.24 Apart from a few studies that 
were positive about the outcomes and prospects of China's foreign aid in Africa (these are 
mainly the studies carried out prior to the 1990s) (see Guo, 1965; Feng, 1987; Anon., 1988a; 
Anon., 1988b), the majority of these studies have raised concerns about the African recipient 
countries' diverse domestic conditions, and thought how their foreign aid projects could 
continue under these drastic political, social and institutional impacts (see Lai, 1995; Li, 2000; 
Li et al., 2010; He, 2013). However, whilst most of these studies are critical – on the one hand, 
China's foreign aid fulfilled the gaps commonly disregarded by Western traditional foreign 
aid donor countries; on the other hand, China's foreign aid resulted in difficulties in terms of 
effectiveness and sustainability – China's foreign aid only to some extent benefited African 
recipient countries' development, the most evident limitation amongst these studies is the 
limitation of case study selection approaches. 
 
To be specific, in addition to a particular favour on specific projects and programs, these 
studies have only reached some focusing areas of China's foreign aid – agriculture, industry, 
economic infrastructure, education, medicine and public health – and left aside one of the 
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 Also known as the TAZARA Railway, or the Uhuru Railway. 
23
 The Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries. Detailed discussion 
regarding this principal guideline for China's foreign aid is located in the "The Development" section in chapter 
three. For full article, see Appendix I. 
24
 These studies are often published via the journal of International Economic Cooperation (国际经济合作). This 
particular journal is edited by the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation – a 
subsidiary academy of the Ministry of Commerce. 
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most important focusing areas of China's foreign aid in Africa: social infrastructure25 (which 
includes both landmark projects and people's livelihoods related projects). Whilst some of 
these studies were able to compare the performance of specific projects and programs in an 
individual focusing area of China's foreign aid in Africa, owing to a lack of a comprehensive 
ground which enables assessment across these focusing areas, these studies are also limited 
in providing a comparative view of how China's foreign aid performed in different focusing 
areas (e.g. is China's industrial aid more appropriate to African recipient countries than social 
infrastructure aid?). As a consequence of these limitations, in spite of the outcomes and the 
contributing factors that these studies have assessed, they do not paint an overall picture of 
how China's foreign aid has performed in Africa. 
 
Studies that Investigated the Shortcomings of China's Foreign Aid 
Concerning the studies that investigated the shortcomings of China's foreign aid, instead of 
assessing the performance of China's foreign aid in Africa, these studies are mainly focused 
on the practices of China's foreign aid itself. Whilst a great of these studies are found to be 
urban myths, and were collectively investigated and made clear by Brautigam (2009), such as 
"China hurts efforts to strengthen democracy and human rights in Africa" (ibid., p.284) – in 
light of China's arguably the most welcoming and famous foreign aid principle: "In providing 
aid to other countries, the Chinese government… never attaches any conditions…"26 (see 
Manning, 2006; McGreal, 2007); "China is making corruption worse" (Brautigam, 2009, p.292) 
– with a view to China's liberal-minded friendship with some of the most corrupted countries 
on the continent and its rather handsome sum of foreign aid input in them (see Naim, 2007; 
Malone, 2008), the majority of the constructive Western studies are focused on one of the 
most challenging issues regarding China's foreign aid practices, or the lack thereof that "fuels 
rumours" (Brautigam, 2009, p.187) – transparency (see Lancaster, 2007; Lum et al., 2009; 
Paulo and Reisen, 2010; Brautigam, 2011a). 
 
Of these studies which attempted to read China's foreign aid expenditures in Africa, Grimm 
et al.'s Transparency of Chinese Aid: An Analysis of the Published Information on Chinese 
External Financial Flows (2011) is amongst one of the most thorough studies which both 
pointed out that the sensitivity of China in publicising its foreign aid figures is owing to its 
"cultural traditions and philosophy" and "persisting high demands for development finances 
'at home'" (ibid., p.4), and suggested how China can take steps to improve its transparency (1. 
Develop a publication schedule for aid information; 2. Facilitate the dissemination and use of 
this information; 3. Build systems) (ibid., p.27). Whilst paying specific attention to published 
data, not only this study put forward a considerably more accurate way of understanding 
China's foreign aid inputs – it looked into the currently available information rather than 
estimated figures, or indeed continues to produce further estimates, but it also investigated 
and grouped different figures made available by different foreign aid participants. In the end, 
as this study suggests, "The Chinese government, overall, publishes less data than 'traditional 
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 Social infrastructure (known as public facilities in The White Paper on China's Foreign Aid) accounted for 670 of 
total 2,025 Complete Project Aid projects that China delivered by the end of 2009. Within the same period, China 
delivered 635 industrial projects and 215 agricultural projects. See p.11, GOVERNMENT OF CHINA 2011. China's 
Foreign Aid, Beijing: People's Press. 
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donors', but provides more than usually believed" (ibid., p.23). 
 
In contrast to Western studies, which placed a specific stress on best practice, the Chinese 
studies that investigated the shortcomings of China's foreign aid, on the other hand, are 
mainly focused on building China's foreign aid capacity. Whilst some studies looked into the 
developing implementation methods of China's foreign aid at the given period and provided 
suggestions for adjustment, such as boosting the efficiency of Management Cooperation (Lu, 
1988); and completing Overseas Volunteer Programs (Cao, 2013), more studies had an eye 
on the underdeveloped administration of China's foreign aid. In particular, the incompetent 
foreign aid implementation management, the insufficient coordination between foreign aid 
institutions and the need for establishing a dedicated foreign aid institution (see Zhao and 
Xue, 2010; Hu and Huang, 2012; Huang and Xie, 2013; Lu et al., 2014). In addition to these, 
there has also been a recent increase in discussing the much lagged legal development of 
China's foreign aid, and these studies suggest that China should promptly transform its 
current, primarily ministerial codes of practices presented foreign aid regulations to relevant 
legislation (see Li, 2014; Guo, 2014; Cao, 2014; Wang, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the understandings contributed by these existing studies, while the 
shortcomings highlighted by Western studies are for the greater part built on Western values 
– foreign aid is aimed at helping recipient countries' development, but not necessarily their 
democracy development, the shortcomings pointed out in most Chinese studies are a lack of 
empirical evidences – neither examined with a practical flaw within the institutions involved 
in the planning and implementation of China's foreign aid, nor an observed failing outcome 
of China's foreign aid projects and programs in Africa. More to the point, with a glance to the 
solutions brought forward by these studies, on the basis of the majority of these studies did 
not go into details exploring the practical situation of the Chinese government, indeed, the 
real capacities of China's foreign aid, as a result of this negligence, as constructive as these 
solutions may conceptually be to the improvement of China's foreign aid, they are in general 
unrealistic to China's immediate development agenda, and only to some extent beneficial to 
China's long-term foreign aid development planning. 
 
The Under Researched Areas of China's Foreign Aid in Africa 
 
On the whole, despite the diverse and multi-dimensional nature of existing studies, as this 
study has found out based on reviewing the above literature, there remain several gaps and 
confusing areas in the current understanding of the development, the performance and the 
shortcomings of China's foreign aid in Africa. First, on the basis of some understandings were 
given in regard to China's evolving motivations for providing foreign aid, and its developing 
practices and arrangements for delivering foreign aid, these existing studies do not include 
sufficient empirical examinations of China's foreign aid development. As a result of a lack of 
practical demonstrations, not only it is difficult to grasp why, in the development of China's 
foreign aid in Africa, one foreign aid objective is particularly emphasised and implemented 
over another (other than political and economic considerations, or international influences), 
but it is also a challenge to find the practical reasons that drive the development of China's 
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foreign aid planning and implementation approaches. 
 
Secondly, while a number of assessments were offered regarding specific projects, programs, 
and particular focusing areas of China's foreign aid in Africa, these existing studies do not 
supply an overall understanding of how China's foreign aid has performed in Africa. Owing to 
the limitation of existing case study selection approaches, some focusing areas of China's 
foreign aid remain unexamined. This is a limitation that becomes apparent when it comes to 
finding the particular focusing areas in which China's foreign aid has worked more effectively 
and sustainably. Thirdly, although there are studies that have investigated the shortcomings 
of China's foreign aid from both a Western and a Chinese point of view, these studies are 
only minimally beneficial to those seeking to improve China's foreign aid. In addition to again 
a general lack of empirical evidence supporting the identified shortcomings, there is also a 
common failure to take into account the real capacities of China's foreign aid; thus, neither 
are the shortcomings that these studies identified straightforward to understand, nor are 
their proposed solutions realistic. 
 
Last and most importantly, given that so far the majority of the studies on China's foreign aid 
development and China's foreign aid performance are carried out separately – the former 
only focused on grasping the evolvement of the objectives, planning and implementation 
approaches of China's foreign aid; and the latter only focused on assessing the effectiveness 
and sustainability of China's foreign in Africa – the current understanding do not explain how 
the development of China's foreign aid is related to its foreign aid outcomes in Africa. Not 
only is such an explanation vital to the identification of the factors that affect China's foreign 
aid outcomes in Africa – in particular the factors within the development of China's foreign 
aid itself, but also when proposing suggestions to China's next foreign aid development – to 
understand what previous development have succeeded and what have failed in improving 
China's foreign aid outcomes in Africa. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
Having explored the different discussions of foreign aid and the literatures that attempted to 
grasp the development, the performance and the shortcomings of China's foreign aid in 
Africa, it can be found that the gaps and confusing areas of existing studies are primarily in 
the divergent identifications of foreign aid, and the multi-dimensional approaches to the 
understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa. As well an universal categorisation of foreign 
aid is unavailable, there is also a lack of fixed models in understanding China's foreign aid in 
Africa. With a view to overcome such a complicated situation, and therefore provide a more 
detailed and systematic understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa – one that both fulfils 
the gaps and confusing areas within existing studies, and coherent to potential publications 
further from the Chinese government – this study is committed to the following approaches: 
First, this study adopts the terminologies and categorisations of foreign aid introduced by the 
Chinese government (as stated in The White Paper on China's Foreign Aid, 2011) for a more 
standardised and coherent understanding. 
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Secondly, so as to establish a practical understanding of China's foreign aid development in 
Africa, and find out which focusing areas of China's foreign aid more appropriate to African 
recipient countries' development, this study selects case studies according to each of China's 
foreign aid objectives that it introduced in Africa in successive development periods. As well 
this approach extends our understanding to additional focusing area of China's foreign aid, 
offers a comparative view of how China's foreign aid performed in different focusing areas, it 
also enables this study to understand how the development of China's foreign aid is related 
to its foreign aid outcomes in Africa. Thirdly, in the interest of bringing forward development 
suggestions that the Chinese government is in a position to implement, this study goes into 
details surveying the capacities and operations of all major government institutions involved 
in the planning and implementation of China's foreign aid. In addition to this, it supplements 
this finding with interviews and discussions carried out with key decision-makers of China's 
foreign aid for increased suitability. 
 
In all, with the purpose of promoting China's foreign aid outcomes, this study improves our 
understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa with an in-depth, case study based approach. 
Not only it draws on extensive government documents that are not in the public domain to 
reconstruct the development of China's foreign aid in Africa, but this study also assesses the 
performance and investigates the shortcomings of China's foreign aid in Africa with exclusive 
interviews and discussions conducted with foreign aid participants. To begin understanding 
China's foreign aid in Africa, the next two chapters first explores the development of China's 
foreign aid in between 1955 and 2012. With emphases placed on identifying China's foreign 
aid objectives in Africa, and the planning and implementation approaches that it accordingly 
developed, so as to establish a foundation for the following assessments and investigations, 
chapter three examines the route that led China's foreign aid to its current formation, while 
chapter four surveys China's foreign aid at present. A detailed breakdown of China's current 
foreign aid arrangement is introduced at the second half of chapter four. 
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Chapter Three: The History of China's Foreign Aid in Africa 
 
As a result of learning the grounds of foreign aid and finding the confusing areas in existing 
knowledge, the previous chapter has provided a foundation for improving our understanding 
of China's foreign aid in Africa. Now, the next two chapters aim to fulfil the first objective of 
this study – to understand China's foreign aid development. Arranged in chronological order, 
chapter thee and four study the historical and present-day conditions of China's foreign aid 
in Africa respectively. With the view of identifying China's foreign aid objectives in Africa, and 
the foreign aid planning and implementation approaches it developed accordingly, chapter 
three focuses on the emergence and early development of China's foreign aid. It addresses 
two primary questions: how has China's foreign aid objective in Africa progressed? And, how 
have China's foreign aid practices developed? Along with these queries, this chapter surveys 
China's foreign aid development between 1955 and 1993 when foreign aid was primarily 
influenced by China's political pursuits, and it is divided into two sections by the reform 
policy inaugurated in 1978 which historically altered China's foreign aid approaches. 
 
In the first section, this study examines China's foreign aid development prior to the reform 
period. It is inclusive of three distinct development periods: The Beginning (1955-1963), The 
Development (1963-1970) and The Outrageous (1971-1978). On the basis of finding that the 
aims of China's foreign aid in Africa evolved from liberating the oppressed peoples in the 
third-world; to strengthening global forces against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism; 
to helping African countries achieve self-reliance; this section reveals that in line with its duly 
determined foreign aid objective of building African industrial and agricultural foundations, 
China has not only established practical foreign aid planning and implementation approaches, 
but to some extent, successfully delivered development assistance to Africa whilst meeting 
its political interests. However, this rather sound outcome was eventually torn apart when 
China's political and economic demands went to one extreme during the Cultural Revolution, 
and consequent upon the devastating domestic financial situation, China was therefore 
forced to reconsider the continuation of its foreign aid.  
 
In the second section, this study centres on the most substantial historical turning point of 
China's development, the implementation of the reform policy and the carrying of China's 
foreign aid development in a fourth period, that of The Initial Reform (1979-1993). It surveys 
the dramatic shift of China's foreign aid objective in Africa as it moved towards reducing 
expenditure while consolidating foreign aid outcomes, which came as a result of the ending 
of the Cultural Revolution and the stabilising of the international environment. In this phase, 
this section finds that China placed considerably greater emphasis on the economic aspect of 
its foreign aid while attempting to relieve its financial burdens. Regardless of such changes 
however, Beijing did little to benefit the development of Africa in comparison to the previous 
period. By the early 1990s, China's planned economic system had been stretched to the limit, 
and it is on this note, this chapter concludes the study of China's foreign aid history and looks 
towards the growing preparation of China's market economic system. Indeed, this is the 
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corner stone leading to the contemporary era of China's foreign aid. 
 
In conclusion, the study of the history of China's foreign aid in Africa highlights the attempts 
that China has made to deliver and improve its foreign aid prior to 1993. While exploring 
China's aims in determining its foreign aid objectives in Africa, this chapter places particular 
attention on China's planning and implementation approaches that were introduced to 
secure these objectives. Therefore, it addresses the origin of China's foreign aid, as well as 
brings out the measures required for the subsequent assessments of China's foreign aid 
performance. To achieve these proposed aims, aside from pointing out the domestic and 
international background of the times, this chapter identifies China's foreign aid objectives in 
Africa and its developing foreign aid practices through an examination of elites' speeches, 
government documents, existing research and field interviews. Where available, quantitative 
data are also utilised to indicate the scale of China's foreign aid.  
 
China's Foreign Aid in Africa: 
From the Bandung Conference to the End of Cultural Revolution 1955 – 1978 
从万隆会议到文化大革命结束 
 
"Ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government has 
always taken foreign aid as an integral part of its foreign diplomacy and fixed obligations of 
proletarian internationalism (无产阶级国际主义)" (Li, 2010, p.19). 
 
As pointed out by Chairman Mao Zedong1 at the very beginning, "Considering the fact that 
China is a country that has 9.6 million square kilometres of land and 600 million people, it 
has an obligation to contribute to the whole of mankind" (Xinhua, 1956b). He also made 
specific his belief that, "those who have already emerged victorious from revolutions should 
help those who are still striving for independence. This is our obligation to proletarian 
internationalism" (Xinhua, 1963). In particular, this combination of internationalism and 
patriotism was based on two ideas: firstly, as a country that had just emerged from colonial 
rule, China must support the other oppressed peoples struggling for national independence, 
and help them progress from political independence towards economic independence. 
Secondly, as an economically underdeveloped country, China's request for a fair political and 
economic international environment was consistent with the mass of third-world countries. 
Therefore, helping other third-world countries meant improving China's own external 
situation (Zhou, 2008a). 
 
Deriving from this internationalist responsibility and determination to support oppressed 
peoples in the third-world countries who were striving for and defending their national 
independence, China began to deliver Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance (对外经济
技术援助)2 shortly after its own independence (Li, 2010). Specifically regarding China's 
foreign aid in Africa, it began with the Asian-African Conference held in 1955. At that time, 
China's priority was to reverse the extreme financial situation left by the feudal regime, as 
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 Mao Zedong was the first Chairman of the PRC. He was in office between 1949 and 1976. 
2
 The official terminology for China's foreign aid. 
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well as to break out of what it perceived as the United States led military threats and 
economic blockades. Meanwhile in Africa, rising nationalism pushed liberation movements 
to a breaking point and many nations were confronting the long-lasting rule of colonialism 
(Luo and Liu, 2007). In view of this situation, and regardless of the immediate needs of 
domestic recovery, China adopted a one-sided foreign policy in response to its urgent and 
alarming external threats, and promptly developed diplomatic relationships with the Soviet 
Union, other socialist countries and potential socialist countries (Zhang, 2011). 
 
To be specific, China at this stage was on the one hand, highly concerned about the battles 
against capitalist invasions in North Korea and Vietnam, and was supporting their recovery 
and economic development. On the other hand, it was keen to establish relationships with 
other third-world countries and to assist the liberation movements of the Asian, African and 
Latin American peoples (CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, 1990). Hence, against this 
background, with similarly modern historical experiences and mutual sympathy, the newly 
established People's Republic of China and Africa moved closer together. 
 
The Beginning  
From 18 to 24 April, 1955, the seminal event of the Asian-African Conference (万隆会议, also 
known as the Bandung Conference) staged in Bandung, Indonesia, provided the very first 
modern opportunity for China to make tentative approach to the leaders of Africa (Taylor, 
2006). Based on the mutual understandings developed by a Chinese delegation led by Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai3, it established optimal conditions for China to cooperate with Asian and 
African countries. As a prelude to China's foreign aid, in regards to the principles of 
cooperation among Asian and African countries, The Final Communiqué of the Asian-African 
Conference stated: "The Asian-African Conference recognises the immediacy of promoting 
economic development of the Asian-African region, and the common aspiration among the 
participating countries to mutual beneficial and respected economic cooperation" (1955). 
And, regarding these approaches, it further stated, "all the participating countries agree to 
provide technical assistance to the best of their ability, in the methods of overseas experts, 
training programs, engineering equipment, technology exchanges, and so on" (ibid.). 
 
Concerned with realising this economic and technical cooperation agreement so as to break 
out of China's diplomatic isolation created by the United States led capitalist world at the 
first opportunity, Zhou delivered his opinions on initialising China's foreign aid at the 3rd 
Session of the First National People's Congress. He said:  
 
On the basis of China is a newly liberated country, with an as of yet underdeveloped and 
dependent economy, we are primarily seeking for trade based economic cooperation. 
However, since we also are aware of the significances of economic development in 
consolidating political independence, China is willing to maximise its contributions in 
assisting other countries' economic development within its capacity. (Xinhua, 1956a)  
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 Zhou Enlai was the first Prime Minister of the PRC. He was in office between 1949 and 1976. 
34 
 
More to the point, as Zhou further stressed, the principles in conducting foreign economic 
and technical assistance are such that: "China upholds the principle of equality and mutual 
respect for sovereignty. Therefore it will never intervene or impose political, economic and 
military disadvantages on other countries in the name of economic cooperation" (ibid.). 
 
Meanwhile in Africa, and echoing China's eagerness to establish diplomatic relationships 
based on mutual respect and cooperation, Africa's liberation movements were also further 
encouraged by the Bandung conference of which China's support for Egypt in the Suez Crisis 
officially marked the outset of China's foreign aid involvement in Africa. Emerging in August 
1956, the decision of the Egyptian government in nationalising the Suez Canal resulted in 
invasions by Britain, France and Israel. In order to assist the Egyptian government in 
defending itself against this three-nation alliance, the Chinese government sent 20 million 
Swiss Franc in cash and dispatched medical teams to Egypt. As well as this assistance 
contributed to the final victory of the Egyptian government, it also made Egypt the first 
African recipient country of China's foreign aid (Li and Wu, 2009, p.47). 
 
Subsequent to this historical episode, in October 1958, with consideration to advance the 
importance of foreign aid, the Central Committee (中共中央) approved for the first time an 
official paper4 regarding China's foreign aid. As it stated, "Foreign economic and technical 
assistance is both a serious political mission, and the Chinese people's internationalist 
obligation to brotherhood and nationalist countries" (CCCPC). In light of this confirmation, 
Zhou immediately gathered the corresponding ministries and introduced the very first 
objective of China's foreign aid:  
 
In accordance with the growth of China's economic and technological capacities, China's 
foreign aid will become an increasingly onerous task. We should uphold the spirit of 
internationalism, assist those socialist countries that are in the need, earnestly carry out 
existing assistance to North Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia and Albania, and arrange foreign 
aid with the priorities and appropriateness in economic development focused aspects. 
In the meantime, within our allowance, we also should assist those economically 
underdeveloped Asian and African nationalist countries, to help them build their own 
industrial foundations on a small to medium project basis. (Shi, 1989) 
 
1955 to 1963 was the emerging period of China's foreign aid in Africa. At this stage, while the 
political interests in proletarian internationalism were dominating China's development, the 
foreign aid decisions were made primarily to assist the communist battle against imperialism, 
colonialism and hegemonism. There was only secondary awareness placed on the liberation 
movements of third-world countries. In this sequence, despite the successful appearance 
that China's foreign aid made in Africa subsequent to the Bandung Conference, and provided 
with the endangering national security due to the capitalist invasions to China's neighbouring 
countries, the priorities of China's foreign aid in this period were given to Vietnam, North 
Korea and other surrounding socialist countries (Li et al., 2009). To be specific, among the 20 
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 "关于加强对外经济、技术援助工作领导的请示报告". Report on Strengthening Foreign Economic and Technical 
Cooperation. 
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countries that signed the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (经济技术合作协
定, also known as the Comprehensive Loan Aid Agreement) with China, only 6 were African 
countries5. 
 
With regards to China's foreign aid administration, owing to the limited number of recipient 
countries, China's foreign aid was directly governed by the Central People's Government (中
央人民政府) and coordinated by the State Planning Commission (国家计划委员会) at the 
beginning. In August 1952, along with the consolidating communist regime, the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade [of the Central People's Government] (1952-1954, 中央人民政府对外贸易部) 
was then established to take over the management of Goods and Materials Aid, as well as 
subsidiary institutions responsible for project implementation. The management of Cash Aid, 
meanwhile, was along devolved to the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Two years later in 1954, 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade was renamed the Ministry of Foreign Trade [of the PRC] 
(1954-1982, 中华人民共合国对外贸易部), and it was assigned the management of the 
newly introduced Complete Project Aid. As for the implementation of Complete Project Aid, 
the State Planning Commission was again charged with coordinating such projects with the 
relevant government institutions. 
 
As a result of the growing number of independent third-world countries, and the subsequent 
foreign aid demand in the late 1950s, the 12th Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Second National People's Congress approved the establishment of the Bureau of Foreign 
Economic Liaison (1961-1964, 对外经济联络总局). As a government institution that took 
direct instruction (归口管理) from the State Council, it was appointed to unify the divided 
management of foreign aid, and to house China's foreign aid under the same administrative 
roof (Huang and Hu, 2009). Anticipating this merger, China has also introduced the Delivery 
Ministry In-chief Mechanism (总交货人部制) to organise its foreign aid implementations. 
Largely based on the Soviet Union's management of Complete Project Aid, this mechanism 
was operated as follows: first the State Planning Commission appointed a delivery ministry 
according to the specialty of the foreign aid projects, then this delivery ministry organised 
the project implementation, and this project would either be commissioned within the 
ministry or assigned to subordinate institutions or provincial bureaus (Zhang, 2012b). 
 
In conclusion, scanning the emerging period of China's foreign aid in Africa, on the basis of 
the majority of China's foreign aid was directed to cope with its immediate national security 
threats, and to support Africa's liberation movements, China's foreign aid during this period 
was largely organised in the military and humanitarian aspects, and it provided only a limited 
amount of assistance to African recipient countries to support their economic development. 
Nevertheless, although China's foreign aid in Africa at that stage had yet to progress to 
development assistance, it promptly proposed the objective of building African industrial 
foundations on a small to medium project basis; and in pursuit of this objective, China 
founded its basic foreign aid institutions, basic operating mechanism, three foreign aid 
implementation methods and built a solid foundation for the forthcoming foreign aid.  
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 There were 6 African countries signed the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation with China 
between 1955 and 1963, which were: Egypt, Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Somalia. 
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The Development  
Struggling in the battle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, the widening gap 
between the political parties of China and the Soviet Union worsened China's external 
situation at the beginning of the 1960s. Rooted in ideological divergence, China's objection 
to the Soviet Union's practice of "revisionism", and the continuing blockade led by the 
United States at this stage almost completely immobilised China's diplomatic relations (Zhou, 
2007, p.14). In order to escape these difficult circumstances, rather than relentlessly 
confronting both superpowers, China quickly shifted its primary interests from the few 
developing socialist countries to the considerably larger number of Asian and African 
countries. Meanwhile, the progression of African liberation movements also chanced to 
bringing in newly independent African countries to the international playground. In such 
ways, China began to balance its foreign aid priorities towards Asian and African countries, 
and placed particular emphasis on the latter (Zhang, 2012b).  
 
On 13 December 1963, in the interest of further deepening China's relationship with Asian 
and African countries, Zhou embarked on his Fourteen Countries Tour6 – China's first 
ministerial-level visit to Africa. During his stop in Accra, and in response to the Ghanaian 
President Nkrumah's proposal to work on "seeking the best way to achieve peaceful 
co-existence" (Chen, 2007, p.207), Zhou promptly offered the framework that he sketched 
for conducting China's foreign aid: The Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical 
Assistance to Other Countries (The Eight Principles, 中国政府对外经济技术援助八项原则)7. 
By placing the emphasis on The Eight Principles, China clearly stated that when it provides 
foreign aid to other countries it acts on the principles of: unity and friendship, respect for the 
recipient country's sovereignty, non-interference in another country's internal affairs, 
freedom from political conditions attached to their foreign aid and never asking for any 
privileges. These principles not only significantly improved China's diplomatic relations with 
African countries, but also took China's foreign aid to a whole new level. 
 
At the same time in China however, the Three Years of Natural Disasters (1959-1961, 三年自
然灾害) and the sudden loss of major support from the Soviet Union (CPC, 1960) caused 
great domestic production difficulties. In view of the continuously expanding foreign aid 
input, this brought a number of opposing voices against Zhou's foreign aid diplomacy. Thus, 
Zhou argued at the 1st Session of the Third National People's Congress that: 
 
The foundation of China's foreign aid is the persistence of proletarian internationalism, 
that is to support brotherhood countries to establish socialist regimes; to support global 
liberation movements; and to support the newly independent countries to achieve 
self-reliance, and to strengthen their anti-imperialist capabilities. And that is also 
beneficial to us. In the past it was suggested that we should reduce our assistance to 
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 Duration: 13 December 1963 to 1 March 1964; the countries visited were: the United Arab Republic (Egypt and 
Syria), Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Ceylon 
(Sri Lanka). 
7
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other countries, and that is completely wrong. In pace with China's growing economy, 
we should provide more foreign aid, and make greater contribution to the cause of 
internationalism. (Xinhua, 1964) 
 
1964 to 1970 was the developing period of China's foreign aid in Africa. On the grounds of 
China's urgent diplomatic needs and African countries' increasing development demands, 
The Eight Principles were significantly improving the relationship between China and Africa. 
Consisting of foreign aid arrangements and objectives, not only was this guidance aptly 
standardising China's foreign aid approaches, it consequently became the most influential 
bilateral development guidance for relations between China and Africa (Shi, 1989). From this 
point, in the pursuit of supporting liberation movements and helping newly independent 
countries achieve self-reliance, The Eight Principles introduced China's foreign aid to a 
further 11 countries, bringing the total number of its foreign aid recipient countries to 31, 
including 14 African countries8. 
 
Subsequent to this success in putting forward foreign aid principles and in the interest of 
improving the administration of China's foreign aid, the Central Committee promptly revoked 
the Bureau of Foreign Economic Liaison and established the Foreign Economic Liaison 
Commission (1964-1970, 对外经济联络委员会) in June 1964 to further upgrade China's 
foreign aid capacity. Arranged as four bureaus and one office, the Foreign Economic Liaison 
Commission allocated three bureaus to individually manage foreign aid to the then major 
recipient groups; namely, Socialist countries, Asian countries and African countries. The 
other bureau and the office were tasked with the coordination of technical support and 
foreign aid equipment and materials. Along with this institutional advancement, the funding 
methods of China's foreign aid were also confirmed as the Grant, the Interest-free Loan and 
the Low-interest Loan9 (ibid.). 
 
Furthermore, when Africa became a priority recipient of China's foreign aid leading to the 
dramatic changes of China's external situation, a delegation led by the Vice Director of the 
State Planning Commission Fang Yi10 was dispatched to Algeria, Mali and Guinea at the turn 
of 1964 in order to explore the most appropriate measures to be taken for planning practical 
and effective foreign aid packages to these countries. Based on observations of the colonial 
devastation in Africa, which induced limited economic development and shortages in human 
resources, it was decided that the immediate foreign aid objective in Africa at the time was 
the delivery of the basic necessities such as food and clothes. To fulfil China's foreign aid aim 
in Africa, that is to help them make use of their natural resources, master technologies and 
ultimately achieve self-reliance, the long-term foreign aid objective was then determined on 
                                                          
8
 There were 8 additional African countries signed the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation with 
China between 1964 and 1970, which were: Kenya, Tanzania, Congo, the Central African Republic, Mauritania, 
Zambia, Sudan and Uganda. 
9
 China's Low-interest Loan is restricted to a maximum interests rate of 2%. See SHI, L. 1989. Economic 
Cooperation with Foreign Countries [eBook version]. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. Available at: 
http://www.1921.org.cn/tushu.php?ac=inlist4&bid=1054 [Accessed: 2 November 2010]. 
10
 Fang Yi was appointed Vice Director of the State Planning Commission in between 1961 and 1963, and he was 
subsequently appointed Head of the Foreign Economic Liaison Commission in between 1964 and 1970 and 
Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison in between 1970 and 1976. 
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the support of African industrial and agricultural foundations building, through a combined 
approach of Complete Project Aid and Technical Aid (Xue, 2013a). 
 
In addition to these efforts, what was also found to be noticeable is that along with the 
increase in foreign aid demand, the lasting effects of colonialism were still impacting Africa's 
development and indeed China's foreign aid implementations. As Shi pointed out:  
 
While a number of African countries agreed on China's foreign aid, some of them were 
as ever hesitated due to the influences from the capitalist countries, certainly their 
former colonies. However, demonstrated by the completion of the first lot of foreign aid 
projects, China has evidently proved its commitments as of The Eight Principles. Aside 
from it reassured the existing foreign aid recipient countries' confidences, the uncertain 
minds of the hesitated African countries were also removed, and thereafter attracted 
further African countries to request foreign aid from China. (1989) 
 
Summarising the developing period of China's foreign aid in Africa: since the inauguration of 
The Eight Principles, the influences of China's foreign aid expanded notably on the African 
continent. Not only faced with the subsequently improved external situation, the Chinese 
government quickly realised the potential of foreign aid in strengthening diplomatic relations, 
but following Fang's investigation, as well Africa's immediate needs were addressed, the 
objective of China's foreign aid in Africa was also confirmed on building African industrial and 
agricultural foundations to further suit African conditions. In pursuit of this objective, besides 
the along progressed foreign aid administration and the approval of foreign aid funding 
methods, according to Shi, "China in total delivered 313 Complete Project Aid projects in 20 
countries during this period, an increase of 210% in comparison to the period of 1950 to 
1963" (ibid.), the introduction of Technical Aid and the sharp increase of Complete Project 
Aid clearly demonstrated its rapid development. Seeing this swift progress, China's foreign 
aid evidently began to evolve into development assistance. 
 
The Outrageous  
Moving on to a discussion of the next decade, with China's external situation continuing to 
improve, the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly Resolution took place on 25 October 
1971 and introduced a completely new paradigm for China's foreign relationships. Passed 
with a two-thirds majority vote, including those of 26 African countries, The UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2758 recognised the People's Republic of China as "The only legitimate 
representative of China to the United Nations" (1971).11 As a consequence of this diplomatic 
victory over Taiwan, the majority of developing countries among the 76 endorsing countries, 
particularly those African countries that were anxiously waiting for replacements for the now 
vacated Taiwan agricultural projects, quickly established diplomatic relationship with China 
and became the recipients of China's foreign aid. However, provided China's underdeveloped 
                                                          
11
 Among the total of 23 proposing countries, there were 11 African countries including: Algeria, Sierra Leone, 
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. The 26 African 
countries, among the total of 76 endorsing countries were: Algeria, Burundi, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Congo, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. 
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economy at the time as a result of the raging Cultural Revolution, China found itself in great 
financial difficulties and struggled to fulfil such a rapid increase in foreign aid demand.  
 
Concerned with meeting these foreign aid requests, the Chinese government successively 
convened five National Conferences on Foreign Aid (全国援外工作会议) in the 1970s of 
which the first three conferences were directly addressed by the Central Committee. Aside 
from repeatedly emphasising the diplomatic importance of China's foreign aid, the Chinese 
government promptly brought in provincial departments to take part in the overloaded 
foreign aid implementations, and furthermore, it outlined a number of instructions to be 
followed in order to maintain foreign aid outcomes. These instructions included: "Upholding 
proletarian internationalism and The Eight Principles", "Preventing and overcoming great 
power poses, focusing on recipient countries' conditions and striving for practical results", 
"Preventing unrealistic planning and prodigal practices, to ensure a steady and reliable 
progress" (Zhang, 2012b, p.138). 
 
In June 1975, after three years of straining the limits of China's financial capacity, as Fang 
investigated in an early study of China's foreign aid expenditure, "The percentage of China's 
national budget earmarked for foreign aid was only a cut above 1% during the first and 
second five-year plan periods (1953-1957; 1958-1962), but in fiscal years 1972, 1973 and 
1974, this amount had risen to 6.7%, 7.2% and 6.3%, respectively" (1984, p.544, cited in Shi, 
1989). The outrageously high foreign aid expenditure eventually exceeded China's bottom 
line and forced the government to amend its foreign aid strategy. As the Central Committee 
and the State Council's resolution delivered at the 4th National Conference on Foreign Aid 
stated:  
 
Considering China's limited financial resources, further foreign aid agreements should 
be approached with extreme caution. While earnestly implementing the already agreed 
terms, the subsequent annual foreign aid budget, indeed the quota of new agreements 
must be restricted within China's financial allowance; the structure of foreign aid in the 
meanwhile, also needs to be further adjusted towards Complete Project Aid; in addition 
to these, the allocation of foreign aid projects and programs to each recipient countries 
should be planned comprehensively, with particular attentions drawn to match the local 
conditions. (Shi, 1989)  
 
One year after these adjustments, the end of the Cultural Revolution in October 1976 finally 
put an end to the most disastrous political chaos in China's contemporary history, retrieved 
China's political order and reinstated the sense of propriety in delivering foreign aid. During 
the subsequent 5th National Conference on Foreign Aid convened in June 1977, the Chinese 
government first criticised, and settled the political interference that, the Jiang Qing led 
Anti-Party Clique (四人帮, also known as the Gang of Four) caused to the planning of China's 
foreign aid, which had been the primary cause for the generous foreign aid disbursements. 
After summarising China's two decades of foreign aid experiences, this conference was then 
concluded with the new instruction that China's foreign aid in the future should "uphold 
proletarian internationalism, uphold The Eight Principles, actively and steadily, focuses clear 
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and comprehensively bringing up the recipient countries' economic capacity and help them 
achieve self-reliance" (ibid.). 
 
Following the conference, the Central Committee approved and distributed the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Liaison's Report on Further Improving the Work of Foreign Aid12, which for 
the first time officially restricted the budgetary allowance of China's foreign aid. As it stated:  
 
Along with the rapid development of China's foreign relations, the foreign aid requests 
from the developing countries are becoming increasingly demanding. While China's 
own economic and industrial resources are still limited, it is suggested that other than 
exceptional circumstances, further foreign aid expenditures should not exceed the ratio 
of 4% of total annual governmental budget. (Fang, 1984, p.586, cited in Shi, 1989)  
 
1971 to 1978 was the surging period of China's foreign aid in Africa. As a result of its previous 
diplomatic successes, the victory of China's UN legitimacy pushed its pursuit of proletarian 
internationalism to the ultimate conclusion. During the Cultural Revolution, and eager to 
manifest China's greater responsibility in international affairs and with a sincere desire to 
return the favour to the countries who endorsed the UN motion that established China's 
legitimacy; not only did China donate 0.4 million USD and 38 million CNY to the United 
Nation Development Programme (UNDP) (MOFCOM, 1995, p.816), but it also approved 
foreign aid requests from an additional 35 developing countries, sharply increasing the total 
number of its foreign aid recipient countries to 66. Amongst these, the African continent 
made up of 27 countries13 alone. This decision was primarily made in line with Mao's 
appreciation, as he said: "It was our African friends who brought us back to the UN, we 
shouldn't forget the helping hand lent by the third-world countries in any way" (Weng, 1995, 
p.9 cited in Li, 2006a, p.18).  
 
Further in line with this determination, and with the goal of administrating the approved 
foreign aid requests from the 1960s and preparing for the continuing diplomatic successes 
guaranteed increase in foreign aid demand, in June 1970, the Central Committee and the 
State Council promoted the Foreign Economic Liaison Commission to the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Liaison (1970-1982, 对外经济联络部). In this upgrading process, two additional 
bureaus were introduced to deal with budget planning and foreign economic cooperation 
with the intention to further complete China's foreign aid administration. In addition to this 
advancement, with considerations to bringing up the effectiveness of Complete Project Aid 
implementation, a dedicated subsidiary public institution (事业单位) to the newly upgraded 
ministry, that is the Complete Plant Export Company (成套设备出口公司) was established to 
manage the implementation of such projects. Moreover, an addition of 26 provincial foreign 
aid departments were also set up.  
                                                          
12
 对外经济联络部的"关于进一步做好援外工作的报告". 
13
 There were 27 additional African countries signed the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation with 
China between 1971 and 1978, which were: Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Mauritius, Tunisia, 
Togo, Burundi, Madagascar, Benin, Zaire (DRC), Cameroon, Chad, Senegal, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Niger, 
Gabon, Mozambique, Morocco, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Comoros, Botswana, 
Seychelles and Liberia. 
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Subsequent to this institutional change, and on the basis of recognising the incompetence of 
the existing foreign aid operating mechanism, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison 
promptly replaced the Delivery Ministry In-chief Mechanism with the Contract Ministry 
In-Chief Mechanism (承建部负责制). Particularly concerned with the ability to cope with the 
dramatically increased foreign aid demand, the advantages of this new operating mechanism 
were that it only required the appointed implementation (contract) ministry to monitor 
foreign aid expenses and project quality, whereas elements of the implementation process 
such as the design and construction of foreign aid packages were allocated to provincial 
departments. In this way, the new operating mechanism both relieved the stress on the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison and mobilised additional support and productivity from 
the provincial foreign aid departments (Huang and Hu, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, concerning the pitfalls that China's foreign aid encountered in this period, in 
spite of the largely consistent foreign aid objective – to assist African countries to build their 
own industrial and agricultural foundations with a small to medium project based, Complete 
Project Aid and Technical Aid combined approach, what needed to be particularly addressed 
was that, with the interference of the Cultural Revolution and peaking pursuit of proletarian 
internationalism, this foreign aid objective was broadly implemented involving "enormous 
investment, gigantic planning and technical complexity" (Shi, 1989). As a result of a failure to 
abide by the instructed foreign aid objective and practices, a number of the most demanding 
Complete Project Aid projects were constructed in the 1970s. These project included: the 
Guinea Tinkisso Hydroelectric Power Station, the Mali Sugar Complex, the Sudan Hasahaisa 
Textile Plant, the world renowned Tanzam Railway and so forth; and they rapidly propelled 
the financial burden of China's foreign aid to its highest level in history (Li et al., 2009). 
  
To conclude the discussion of this outrageous development period of China's foreign aid in 
Africa, it can be seen that it was on account of China's proletarian internationalist diplomacy 
and the influence of the Cultural Revolution that the excessively approved foreign aid 
requests threatened China's domestic development. Despite the assistance provided by the 
provincial departments or the further upgraded foreign aid administrative capacity, China's 
foreign aid continuously prioritised achieving its political pursuits to the extent that it 
undermined China's as yet underdeveloped economy. At the end of 1977, together with the 
devastating financial situation, the anti-China policy adopted by Vietnam and Albania (then 
the main foreign aid recipients) brought China's proletarian internationalist foreign aid to 
these countries to a standstill,14 and forced China to earnestly reconsider its interests in 
delivering further foreign aid (Shi, 1989). 
 
The Beginning of China's Foreign Aid in Africa 
 
Looking through this pre-reform period, China's foreign aid developed predominately under 
the political influence of proletarian internationalism, and it had been implemented only to 
                                                          
14
 China terminated its foreign aid to Vietnam and Albania on 3 and 7 July 1978, respectively. See 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/4162/64165/67447/67450/4554967.html, accessed 2 November 2010. 
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serve China's political interests (Zhang et al., 2010). To be specific, China's foreign aid began 
as an instrument for consolidating its independence and for defending itself against capitalist 
invasions of neighbouring countries. Indeed, it was used to strengthen the socialist alliance 
against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. In 1960, in response to China's diplomatic 
break-up with the Soviet Union, foreign aid began to be utilised in improving its foreign 
relationships with potential socialist as well as China-friendly countries. After obtaining sole 
UN legitimacy in 1971, the external situation for China improved and as a result China's 
foreign aid was promoted as a sign of appreciation for developing countries' political support 
in the process of legitimisation. In the case of Africa, China planned its foreign aid through 
three aims: to support African liberation movements, to unite African countries against the 
imperialist world and to assist African countries in achieving self-reliance (Li, 2006a).  
 
To achieve these aims, besides inaugurating the guidance of The Eight Principles, China made 
substantial efforts in developing its foreign aid in pace with China and Africa's evolving 
requirements. For instance, along with the increase of recipient countries and after foreign 
aid demands, China's multiple institutions involved in foreign aid administration gradually 
unified under the sole authority of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison. Subsequently, 
this ministry was successively accommodated by the Delivery Ministry In-chief Mechanism 
and the Contract Department In-chief Mechanism to regulate its yet underdeveloped foreign 
aid capacity. And then, in addition to participating in International Multilateral Aid, China 
adopted three funding methods to make best use of its limited foreign aid budget. Of these, 
the "Interest-free Loan was utilised as the primary method to fund China's foreign aid in 
Africa while Low-interest Loan was arranged for recipient countries with relatively sufficient 
economic resources, and Grant was delivered to those recipient countries that were still 
striving for independence or facing particular financial difficulty" (Shi, 1989).  
 
More to the point, to realise China's foreign aid objective in Africa meant assisting these 
countries in building their own industrial and agricultural foundations on a small to medium 
project basis. China introduced four foreign aid implementation methods, namely: Complete 
Project Aid, Technical Aid, Goods and Materials Aid15, and Cash Aid16. First Introduced in 
1954, Complete Project Aid was initially inaugurated to assist North Korea and Vietnam in 
rebuilding infrastructures lost during foreign invasions. Then, as a result of the development 
of China-Africa relationships in the 1960s, Complete Project Aid was thereafter brought to 
the repertoire of China's foreign aid in Africa so as to demonstrate China's aim to support 
African liberation movements, to unite African countries against the imperialist world and to 
assist African countries in achieving self-reliance. It was accordingly utilised in building 
African industrial and agricultural foundations. Through the implementations of Complete 
Project Aid, China was not only required to provide project construction, but it was also 
responsible for field surveys, project design, technology and management transfers and 
marketing of the final product. 
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 Goods and Materials Aid refers to the foreign aid which mainly provides recipient countries' livelihoods 
supplies, technical products and individual equipment. 
16
 Cash Aid is similar to Programme Aid in practice. It mainly involves direct transfers of funds from the donor 
country to recipient countries. 
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Coordinated in conjunction with Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid was introduced to 
improve the effectiveness of technology and management transfers. As a main segment of 
The Eight Principles, it was the fulfilment of the principle of "in giving any particular technical 
assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country 
fully master the technology"17. Furthermore, what also needs to be pointed out is that at the 
early stage of Chinas' foreign aid development, along with other Individual Programs (单项援
助)18, both Medical Teams and overseas training programs were classed as Technical Aid. 
Whereas the former evolved into a permanent feature of China's foreign aid in 1963, the 
latter became individualised in the 1970s. As an exploratory attempt at the subsequently 
promoted Human Resource Development Cooperation, the China-based training courses 
were offered as Foreign Internships and Overseas Student Programs. While the internships 
were arranged to train technicians to run delivered projects, the Overseas Student Programs 
were specifically implemented to meet the vast employment demand of the Tanzam Railway, 
and were later developed into the Overseas Scholarship Programs (Shi, 1989). 
 
With regards to the collaboration of these foreign aid implementation methods, Complete 
Project Aid and Technical Aid were utilised as the primary methods in assisting Africa's 
development, and both have seen continuous expansion since their introduction. Goods and 
Materials Aid only accounted for minor contributions for development to Africa since it was 
mainly organised through military and humanitarian efforts. While it was primarily offered to 
neighbouring communist countries that were battling with foreign invasions, Goods and 
Materials Aid was only applied to African countries to supply their immediate needs for basic 
necessities. At last, owing to China's extremely limited foreign exchange reserves, Cash Aid 
was rarely delivered at all and only in urgent situations (ibid.). In general, by the end of this 
pre-reform period, African countries had gradually become the largest recipient group of 
China's foreign aid and as Li et al. pointed out, "from the 1950s when China's delivered its 
first lot of foreign aid to Africa to the end of Cultural Revolution in 1978, 56.96% of China's 
total foreign aid budget was delivered to 43 African countries" (2009, p.336).19  
 
However, given the significant efforts that the Chinese government made in assisting Africa's 
development, a number of drawbacks also appeared which damaged both China's economic 
development and its foreign aid outcomes in Africa (Shi, 1989), despite the fact that China's 
political interests were achieved as evidenced by its substantially improved international 
status. Grounded in the most dramatic ideological confrontation in the 20th century, and 
established in order to defend China's proletarian internationalism, China's foreign aid was 
deeply involved in global political conflicts and revolutionary causes. Furthermore, this 
combination resulted in the acceptance of outrageous foreign aid requests and disappointing 
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 The 7
th
 principle of The Eight Principles, see Appendix I. 
18
 For example, conducting a geological survey, water exploration, etc. 
19
 Li et al., suggest that there were 43 African countries receiving China's foreign aid by the end of 1978, but they 
do not provide a specific breakdown by country. In accordance with the primary resource for figures regarding 
China's foreign aid of this particular period, Shi pointed out that there were 41 African countries receiving China's 
foreign aid at the same time. See SHI, L. 1989. Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries [eBook version]. 
Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. Available at: http://www.1921.org.cn/tushu.php?ac=inlist4&bid=1054 
[Accessed: 2 November 2010]. 
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foreign aid outcomes (Zhou, 2008a) which to a large extent, steered China's foreign aid away 
from what promised to be a cooperation based mutual development cooperation, and 
turned it into a political instrument dedicated to China's ideological concerns. As plainly 
pointed out by Zhang, "China was trading Africa's diplomatic recognition and ideological 
support with its continuous development assistance" (2006a, p.44).  
 
To be specific, China's proletarian internationalism underpinning foreign aid in Africa had 
shortcomings in four major instances during this pre-reform period. In regards to the foreign 
aid decision-making process, the fact that China's "foreign aid served political objectives" 
(Shu, 2010, p.84) not only restricted its foreign aid diplomacy to socialist and third-world 
countries, but also the amount of foreign aid to a particular recipient country was heavily 
influenced by their ideological stance. According to this logic, depending on the recipient 
country's relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union, or both, China's foreign 
aid was endlessly involved in a dilemma. China either missed the opportunity to obtain 
non-politically considered development interests, or suddenly turned against its foreign aid 
recipient country due to changes in political strategies as seen with Albania and Vietnam. 
Therefore, the result was foreign aid waste (Xue, 2013a).  
 
More to the point, whilst China delivered its foreign aid to the countries that it trusted 
politically, so as to fulfil obligations of proletarian internationalism, likewise this substantial 
political emphasis overshadowed the economic consideration of China's foreign aid (Liu, 
2008b). It also oversimplified the planning of such foreign aid and therefore led to failed 
outcomes. As a senior Chinese official noted:  
 
China's foreign aid at this stage was mostly agreed during the visits between principal 
decision-makers and considered only in terms of political interests. Unsurprisingly, given 
the lack of financial assessments, feasibility studies, and other necessary processes of 
foreign aid planning, a number of China's foreign aid projects were unable to meet the 
recipient countries' demand.20  
 
As a consequence of this extremely politically biased foreign aid planning, as well as failure 
to meet the principal aim of helping the recipient countries to achieve self-reliance, 
depending on that China's foreign aid was practically implemented as "political missions", 
this tendency sometimes also result in the worst scenario of foreign aid dependencies 
(Zhang, 2001, p.44). 
 
In addition to these concerns appeared in the process of China's foreign aid planning, given 
that the foreign aid operating mechanisms were built on China's planned economic system, 
its foreign aid implementations were also open to doubt. In spite of the Delivery Ministry 
In-chief Mechanism and Contract Department In-chief Mechanism adapted to their current 
situations, these mechanisms were managing China's foreign aid on an administrative basis 
instead of an economic basis. Together with China's foreign aid expenditures which were at 
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 Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2
 
September 2011. 
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the same time reimbursed upon invoice (实报实销), the investment, construction period, as 
well as the quality of the foreign aid implementations were essentially disconnected from 
the economic interests of the implementation parties. This arrangement inevitably resulted 
in the excessive reimbursement of foreign aid costs, and it worked to the disadvantage of 
mobilising the interests of implementation. As confirmed by Shi, "The drawbacks of these 
administrative means based operating mechanisms become increasingly problematic in the 
late 1970s" (1989).  
 
Furthermore, while government budgets remained the only financial resource for China's 
foreign aid, the foreign aid funding methods were found to be questionable in channelling 
China's limited foreign aid budget. Not only were two-thirds of these methods (the Grant 
and the Interest-free Loan21) established on an unidirectional financial basis (Xiao and Zhang, 
2002), as pointed out by a senior Chinese official, "The chances of receiving repayments of 
both these loans were [also] extremely low, as they are no different financially to Grants to a 
large extent"22. Therefore, all of China's foreign aid funding methods were in essence based 
on a donation approach. This fundamentally flawed financial arrangement of China's foreign 
aid directly affected its domestic development – especially on China's as yet underdeveloped 
economy and during the peak political chaos reached in the Cultural Revolution period, as 
Xue noted, "The shortage of domestic production and development assets even jeopardised 
the livelihoods of China's own people" (2013a, p.111).  
 
To conclude, by 1978, China's foreign aid in Africa had developed as many successes as 
shortcomings. On the one hand, it had significantly improved China's external situation and 
provided African recipient countries with noticeable development assistance, which had built 
a solid foundation for the ensuing cooperation between China and Africa. On the other hand, 
the proletarian internationalist obligations underpinning foreign aid drove it to political 
extremes, as "the leader [Mao] normally planned foreign aid according to his personal 
ideological considerations. Although arguably he was making decisions by strategic level, the 
negligence to China's financial situation has caused great difficulties to China's domestic 
development" (Yuan and Yang, 2003, p.576 cited in Zhang, 2012b, p.136). Furthermore, 
when this situation was accompanied by China's yet to be competent foreign aid practices, 
this predominant political concern also resulted in limited foreign aid outcomes. In view of 
these inapprehensive consequences, chance on the global development emphasis begins 
shifting towards economy, China initiated its foreign aid reform. 
 
China's Foreign Aid in Africa: 
From the Initial Reform to the End of Cold War 1979 – 1993 
从改革开放到冷战结束 
 
With peace and development gradually evolving into an international theme in the 1980s, 
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 Although lacking a specific breakdown, the government document suggests that in this pre-reform period, 
China's foreign aid was "主要" mainly provided with Grants and Interest-free Loans. See p.728, CCCPC PARTY 
LITERATURE RESEARCH OFFICE (ed.) 1982b. Important File Selection Since The 3rd Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
CPC Central Committee, Beijing: People's Press. 
22
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 29 August 2011. 
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revolutionary causes and ideological conflicts were no longer the top priorities for China and 
Africa. Rather, the economy and technology were leading concerns. From China's standpoint, 
seeing the drawbacks of ideologically determined policies, it was vital to realise immediate 
domestic recovery as a result of the Cultural Revolution; thus, the importance of economic 
development became increasingly obvious. In the mean time, on the basis that most African 
countries had achieved political independence and now wanted to break away from poverty 
and become self-reliance, economic development was also pushed to the front of their 
agendas. On the ground, provided with the opportunity granted by the switch of leadership, 
China promptly replaced its one-sided foreign policy with non-aligned diplomatic approaches, 
and began to implement its foreign aid in Africa with an emphasis on the long promised 
mutually beneficial economic cooperation (Liu, 2008b). 
 
In December 1978, based on summarising previous foreign aid experiences, the 3rd Plenary 
Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC (中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三
次全体会议) brought China's development assistance into a completely new era. Indeed, it 
introduced a transitional period to China's foreign aid development, as this session stated:  
 
On the basis of achieving self-reliance, China should actively develop equal and 
mutually beneficial relationships with all foreign countries, and effectively take 
advantage of world leading technologies and equipment… In order to realise China's 
socialist modernisation, we should utilise both domestic and international resources, 
open up both domestic and international markets, and acquire the ability to both 
realise domestic constructions as well as develop foreign economic relations. (CCCPC 
Party Literature Research Office, 1982a, p.5)  
 
In light of these instructions, China began to accept international multilateral development 
assistance in the following year (Penny, 2007, cited in Zhou, 2008a). While fully concentrating 
on domestic development, in July 1979, the current leader Deng Xiaoping23 pointed out in 
the Central Meeting on the Works of Foreign Affairs (中央外事工作会议):  
 
We should acknowledge that the decision to assist the third-world countries was correct. 
Although our economy is still having difficulties, we have to come up with the necessary 
budget for foreign aid. From a strategic standpoint, when we are developed, we need to 
provide more assistance to other countries. China should always keep this in mind. In 
providing foreign aid, we should continue to comply with The Eight Principles, but it is 
the specifics that we have to adjust in order to really benefit the recipient countries. 
(Wang, 1998, cited in Liu, 2009, p.51) 
 
Guided by his words, China continued to deliver development assistance to third-world 
countries while also gradually recovering domestic productivity and subsequent economic 
capacity. It was then that China launched a complete reform of its foreign aid.  
 
                                                          
23
 Deng Xiaoping was appointed Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference in between 1978 and 1983. 
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The Initial Reform  
Since Deng's assertion, as well as those of the 3rd Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the CPC, and in line with the newly determined diplomatic objective of 
expanding foreign economic relations, in March 1980, the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Liaison put forward a guideline for conducting further foreign aid during the National 
Conference on Foreign Economics (全国外经工作会议). The guideline confirmed that China's 
foreign aid should "uphold proletarian internationalism, stand by The Eight Principles, 
expand foreign economic and technological cooperation, to provide and to receive equally 
and to mutual benefit, make due contributions to friendly countries and accelerate China's 
Four Modernisations (四个现代化)" (Shi, 1989). Later in May of that year, with formal 
approval of this guideline from the State Council, not only did the Chinese government affirm 
that its foreign aid would be an integral part of foreign economic cooperation, but it also 
plainly implied that economic interests were no longer secondary to political concerns. 
Instead, economic interests became a decisive factor for China's providing of foreign aid.  
 
However, due to Vietnam and Albania's continuing problematic relations with China, both 
the Chinese public and officials hesitated regarding China's foreign aid, questioning whether 
to provide foreign aid at all. Despite the revised guidelines, the implementation of China's 
foreign aid encountered a number of difficulties in the early 1980s (ibid.). In order to cope 
with this situation, the Central Committee and the State Council delivered The Comments on 
Conscientiously Providing Foreign Aid24 in response. This document stated:  
 
Since the establishment of China, foreign aid has directly coordinated with China's 
foreign conflicts, improved China's foreign diplomatic relations and consolidated the 
international alliance against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. Provided with 
China's current international status, it is aided by the support of third-world countries. 
Although problems and issues have surfaced, some of them have been sorted out and 
the rest are being resolved. (CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, 1982b, p.727) 
 
Added to these comments, the General Secretary of the CPC Hu Yaobang25 again stressed 
the meaning of China's foreign aid:  
 
To assist people in the third-world defend their national independence, and that to help 
them develop their economy is our compelling obligation. In the past 30 years, we have 
devoted ourselves to this mission. Although there have been some mistakes, generally 
speaking, our work has played an important role in international affairs… Our comrades 
should know that delivering foreign aid to third-world countries is a strategic matter, it 
is too serious to be taken lightly. (CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, 1982b, 
p.1127) 
 
Subsequent to both of these efforts in reinstating confidence in providing foreign aid, the 
12th National Congress of the CPC further commented on China's foreign policy. It suggested 
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that when China approaches another country, it should abide by the principles of politically 
mutual trust, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; strive for 
mutual economic benefits and achieve common development (Li, 2006b, p.17). To this point, 
not only had China's foreign relations in substance broken away from dominant political 
influences by abandoning ideological preferences, but its foreign aid development had also 
expanded to a notably broader ground.  
 
In December 1982, to further promote confidence in the effectiveness of China's foreign aid 
and economic cooperation with third-world countries, the Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang26 
conducted China's second ministerial tour of Africa27. Upon completion, Zhao announced in 
Dar es Salaam that28: 
 
On the basis of continuingly providing available foreign aid, the Chinese government is 
seeking to expand economic and technical relations with African countries, to advance 
the essentially donated, unidirectional assistance to effect mutually beneficial economic 
and technical cooperation; therefore promoting Sino-African relations as the power to 
achieve our individual economic development and modernisation. (Xinhua, 1983)  
 
Such an aim was summarised on Zhao's return as the intention of China to uphold equality 
and mutual benefit, place emphasis on practical results, bring forward diverse methods and 
achieve common progress (ibid.). These words later became the specific guideline for China's 
foreign aid in Africa – The Four Principles of Economic and Technical Cooperation between 
China and African Countries (The Four Principles, 中非经济技术合作四项原则)29. 
  
To implement these new principles, carry on further research and devise measures for the 
future of foreign aid, the 6th National Conference on Foreign Aid was convened in September 
1983. In addition to re-stressing the importance of consolidation and cooperation with 
third-world countries, it placed particular emphasis on the cost-effectiveness of foreign aid. 
As this conference concluded: 
 
In order to conduct further foreign aid, China needs to arrange projects and programs in 
accordance with the available resources, to explore varied methods and therefore to 
utilise the limited funds available to achieve maximum practical results. While keeping 
foreign aid expenditure within China's financial capacity, the distribution of foreign aid 
must also be optimised in order to strictly avoid past mistakes where certain countries 
were allocated significantly more foreign aid than others. (Li, 2010, p.22)  
 
As a result of this conference, not only was China's foreign aid given a new framework to 
increase on its economic concerns, but the confidence in providing foreign aid was also 
resumed, thus guaranteeing the ensuing foreign aid implementations. Further, in accordance 
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with these instructions, Zhao subsequently outlined30 the specific foreign aid emphases in a 
government report as follows:  
 
For the existing foreign aid with third-world countries, we will continue to provide 
services to realise their economic potentials. For the agreed foreign aid projects and 
programs, we will continue to fulfil them to the highest standard. As for the third-world 
countries that are suffering particular difficulties, we will keep on providing available 
foreign aid, with the focus on less financially demanding, more effective projects and 
programs that directly benefits the local people. (1986, p.504) 
 
Adhering to these emphases, China began to request the recipient countries share some of 
the foreign aid costs, and officially adjusted its foreign aid objective in Africa from building 
African industrial and agricultural foundations to reducing expenditure while consolidating 
foreign aid outcomes (Zhou, 2008a). Moreover, on the basis that China instructed its further 
foreign aid planning to be downsized in order to reduce foreign aid expenditures, and in 
consideration to the recipient countries' contemporary productivity and management 
capacities as learnt in the pre-reform period, the less financially demanding and less 
technical landmark projects replaced the industrial and agricultural foundation projects 
(Yang and Chen, 2010). 
 
What ensued was a decade of continuing foreign aid reform and implementation, until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s changed the international landscape once 
again, as it initiated the current wave of political and economic liberalisation across many 
third-world countries. Meanwhile, with its planned economic system deemed unable to cope 
with new development demands, China thus took this opportunity to proceed with its 
conversion to a market economy (Mao, 2011). That also included a conversion of its foreign 
aid approaches, as indicated by the Minister of Foreign Economic and Trade Li Lanqing31, 
"Where possible, China's foreign aid in the future should be further integrated with 
economic and technical cooperation, to develop across financial and human resources 
sectors and comprehensively establish cooperation based relationship with the recipient 
countries" (1993, cited in Zhang, 2009).  
 
Aside from China's realisation that, "according to previous experiences, the simple donation 
based foreign aid approach aid is not beneficial to the development of both China and 
Africa" (CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, 1982b, p.1128), with considerations to 
African perspective, as seen in the Tokyo International Conference on African Development32, 
"The productivity development based on the increase of foreign trade and overseas 
investment is significantly more effective than the traditional inter-government cooperation" 
(Zhang, 1994, p.62). It can be seen that by 1993, both China and its African recipient 
countries had realised the disappointments in relying on foreign aid alone to improve the 
development of Africa. In seeking to integrate foreign aid with economic cooperation, so as 
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to further foreign aid effectiveness with available resources, China decided to proceed to the 
next step in foreign aid reform – those opportunities brought along by the new market 
economic system.  
 
1979 to 1993 was the transitional period of China's foreign aid in Africa. As a result of the 
Cultural Revolution, China's collapsed economy left it devastated with a need to reform its 
development agenda. As Li and Wu pointed out, "At this stage, China was compelled to 
reinstate its domestic productivity. In spite of weakened yet demanding political interests, 
China's foreign aid was needed to facilitate urgent economic development" (2009, p.48). 
Under these circumstances, China's foreign aid experienced a decrease between 1979 and 
1982 as a consequence of the assets required for initiating domestic economic recovery (Liu, 
2008a). Along with the improving economy, in 1983 China gradually resumed its foreign aid 
to Africa; and, as noted by Kong, "China delivered more than 130 Complete Project Aid and 
Technical Aid in more than 30 African countries by 1993" (1989, cited in Liu, 2008b, p.84), 
subsequently establishing diplomatic relationships with an addition of 7 African countries33, 
which increased the total number foreign aid recipient countries on the continent to 48. 
 
To coordinate with China's emphasis on domestic development, aside from introducing The 
Four Principles as an Africa-centred, economic interests-emphasised addition to The Eight 
Principles, China's foreign aid administration was restructured along with major reforms to 
accommodate the new objective of reducing expenditure while consolidating foreign aid 
outcomes. In March 1982, with approval from the Standing Committee of the 5th National 
People's Congress, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison, State 
Planning Committee and Foreign Investment Managing Committee (1979-1982, 外国投资管
理委员会) merged into the Ministry of Foreign Economic and Trade (1982-1993, 对外经济贸
易部). In this process, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison transformed into a single 
department (the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, 援外司) within the new ministry. 
It took charge of foreign aid planning and budget management, while the management of 
foreign aid implementations was entirely delegated to the Complete Plant Export Company 
(at this stage also known as the Foreign Aid Implementation Bureau, 援外项目执行局). 
 
Ensuing this institutional merger, China's foreign aid was upgraded with the Investment 
Responsibility Mechanism (投资包干制)34 and the Contract Responsibility Mechanism (承包
责任制)35 respectively. Of these operating mechanisms, the former was implemented 
particularly to replace the Delivery Department In-chief Mechanism which was found unable 
to adequately control China's foreign aid expenditure. It assigned the responsibility of 
overseeing the entire implementation process of a foreign aid project to the given ministerial 
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or provincial department, therefore granting it autonomy. Following three years of piloting, 
in December 1983, the Contract Responsibility Mechanism was then implemented based on 
a policy of creating separate enterprises from government administrations36. Instead of 
ministerial and provincial institutions, the newly established subsidiary enterprises of these 
institutions (State Owned Enterprise, SOE, 企业单位) became the main parties of foreign aid 
implementation. They were made to work to the advantage of realising financial autonomy, 
and thus improved the implementation efficiency of foreign aid (Huang and Hu, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, given the sharp increase in the number of delivered projects, the question of 
how to sustain project effectiveness also became a progressively more important issue in the 
1980s, especially with regards to the industrial and agricultural foundation projects agreed to 
in previous periods. In spite of the Technical Aid organised specifically in order to transfer the 
required technical and management skills to the local people, a lack of understanding of the 
complexities of local conditions and the extreme interpretation of the principle of 
"non-interference with each other's internal affairs"37 significantly dampened the outcomes 
of such foreign aid. During implementations, Chinese experts were mainly focused on 
delivering technical training; however, they also dared to participate in the management of 
the project, and even caused further foreign aid to be increasingly delivered on a turnkey 
basis. In this situation, given the lack of local human resources and policy protection, not 
only did the majority of China's foreign aid projects suffer deficient productions, but some of 
them were even pushed to the verge of collapse (Shi, 1989). 
 
To overcome these difficulties, China thereafter trialled a number of tailored methods based 
on the existing Technical Aid package, including Management Participating, Management 
Cooperation, Mandatory Administration, Joint Investment Cooperation and Contract by 
Lease (Lu, 1988). In order to move these individual trials to standard practice, and with the 
aim of fundamentally revising the situation of "a number of projects that have suffered great 
loss due to the backwards nature of local technical and management conditions" (Zhang, 
2009), in January 1984, the Ministry of Foreign Economic and Trade delivered additional 
instructions in the work of Opinions Regarding the Consolidation of Constructed Complete 
Projects38. On the basis of integrating Management Cooperation (管理合作) into Technical 
Aid, this government work enabled the Chinese experts to be directly involved in project 
management and operation, a move that notably enhanced the sustainability of China's 
foreign aid (Zhou, 2008a). 
 
With positive outcomes beginning to appear as a result of this integration, China continued 
to search for methods of delivering effective and sustainable foreign aid. In 1987, owing to 
the lack of technical and managerial capacities of the recipient country, a team of Chinese 
experts was dispatched to lease the Togo Anie Sugar Refinery39. In view of the improved 
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production subsequent to the lease, this leasing cooperation based approach quickly became 
a new implementation method of China's foreign aid: Foreign Aid Joint Ventures and 
Cooperative Projects (援外项目合资合作)40 and received publicity in 1992 (Li, 2006a). In 
support of this method, the State Council also approved the Fund of Multiple Foreign Aid 
Forms (多种形式援外专项资金)41 and allocated it to the management of the MOFTEC and 
MOF. Regardless of it being relatively limited in scale (maximum 200 million CNY from 
China's foreign aid budget per annum), it was nevertheless the first attempt by the Chinese 
government in the promotion of mutually beneficial, cooperation based foreign aid approach 
(Liu, 1998). 
 
By the beginning of 1993, in order to prepare China's foreign aid for the market economy as 
well as to further encourage its potential economic interests, the 1st Session of the Eighth 
National People's Congress promptly advanced the Ministry of Foreign Economic and Trade 
to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC, 1993-2003, 对外贸易
经济合作部). It also reorganised the Complete Plant Export Company to the Complete Plant 
Import and Export Cooperation Group (COMPLANT, 成套设备进出口集团公司) by making it 
a SOE instead of a subsidiary public institution.42 While completely centralising foreign aid 
administration to MOFTEC, COMPLANT was therefore made responsible solely for foreign aid 
implementation, which substantially improved China's foreign aid planning integration and 
maximised the financial autonomy of foreign aid implementation. In addition, the operating 
mechanism of China's foreign aid, meanwhile, was also upgraded to the Enterprise Contract 
Responsibility Mechanism (企业总承包责任制) to further accommodate this institutional 
reform (Zhang, 2012b).  
 
With regards to the improvement of China's foreign aid implementation methods in this 
period, besides the above mentioned developments of Complete Project Aid and Technical 
Aid, noticeable progress was also made in its Medical Teams and overseas training programs 
(both were still categorised as Technical Aid). For instance, formerly arranged by the Ministry 
of Health but negotiated and dispatched by the correspondent foreign aid institutions, the 
management of Medical Teams was completely delegated to the Ministry of Health in 1985 
in order to increase efficiency in allocating specialised teams and thus to maximise overall 
budget control.43 Concerning China's overseas training programs, as well as the foreign aid 
projects related Foreign Internship programs, these were swiftly increased in scale to adapt 
to the rising number of delivered projects. The Overseas Scholarship Program at this stage 
also became a permanent feature of China's foreign aid (Li et al., 2009). As for China's 
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participation in International Multilateral Aid, it joined the UN Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries (TCDC) in 1982 (Shi, 1989).  
 
To sum up this transitional period of China's foreign aid in Africa, following the inauguration 
of the reform policy and additional foreign aid principles, China's foreign aid focuses were 
further adjusted to Africa, and the newly stressed economic interests significantly improved 
the efficiency of China's foreign aid. Leads to the heavily reformed foreign aid administration 
and the introduction of various cooperative implementation methods, not only did this initial 
reform of foreign aid relieve China's financial burdens carried over from the previous period, 
but it also introduced China's foreign aid development to a route emphasising both political 
and economic benefits. However, while China's foreign aid at this stage seemingly coped 
with its domestic development concerns and Africa's development needs, the evolving 
international circumstances meant that both the insufficiencies of traditional foreign aid 
approaches and China's planned economic system became increasingly apparent towards 
the end of this period.  
 
The Initial Reform of China's Foreign Aid in Africa 
 
Surveying this initial reform period, China's foreign aid successfully broke away from its 
earlier situation dominated by political interests. It began to take shape in a relatively 
balanced agenda that encompassed both economic and political interests. Consequent to 
settling the 10 years of political unrest, the stabilising international environment to a degree 
softened China's extreme pursuit of proletarian internationalism. Not only was China at this 
stage enabled with international assistance to promote domestic development, but its 
foreign aid also transformed from being predominately an instrument of political ideology to 
an approach for promoting bilateral economic development. Consistent with the principal 
aim of helping African countries achieve self-reliance, this additional dimension of economic 
interests attached to China's foreign aid replaced the objective of building African industrial 
and agricultural foundations. With a new emphasis placed on reducing expenditure while 
consolidating foreign aid outcomes, it brought along the landmark projects as well as guided 
China's foreign aid to the exploration of mutually beneficial cooperation. 
 
In line with this revised objective, The Four Principles were subsequently put forward to lead 
China's foreign aid through this period. Being an inheritance from and development of The 
Eight Principles, this new guidance was established on China's principles of internal affairs 
non-interference and mutual respect. With particular attentions placed on "the strong points 
and potentials of both sides on the basis of their actual needs and possibilities"44, it has been 
stressed that this bilateral economic and technical cooperation should be implemented with 
a rational and pragmatic vision, instead of idealistic passion. More importantly, foreign aid to 
other countries should not undermine China's own development, but should foster both 
China and Africa's development progress (Zheng, 2000). Upon the introduction of these 
principles, China's foreign aid finally escaped from the extreme situation it was in during the 
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Cultural Revolution. Confidence was also restored in foreign aid implementation, and for the 
first time foreign aid was made secondary to China's domestic development.  
 
To adapt to this adjusted foreign aid guidance, the Chinese government centralised the 
administrations of foreign aid, foreign economic and foreign trade to boost institutional 
integration, it also established SOEs to take over foreign aid implementations and modified 
foreign aid operating mechanisms accordingly to maximise the economic interests of foreign 
aid. Moreover, determined to reduce China's foreign aid expenditure, with regards to the 
progression of foreign aid implementation methods, this transitional period of China's 
foreign aid development witnessed the creation of a number of cooperative methods. Not 
only were explorations carried out in the implementations of foreign aid projects and 
programs, China also attempted to direct its foreign aid towards mutually beneficial 
cooperation by initiating particular funds. Further, whilst Goods and Materials Aid and Cash 
Aid continuously decreasing given their emergency based applications, Complete Project Aid 
and the Management Cooperation integrated Technical Aid again led China's development 
assistance to Africa in this period.45 
 
Nevertheless, alongside the successes of the initial reform, the extreme situation that China 
arrived at during the previous period had a number of consequences that continued to affect 
its foreign aid in the 1980s. In particular, the shortage of financial capacity forced China to 
opt for the less financially demanding and less technical landmark projects. "Albeit such an 
alteration seemingly catered for both China's contemporary economic situation and African 
countries' divergent local conditions, the nature of these projects determined its limitations 
in delivering a similar degree of development assistance compared to the industrial and 
agricultural projects"46. Further, as a result of the inadequately delivered Complete Projects 
Aid and Technical Aid, the shortage of human resources led to foreign aid insufficiencies, 
regardless of the promptly implemented Management Cooperation that was particularly 
arranged to resolve this issue. As noted by Zheng, "Even with the switch to landmark projects, 
most of the African recipient countries have still failed to maintain their functionality, and 
eventually became dependent on China's foreign aid" (2000, p.98).  
 
To conclude, during the initial reform of China's foreign aid, other than some improvements 
made in accordance with China's development concerns, the outcomes of China's foreign aid 
in Africa by and large remained the same. From the Chinese standpoint, as well it put 
forward the objective of reducing expenditure while consolidating foreign aid outcomes to 
preserve its domestic development, China's foreign aid began to transform from the 
donation based approach to mutually beneficial cooperation (Zhou, 2008a). From the African 
side, given the general incompetency of China's foreign aid, some of the recipient countries 
raised concerns and felt that, "the Chinese are keen on securing foreign exchanges rather 
than providing development assistance" (Yan, 1987, p.53). Furthermore, as pointed out by Li, 
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"Despite China's new funding method and Management Cooperation, the majority of its 
foreign aid have stayed in non-profit forms nonetheless" (2010, p.24). On these notes, with 
both the donor and recipient countries struggling with the initial reform of China's foreign 
aid, the opportunity carried by global political and economic liberalisation brought another 
series of reforms.  
 
Chapter Summary 
 
In looking at the way China's foreign aid in Africa developed from the Bandung Conference in 
1955 to the end of the initial reform period in 1993, one can see that it had successes in 
meeting China's political and economic interests and that China's foreign aid developed to a 
stage where it was capable of delivering some development assistance to Africa. As a result 
of evolving international and domestic conditions, China successively introduced foreign aid 
to support Africa's liberation movements, strengthen African countries' capacities against the 
imperialist world and help African countries achieve self-reliance. In the pursuit of these 
aims, other than the initial humanitarian and military aid delivered to African countries to 
assist them achieve national independence, China consistently provided development 
assistance to help African countries achieve self-reliance, and duly determined objectives of 
building industrial and agricultural foundations to boost Africa's development capacity, as 
well as reducing expenditure while consolidating foreign aid outcomes to explore mutually 
beneficial cooperation and improve foreign aid effectiveness.  
 
Along these objectives, the development of China's foreign aid before the reform period was 
overwhelmingly influenced by Mao's political considerations centring on the desire to 
protect China's political sovereignty and expand China's diplomatic relations. With The Eight 
Principles emphasising equality and mutual benefit, not only was China's foreign aid 
grounded on a friendship basis by stressing that "It [China] never regards such aid as a kind 
of unilateral alms but as something mutual"47, it was deeply impacted by the belief in 
proletarian internationalism and to a large extent this prohibited it from attaching any 
conditions such as pursuing economic benefits. When furthered by the extreme political 
ambitions raised during the Cultural Revolution period, China's foreign aid was organised 
completely on political grounds, so much so that it neglected China's own economic capacity 
and resulted in substantial harm to China's domestic development. For these reasons, 
whether China's foreign aid was aimed at liberating third-world countries or helping African 
countries achieve self-reliance, it was predominately driven by China's political interests.  
 
Then came the reform policy. On the basis of China's significantly elevated global status and 
the disastrous development caused by the Cultural Revolution, the stabilising international 
environment promptly brought economic interests to bear on China's foreign aid. While The 
Four Principles placed additional emphasis on cooperation between China and Africa, Deng's 
argument that China should provide more foreign aid once it developed itself substantially 
revised the order of priority attached to domestic development and foreign aid, and gave 
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priority to the economic development of both China and Africa. However, in spite of these 
new economic interests underpinning the development of China's foreign aid, China's foreign 
aid in essence only changed in the details of implementation so as to preserve China's 
domestic development and to promote foreign aid outcomes in Africa. The motivation for 
China's foreign aid, on the other hand, remained in line with its political interests to actively 
develop equal and mutually beneficial foreign relationships.  
 
Working towards these political aims, China's foreign aid achieved a number of notable 
developments. Regarding China's foreign aid administration, while it was initially governed 
by the Central People's Government and coordinated by its subsidiary institutions, the 
administration of China's foreign aid was first devolved to state institutions. This was 
followed by two mergers: the unification of foreign aid administration prior to the reform, 
and the integration with foreign economic and trade administrations during the reform. By 
the end of 1993, with the intention to further promote the economic interests of foreign aid, 
China completely separated the administration and implementation of foreign aid. In doing 
so, China delegated the former to the MOFTEC and devolved the latter to the COMPLANT; 
thus, it effectively granted financial autonomy to foreign aid implementations. In short, the 
development of China's foreign aid administration accommodated to both the demands of 
foreign aid implementations and China's interests in the given period.  
 
Regarding the operating mechanisms adopted for China's foreign aid, China successively 
introduced the Delivery Ministry In-chief Mechanism and the Contract Department In-chief 
Mechanism in the pre-reform period. With foreign aid implementations undertaken by the 
relevant ministries and provincial departments, these mechanisms exploited China's yet 
limited capacity and satisfied the growing demand for China's foreign aid. Following the 
domestic reform, and in view of the potential weaknesses of these administrative means 
based mechanisms, China promptly put forward the economic means orientated Investment 
Responsibility Mechanism, Contract Responsibility Mechanism, and Enterprise Contract 
Responsibility Mechanism during the initial reform period. Although still restricted within the 
planned economic system, these improved mechanisms adequately coordinated with the 
devolvement of China's foreign aid administration, significantly enhanced the efficiency of 
China's foreign aid implementations and prepared it for the coming market economy.  
 
Furthermore, in providing foreign aid to African countries, China accordingly developed three 
main foreign aid funding methods and four implementation methods. In particular, whilst 
China's foreign aid budget was being utilised through the applications of Grant, Interest-free 
Loan and Low-interest Loan, Complete Project Aid was established as the primary method 
for both building African industrial and agricultural foundations, and the delivery of 
landmark projects. In conjunction, Technical Aid was then introduced to improve the transfer 
of the required technical and management skills to the recipient countries; and, subsequent 
to the reform, it became the pilot for China's pursuit of mutually beneficial cooperation. 
Moreover, given the emergency based applications, although the other two implementation 
methods – Goods and Materials Aid and Cash Aid were gradually dropping out of China's 
foreign aid to African countries during the initial reform, both of these methods contributed 
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in assisting African countries' liberation movement at the very beginning. 
 
Owing to these efforts, China's foreign aid accomplished many successes for both China and 
Africa. From the Chinese point of view, foreign aid first helped in the battles against the 
capitalist invasions to its neighbouring countries, consolidated the communist regime and 
improved China's external situation by creating allies with countries from the continent of 
Africa. Then, in the political rivalry with the US and Soviet Union, foreign aid lifted China out 
of the diplomatic quandary and supported its competition with Taiwan over the legitimacy in 
the UN. As a result of China's significantly elevated international status, foreign aid not only 
subsequently became the instrument to manifest China's international responsibility, it also 
contributed to the ensuing cooperation between China and Africa. Whereas in the search for 
economic development during the reform, upon political interests were for the first time 
made secondary to China's domestic development, Beijing quickly integrated economic 
interests into its foreign aid and began to transform it into a cooperative link connecting 
China's domestic economic development and the markets of the recipient countries.  
 
From the African perspective, they benefited early from China's support for their liberation. 
China's foreign aid first assisted African countries in their opposition to colonial domination. 
And then, following Africa's political independences, China's foreign aid swiftly transformed 
into development assistance and provided Africa's immediate need for basic supplies, as well 
as delivered support for the development of industrial and agricultural foundations to assist 
Africa's economic independence. After forwarding development focus to the economy, aside 
from continuing to support Africa's infrastructure building with landmark projects, China's 
foreign aid also contributed to Africa's human resource development in consideration to 
African countries' current development capacities. Although it is impossible to make clear 
the impacts of China's foreign aid to Africa given the secrecy of the Chinese government, in 
view of the large amount and significant Complete Project Aid projects that were delivered 
to Africa as identified earlier, it can still be adequately argued that China's foreign aid to 
some extent contributed to Africa's self-reliance.  
 
It is also worth noting that, alongside the delivery of these sound results, China's foreign aid 
had a number of drawbacks and particularities that affected its outcomes, as well as China's 
domestic development. To be exact, with regards to China's politically motivated foreign aid 
decisions, foreign aid delayed China's domestic recovery from the turmoil left by the feudal 
regime. Meanwhile, with the foreign aid distribution likewise tied to political considerations, 
the development of China's foreign relations had been restricted only to socialist and 
nationalist countries. Furthermore, as a result of this overwhelming political influence and 
the rapidly evolving international circumstance, in addition to causing substantial waste of 
development resources when the recipient countries suddenly adopted a strategic change, 
considering the overly approved foreign aid requests for fulfilling obligations of proletarian 
internationalism, this political interests dominated foreign aid impacted as extensive as the 
livelihoods of China's own population.  
 
More to the point, apart from these strategic planning related consequences, the funding 
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methods of China's foreign aid were also problematic. Provided that the government budget 
remains the only financial resource to China's foreign aid, in spite of China's intention to 
utilise Interest-free Loan as its primary foreign aid funding method, or to allocate Grants to 
only recipient countries in great financial difficulties, the pessimistic repayment rate of both 
loan methods brought China's foreign aid to an unidirectional financial basis, hence again 
intensifying the financial burden to China's domestic development. Even though during the 
initial reform period, China attempted to overcome this situation by introducing alternative 
funding methods to drive its foreign aid towards mutually beneficial cooperation, China only 
managed to put forward marginal funding in this thinking, but was unable to implement 
adjustment to the financial resources of foreign aid, which is arguably the key point to the 
improvement of the financial situation of China's foreign aid.  
 
With concerns to the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa, in spite of the efforts and 
compromises that China made in helping African countries achieve self-reliance, both the 
effectiveness and sustainability of China's foreign aid in Africa was also largely undermined. 
With exceptions for some of the projects that eventually managed to contribute to the 
recipient countries' development as intended, the majority of China's foreign aid projects 
required immediate Technical Aid and additional attentions after the transfers, regardless of 
whether it was the relatively straightforward landmark projects, or the piloted cooperation 
methods that were introduced particularly to address this issue. Depending on the extreme 
interpretations to The Eight Principles, and the massive gap between China's understandings 
and African countries' diverse domestic conditions, China was under pressure to maintain its 
foreign aid outcomes, while most of the African recipient countries were left with insufficient 
foreign aid and continued to struggle along foreign aid dependencies. 
 
To conclude the research on the history of China's foreign aid in Africa: from assisting Africa's 
liberation movements to the pursuit of mutually beneficial economic cooperation, China's 
foreign aid evolved from being dominated by political interests to emphasising both political 
interests and economic development needs. In this process, asides from actively contributing 
to Africa's liberation movements at the beginning, China's foreign aid has insisted on helping 
African countries achieve self-reliance, and duly determined objectives in building African 
industrial and agricultural foundations, as well as reducing expenditure while consolidating 
foreign aid outcomes. Through the exercise of these objectives, by promptly advancing 
foreign aid planning and implementation approaches in pace with the evolving domestic and 
international situation, not only was China's foreign aid successfully en route from simply 
donating to Africa to providing the capacity for African countries to develop, but China's 
political demands were also followed. 
 
By the end of 1993, in view of the declining foreign aid outcomes and the need to adjust 
domestic economic structure, China began to further reform its foreign aid. On the basis of 
the now reformed foreign aid administration and mechanisms, how China's foreign aid 
sought to satisfy African recipient countries' demand for productivity development based 
foreign trade and overseas investment, and how China's foreign aid evolved along with the 
increasing concern on economic interests became central. With these issues in mind, the 
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next chapter focuses on China's foreign aid development at present, and aims to uncover the 
changes in China's foreign aid objectives, planning and implementation approaches. By 
placing particular attentions on the newly inaugurated foreign aid funding method of the 
Concessional Loan, and the further progressed traditional foreign aid objective of improving 
people's livelihoods, chapter four understands how China's commercial interests orientated 
contemporary foreign aid collaborates with its friendship building emphasised traditional 
development assistance. 
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Chapter Four: The Present of China's Foreign Aid in Africa 
 
After discussing the route that brought China's foreign aid in Africa to its current formation, 
and understanding China's earlier foreign aid objectives and practices, chapter four examines 
the development of China's foreign aid in Africa between 1994 and 2012. Continuing with 
the same purpose of identifying China's foreign aid objectives in Africa, and the foreign aid 
planning and implementation approaches it accordingly developed, this chapter focuses on 
two primary questions: what is China's current foreign aid objective in Africa? And how does 
China deliver its foreign aid to Africa at present? With these questions in mind, chapter four 
is arranged in two sections exploring first the contemporary aims of China's foreign aid in 
Africa, and then the foreign aid practices it developed in pursuit of these aims. 
 
In the first section, this study investigates China's foreign aid development from 1994 when 
China arrived at the final preparation of its market economy transformation. It covers two of 
China's succeeding foreign aid development periods: The Further Reform (1994-2004) and 
The Return (2005-present). On the basis of finding that the development of China's foreign 
aid in Africa was further pushed to explore mutually beneficial economic cooperation, this 
section first brings out China's profitability grounded foreign aid funding method in the 
Concessional Loan. And then, upon discovering this steadily expanded commercial approach 
to foreign aid overshadowed China's traditional foreign aid for almost an entire decade, it 
surveys China's current foreign aid objective of improving people's livelihoods and finds that 
China's foreign aid of today, not only accommodates China's political and economic interests, 
but also seeks to fulfil Africa's development needs. 
 
Subsequent to identifying China's current foreign aid objectives in Africa, the second section 
focuses on China's duly developed foreign aid planning and implementation approaches. On 
the basis of elaborating on the framework introduced by The White Paper (2011), it is 
composed of three parts that detail the current practices of China's foreign aid. To be specific, 
the first part summarises the institutions involved in planning and managing China's foreign 
aid, and sets out China's current foreign aid operating mechanisms. In the second part, this 
study outlines the funding methods of China's foreign aid and explains the foreign aid 
statistical regulations that the Chinese government has adopted. Finally, based on reviewing 
China's foreign aid implementation methods, the third part links each of these methods with 
its dedicated management institutions, and points out the current packaging preference of 
China's foreign aid. 
 
In summary, the study of China's current foreign aid development in Africa inspects China's 
attempts to promote its foreign aid for mutual benefit. Whilst following up on China's 
considerations in determining its foreign aid objectives in Africa, it draws particular attention 
to China's developed foreign aid planning and implementation approaches. Therefore, this 
chapter completes our understanding of China's foreign aid development; it builds up the 
knowledge required for the ensuing assessments of China's foreign aid performance in Africa, 
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and indeed for the investigation into the successes and failures of China's foreign aid in the 
past six decades. To achieve these aims, this chapter looks at elites' speeches, government 
documents, existing research, field interviews and unpublished materials to identify China's 
current foreign aid objectives and practices. Again, where available, quantitative data are 
utilised to indicate the scale of China's foreign aid. 
 
Further, as a prelude to understanding China's current foreign aid in Africa, what needs to be 
recapitulated here is that China's foreign aid development has split into two paths since the 
inauguration of the Concessional Loan in 1994. In accordance with the specifics pointed out 
by the Chinese officials put forth in the introduction chapter, this study is concentrated on 
the foreign aid solely funded by Chinese government budgets and used for the promotion of 
recipient countries' economic development and welfare. More to the point, this is seen as 
traditional foreign aid in this chapter and is distinguished from the Concessional Loan as a 
new, integrated type of foreign aid. In terms of the Concessional Loan, as identified earlier, it 
to some extent conflicts with the general understanding recognised foreign aid norms and as 
such it is not considered as China's foreign aid in this study, but rather as a competitively 
rated commercial funding method.  
 
China's Foreign Aid in Africa: 
From the Grand Economic Strategy to the 5th FOCAC Meeting 1994 – 2012 
从经贸大战略到第五届中非合作论坛 
 
In pace with the evolving global development trend and China's deepening domestic reform, 
both the internal and external situations of China's foreign aid have undergone profound 
changes. With the ending of the Cold War and the stabilising of the international situation, 
political rivalry and military confrontations declined between states. In contrast, economic 
and, science and technology based competitions have taken the centre stage. Provided the 
increased economic emphasis in development, traditional foreign aid donor countries have 
shifted their priorities away from the Least Developed Country[ies] (LDGs) and have began 
focusing instead on China, India and other minority developing countries that possess 
greater capabilities of repayment and development of markets. Since the mid-1990s, this 
current has gradually pushed Grant based foreign aid out of the focus of international 
development assistance whilst business orientated, cooperation based foreign aid is now the 
theme in modern day donor-recipient relations (Yuan and Yang, 2003).  
 
Regarding China's foreign aid specifically: realising that inter-government cooperation based 
foreign aid is no longer satisfactory to both China and Africa, China has taken advantage of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting liberalisation of the international market to 
complete its own transformation to a market economic system, as well as to speed up its 
transformation of foreign aid towards one in which further economic interests of China are 
embedded. Following the institutional adjustments at the end of 1993, which established the 
market economic system adapted foreign aid arrangement; the MOFTEC for foreign aid 
administration and the COMPLANT for foreign aid implementation, the Chinese government 
promptly introduced development guidance for its current foreign aid – The Grand Economic 
62 
 
Strategy (大经贸战略). In line with this strategy, to push forward foreign aid restructuring, to 
promote direct cooperation between Chinese and recipient countries' enterprises thereafter 
became the new goals of China's foreign aid (Lin, 1995). 
 
The Further Reform 
On 11 May 1994, following the conclusion of China's foreign aid institutional reform and 
market economic system conversion, the Minister of MOFTEC Wu Yi1 addressed The 1990s 
China's International Business Strategy Seminar2, saying:  
 
Considering the next step of Reform and Opening Up, the increasing demand for further 
development and the current circumstances of foreign trade, China's foreign economic 
relations in the 1990s must proceed in accordance with import and export trade based; 
goods, capital, technology, labour cooperation and exchange integrated; foreign trade, 
manufacturing, technology, finance and other institutions jointly participated Grand 
Economic Strategy. (1994, p.4)  
 
In light of this talk, not only was China's foreign aid continuously asked to uphold friendship 
building, but it was also intended to stimulate China's foreign economic and trade, to assist 
Chinese enterprises to open up the markets of the recipient countries, and to carry out 
various funding methods based and comprehensively focused cooperation (Zhang, 2012b).  
 
Apparently, Grant based, non-profit driven traditional foreign aid was unable to achieve this 
advanced and economically based objective. To break out of such a restrained framework 
and interact on China's newly founded market economy, the next step of China's foreign aid 
reform was twofold: on the one hand it focused on diversifying foreign aid implementation 
participants in order to truly pass on the financial autonomy of foreign aid implementation 
to enterprises, as well as to improve budget coordination amongst financial institutions. On 
the other hand, it stressed on expanding the current implementation approaches in order to 
explore economic cooperation that was grounded in business orientated development 
assistance (Li, 2010). Abiding by this thinking, after a year of research and preparation, the 
State Council brought forward a paper entitled On the Issues Related to the Foreign Aid 
Reform Approval3, which officially launched the sequence of China's foreign aid reform 
emphasising on domestic economic development needs (Huang, 2010). 
 
In accordance with this formal approval, whilst also reconfirming on the guidance of The 
Eight Principles and The Four Principles to China's foreign aid in the subsequently convened 
National Conference on Foreign Aid, the State Council clearly expressed its encouragement 
for all foreign aid projects that were going to be carried out on any kind of joint management, 
cooperative management and Chinese enterprises solely operated basis (Huang and Lang, 
2010).4 Aimed at integrating China's reform experience with its foreign aid, and to initiate a 
                                                          
1
 Wu Yi was appointed Minister of the MOFTEC in between 1993 and 1998. 
2 
"吴仪在 90年代中国外经贸战略国际研讨会上的主旨报告". Wu Yi's Principal Report. 
3
 "关于改革援外工作有关问题的批复". This document was delivered in May 1995. 
4
 This conference was convened in October 1995. 
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foreign aid and overseas investment combined economic and trade relationship to fully 
exploit the potentials of African markets, the Vice Prime Minister Zhu Rongji5 pointed out in 
regards to China's foreign aid objective in developing countries, particularly the African 
developing countries:  
 
We have to adopt incentive policies to support our outstanding enterprises to conduct 
various sector resided economic cooperation in Africa, to promote those recourses 
viable, marketable and profitable medium to small sized projects, to push forward direct 
cooperation between competitive Chinese and recipient countries' enterprises. (Qi, 
1995, p.4) 
 
To put these words into practice, in the successive report of Implementation of the State 
Council's Directives, Further Reform of Foreign Aid6, Wu pointed out the specifics for China's 
further foreign aid adjustments. With regards to the packaging of China's foreign aid, she 
first suggested that China should promote the existing implementation method of Foreign 
Aid Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects, as well as the newly introduced funding method 
of the Government Subsidised Concessional Loan (Concessional Loan, 政府贴息优惠贷款)7. 
And then, concerning the utilisation of these, Wu added that the Chinese government should 
encourage and support enterprises to apply the former method to reinstate the operations 
of the delivered projects; and to employ the latter method to initiate viable, marketable and 
profitable medium to small sized foreign aid projects. Whereas considering the future budget 
planning of China's foreign aid, as she additionally confirmed, "Aside from continuingly fulfil 
the already agreed Interest-free Loans, China hereafter terminates this funding method fully 
supports the promotion of Concessional Loan and Grant" (Zou, 1995). 
 
Following these instructions, China made a number of efforts in Africa in promoting these 
new variants of its foreign aid. In addition to the Vice Prime Ministers Zhu Rongji, Li Lanqing8 
and Qian Qichen's9 18 visits in 1995 (Li, 2012, p.19), Chairman Jiang Zemin10 conducted 
China's first Supremo African tour in 1996.11 Subsequent to finding that African countries' 
rich resources and vast potential markets were highly complementary to China's economic 
development, he noted, "Africa's immense territory and rich natural resources has provided 
it with great potentials for economic development... China should place particular attention 
on conducting variously sized, broadly focused mutual beneficial cooperation between 
capable Chinese and African enterprises" (Chen, 2008). On his return, not only were these 
words put forward as China's contemporary economic development guidance – The Going 
                                                          
5
 Zhu Rongji was appointed Vice Prime Minister of the State Council in between 1991 and 1997. 
6
 "贯彻国务院指示, 进一步改革援外工作". This document was delivered in October 1995. 
7
 Concessional Loan is a foreign aid funding method that mobilises funds from commercial banks where the 
interests is subsidised by the government budget, so that the loan interest rate is reduced for recipient countries, 
and loan conditions become more favourable. Unpublished government document, The Loan Regulations of the 
EXIM Bank, obtained on 1 September 2011. 
8
 Li Lanqing was promoted to Vice Prime Minister of the State Council in 1993 and stayed in office until 2002. 
9
 Qian Qichen was appointed Vice Prime Minister of the State Council in between 1993 and 2003. 
10
 Jiang Zemin was appointed Chairman of the PRC in between 1993 and 2003. 
11
 Duration: the 8 to the 22 of May 1996; the countries visited were: Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe. 
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Out (走出去战略), but China's foreign aid thereafter stepped up from the passive role of 
China-Africa relations and become the initiative that drove China's economic links to the 
continent.  
 
After three years of successful foreign aid reform, and in response to Africa's readily growing 
interests in China's business orientated combination of cooperation and foreign aid, China 
decided to advance this relationship to an institutional level. Thus, it launched the Forum of 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and convened its first ministerial meeting in Beijing on 10 
October 2000 (Zhang, 2006a). This conference was concluded with The Beijing Declaration12 
and The Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development13 as 
guides for the development of China-Africa relations in the 21st century, in the words of 
Minister of MOFTEC Shi Guangsheng14, China additionally promised: 
 
To gradually increase foreign aid to Africa to implement projects and programs across 
extensive sectors; to cancel the debt of 10 billion CNY to relief the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPCs) and LDGs; to set up particular fund for joint ventures and 
cooperative projects; and to establish Africa Human Resources Development Fund (非洲
人力资源开发基金) to help African countries training professional talents. (2000) 
 
As a result of the establishment of this multilateral liaising platform, the FOCAC ensured a 
steady development of China-Africa relationships so that by the time the second ministerial 
meeting convened in Addis Ababa in 2003, China's compliance with The Beijing Declaration 
and its prompt efforts in realising its pledges had won abundant praise from the African 
participants.15 Not only had it straightforwardly demonstrated that China had competently 
integrated its own economic interests with its foreign aid, but the progress of the FOCAC also 
built a solid foundation for the continuous implementation of The Going Out policy. 
 
1994 to 2004 was the improvement period of China's foreign aid in Africa. To adapt to the 
switch from Cold War confrontation, China's foreign aid development progressed from an 
economic interests appended exploratory reform to an entirely financial benefits concerned 
transformation. Guided by The Grand Economic Strategy and The Going Out policy, this 
further reform advanced China's foreign aid with government, enterprises and financial 
institutions working in a joint participation framework. It also diversified China's foreign aid 
funding and implementation methods (Zhang, 2007), as well as revolutionised the previous 
inter-government cooperation based foreign aid approach to business grounded cooperation 
                                                          
12
 "中非合作论坛北京宣言". See http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhy/DOC12009/t606796.htm, accessed 16 
June 2012. 
13
 "中非经济和社会发展合作纲领". See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/wjjh/hywj/t157834.htm, accessed 16 
June 2012. 
14
 Shi Guangsheng was appointed Minister of the MOFTEC in between 1998 and 2003. 
15
 These efforts include but not limited to: establishing 22 special committees to liaise with foreign aid 
implementation, relieving due loan of 10.9 billion CNY by June 2002, delivering 72 complete projects, introducing 
1.2 billion USD investment with 826 Chinese enterprises, training more than 7,000 professional personnel, 
achieving more than 20 bilateral ministerial visits. Unpublished government document, October 2006, Follow Up 
Report of the FOCAC 2000, p.4. WANG, Q. 2004b. The Addis Ministerial Conference Addressing Sino - African 
Cooperative Operation. West Asia and Africa, 42-45. 
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between Chinese and African enterprises, and notably improved the situation of "regarding 
China's foreign aid, the recipient country is the dominant and only beneficiary" (Li, 1999, 
p.93). At this stage, China officially determined Africa to be its main economic cooperation 
partner, and vice versa, so Africa became the primary ground for China's foreign aid.  
 
Along with this substantial shift towards economic development, China carried out a number 
of adjustments to its foreign aid approaches. Of these, the most significant changes were the 
introduction of the Concessional Loan and the promotion of the Foreign Aid Joint Ventures 
and Cooperative Projects. Not only a dedicated policy bank – the Export and Import Bank 
(EXIM Bank) was consequently established in 1994 to manage the former, but by collecting 
repayments on China's early Interest-free Loans, Low-interest Loans, and the Fund of 
Multiple Foreign Aid Forms, the Fund of Foreign Aid Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects 
(援外合资合作项目基金) was also set up four years on to support the latter. However, what 
needs to be pointed out is that Foreign Aid Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects was only 
a small part of China's foreign aid (Lin, 1997). It was more a supportive method owing to its 
particular focus of China's earlier delivered projects, and its rather limited financial allowance 
(each loan generally did not exceed the amount of 10 million CNY or 1.53 million USD).16  
 
In addition to these newly integrated commercial implementation and funding methods to 
China's foreign aid, regarding the development of China's traditional foreign aid approaches 
in this period, in spite of China's at large unimproved foreign aid budget, it individualised the 
Human Resource Development Cooperation (HRDC) from Technical Aid in 1998. Replacing 
the previous training programs and scholarships that were focused on Chinese foreign aid 
projects, while this improved HRDC was broadly organised in the subjects of Government 
Official Seminar, Technical Professional Training, Overseas Student Scholarship, Expert Going 
Out Program and Exchange Program (Li et al., 2009), it further pushed the emphasis of 
China's traditional foreign aid towards developing African human resource capacity. More to 
the point, according to the pledges that China made in the FOCAC meeting in 2000, and in 
addition to setting up the Africa Human Resources Development Fund to support the above 
mentioned programs, China's foreign aid also welcomed a new implementation method of 
Debt Relief.17  
 
Together with these improvements in China's foreign aid approaches, the changes applied to 
China's foreign aid institutions and mechanisms can be considered. Subsequent to the 
establishment of the MOFTEC and COMPLANT in 1993, China successively introduced the 
Project Tendering Mechanism (援外项目招投标机制), Project Supervision Mechanism (援外
项目设计施工监理机制) and other integral mechanisms to encourage the involvement of 
SOEs (Xue, 2011), and to further expand the scope of participants in foreign aid deliveries 
                                                          
16
 Although this fund was established with margins of China's government foreign aid budget, owing to its 
commercially approached operation, it is not considered to be a method of China's traditional foreign aid with 
which this study is concerned. See "援外合资合作项目基金管理办法", Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation and the Ministry of Finance on Issuing the Measures for the Management of the Fund of 
Foreign Aid Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the 
Ministry of Finance [1998], No. 481. 
17
 See Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/wjjh/hywj/t157834.htm, accessed 29 June 2012. 
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(Xiao and Zhang, 2002). Additionally, China also put forward a series of codes of practices to 
govern the amplified foreign aid process.18 In March 2003, with the purpose of further 
integrating China's domestic trade with its international economic cooperation, the 1st 
Plenary Session of the Tenth National People's Congress elevated MOFTEC to the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC, 2003-present, 商务部) and appointed to it the complete administration of 
China's internal and external economic and trade affairs.  
 
To conclude, this further reform period of China's foreign aid in Africa led to the arrival of 
China's economic development climax where China prominently integrated foreign aid into 
its overseas economic and trade cooperation, and strategically fixed its partnership with 
Africa. Provided with the extensive promotion and wide acceptance of its new cooperative 
foreign aid approaches, not only did China realise its domestic development and Africa's 
economic growth (Zhang et al., 2010), but it substantially altered the earlier situation where 
only the bare minimum of loan repayments were received. As implied by a senior Chinese 
official, "By providing foreign aid loans through a commercially managed policy bank in 
essence changed the scenario from that of a friendly government loan to that of a business 
loan, and in doing so China has managed to recover more than 98% of its total loans due 
from Africa"19. As a result of this significantly improved financial situation, the Concessional 
Loan became the most prominent funding method of China's foreign aid in this period. 
 
In contrast, while China's commercial approach to foreign aid created economic benefits for 
both China and Africa, the development of China's traditional foreign aid has yet to make any 
substantial progress throughout this decade. Aside from the HRDC programs introduced in 
the late 1990s, China's traditional foreign aid has at large remained focused on providing 
landmark projects as per the initial reform.20 Until August 2004, subsequent to the change in 
principal leadership, China's traditional foreign aid at long last caught the attention of its 
decision-makers once again. As indicated in China's first Conference on China's Economic 
Diplomacy in Developing Countries (全国对发展中国家经济外交的工作会议), "For future 
foreign aid works, China has to make due improvements in both its political and economic 
influences in the international ground, adequately places foreign aid emphasis on people's 
livelihoods related projects, emergency humanitarian assistance, medical teams and human 
resources training" (Xinhua, 2004).  
 
The Return 
A year after this conference, on the basis of continuing to promote the economic interests 
emphasised foreign aid approaches, China's traditional foreign aid made a sharp return on 
15 September 2005, when Chairman Hu Jintao21 delivered the speech entitled Strive to Build 
                                                          
18
 These codes of practices include but not limited to: "对外援助支出预算资金管理办法", Measures for the Financial 
Administration of General Foreign Aid Provided by the Chinese Government [1998], "对外援助成套项目施工任务实施
企业资格认定办法试行", Measures for Accreditation of Qualifications of the Enterprises Undertaking the 
Construction of the Complete Foreign Aid Projects [2004], "对外援助物资项目实施企业资格认定办法试行", Measures 
for Accreditation of Qualifications of the Enterprises Undertaking Foreign Aid Material Projects [2004]. 
19
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2 September 2011. 
20
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Beijing, China, 1 December 2011. 
21
 Hu Jintao was appointed Chairman of the PRC in between 2003 and 2013. 
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A Harmonious World, Where There Are Permanent Peace and Common Prosperity22 at the 
Summit on the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the United Nations. The key points 
of his speech focused on the need to "uphold equality and realise harmonious cooperation, 
persist in mutual trust and realise common security, uphold mutual benefits and realise 
common development, uphold the spirit of inclusiveness and realise civilised dialogue" 
(Xinhua, 2005). This plainly pointed out to the fact that "the substance of a win-win situation 
is not only a simple share of benefits, but requires caring for and supporting poor and 
developing countries" (Li, 2010, p.26). Being one of the most important carriers of China's 
mutually beneficial development strategy, foreign aid swiftly entered a new development 
phase in the aim of building a harmonious world. 
 
To demonstrate China's commitment, Hu announced in the successive UN High-Level 
Meeting on Financing for Development, The Five Measures to Accelerate development for 
Developing Countries (中国加强与发展中国家经济合作的五项举措)23 duly outlining the 
promises of China's next phase of foreign aid. According to this announcement, besides 
continuing to support the recipient countries' economic development utilising Debt Relief, 
Concessional Loan (and Preferential Buyer's Credit, 优惠出口买方信贷)24 and Zero-tax 
Treatment, two of the five measures directly emphasised improving people's livelihoods. In 
addition to restating the importance of medical and health development, particularly with 
consideration to Africa's current development conditions, China's determination to advance 
developing countries' human resources capacities was for the first time elevated to a primary 
concern in its foreign aid.  
 
Subsequent to this UN meeting, and in view of further aligning China's Going Out policy 
towards Africa, the Chinese government quickly released the first issue of China's African 
Policy Paper (中国对非洲政策文件) in January 2006. This paper first suggested that China 
and Africa should establish a politically mutual trust, economically mutual beneficial, and 
culturally mutual referenced new type of strategic partnership to further expand the scope 
of China-Africa cooperation. And then, it thoroughly elaborated additional plans for political 
dialogue, economic cooperation, medical and health support, humanitarian assistance and 
peace building operations. Likewise, these plans were correspondingly stated in China's 11th 
Five-Year Development Guidelines (2006-2010), as again stressed by Hu in the next Central 
Meeting on the Works of Foreign Affairs25: 
 
We should accordingly increase our foreign aid as our economic capacity improves, 
particularly in consideration to support the developing countries to accelerate their 
economic development, and to improve their people's livelihoods standards. (Xinhua, 
2006a) 
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 "努力建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界". See 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/18/n/2012/1103/c351073-19483816.html, accessed 2 August 2012. 
23
 For full article, see Appendix III. 
24
 Introduced in 2002, Preferential Buyer's Credit is a variation on the Concessional Loan, and it is also solely 
managed by the EXIM Bank of China. Unpublished government document, The Loan Regulations of the EXIM 
Bank, obtained on 1 September 2011. 
25
 This conference was convened in August 2006. 
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Later in December 2006, in order to follow up China's commitments and Hu's instructions 
and in order to advance this cooperative relationship to strategic partnership, "deepening 
political relations of equality and mutual trust, expanding mutually beneficial economic 
cooperation, boosting mutual learning and cultural exchange, promoting balanced and 
harmonious global development, and strengthening mutually supported international 
cooperation" (XinHua, 2006b), the FOCAC Beijing Summit26 quickly came to the agreements 
of a Declaration27 and an Action Plan28. As a concluding remark, China also put forward an 
Eight-Point Plan (中国对非洲合作八项举措)29 to coordinate this newly established strategic 
partnership. Initiated with the intention to "increase assistance to African countries, and by 
2009 double the size of its assistance to African countries in 2006"30, this practical plan 
advanced the development of China's traditional foreign aid by a number of specified 
projects and programs related to improving people's livelihoods. In addition, it also included 
the building of the African Union Headquarters. 
 
From this point onwards, on the basis of setting the developing principles of the China-Africa 
strategic partnership (Liu, 2008a), the desire to improve people's livelihoods has officially 
evolved into the objective of China traditional foreign aid. In accordance with which, not only 
have the packages of China's traditional foreign aid become increasingly complete, blending 
Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid, Goods and Materials Aid, Medical Teams and HRDC, the 
advantages of this friendship building purposed foreign aid was also clearly exercised – by 
explicitly revolving around Africa's underlying needs of livelihoods improvement and human 
resources capacity building, it indeed echoed China's principal foreign aid aim of helping 
African countries achieve self-reliance. More to the point, considering the current landmark 
projects were no longer adequate for this revised objective, schools, hospitals, training 
programs and other people's livelihoods related projects and programs in turn became the 
main theme of China's foreign aid in Africa.31 
 
In the mean time, while attention was on the HRDC, in July 2007, the Minister of the MOC Bo 
Xilai32 stressed at the 1st National Conference on Foreign Aid HRDC (全国援外培训工作会议) 
that, "since the progress of international development assistances gradually places emphasis 
on social development, in providing China's HRDC, we should follow this tendency, and meet 
the recipient countries' development concerns so as to create an optimised external 
environment for our enterprises going out and enhance China's international influence"33. To 
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 The third FOCAC ministerial Conference. 
27
 "中非合作论坛北京峰会宣言", The Declaration of the Beijing Summit. See 
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t606841.htm, accessed 2 August 2012. 
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 "中非合作论坛 - 北京行动计划", The FOCAC – Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009). See 
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t280369.htm, accessed 2 August 2012. 
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be specific about the promotion of HRDC in Africa, as Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi34 indicated 
during the specialised ministerial meeting, "China's massive investments in African human 
resources is owed to the rising international importance of Africa and to the particularities of 
African human resources development in strengthening the China-Africa friendship"35. As a 
result of these instructions, in addition to revising HRDC programs to further accommodate 
the individual conditions of Africa, China's entire foreign aid planning priorities began to shift 
from a focus on infrastructures to a focus on building African human resources capacity.36  
 
Following two years of promptly realising its latest commitments,37 in September 2008, 
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao38 delivered China's future concerns for developing countries and 
additional foreign aid plans at the UN High-Level Meeting on the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) (Xinhua, 2008). Beginning by demanding that developed countries create an 
accommodating environment in which developing countries could focus on improving their 
people's livelihoods instead of simply aiming for economic development, Wen insisted on 
adopting a "selfless and non-conditional"39 approach in providing international development 
assistance. Upon stressing "China's commitments to honour its responsibility"40, he proposed 
The Six Measures for Foreign Aid (对外援助六项措施)41 for the promotion of the MDGs 
achievement. Besides focusing on the much emphasised issues of education, agriculture, 
medicine and health, China introduced the issue of clean energy development to its foreign 
aid as a way to take Africa's development into the 21st century.  
 
However, by the end of 2008, the dramatic global economic crisis substantially impacted 
Africa's development once again. Many of the traditional foreign aid donor countries found 
great difficulties in realising their promised ODA targets, and the result was a minimum of a 
one third decrease in overall international development assistance (Li et al., 2009, p.334). In 
this situation, China's foreign aid became even more critical to Africa's development. With 
the aim of building Africa's confidence in China's foreign aid, in February 2009, Hu conducted 
his second African tour42 and announced in Mali that, "although China is also suffering from 
this economic crisis, nonetheless China will insistently fulfil all the pledges made in the 2006 
FOCAC meeting, continuously increase foreign aid to Africa wherever possible within its 
capacity allowance, and expand the scale of trade and investment so as to boost pragmatic 
cooperation between China and Africa" (Xinhua, 2009).  
 
To prove his commitment to honouring China's responsibility, in the immediate 2009 FOCAC 
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Ministerial Conference held in Egypt, while noting that China already fulfilled more than 90% 
of its 2006 FOCAC pledges,43 the participants promptly agreed on a Declaration44 and an 
Action Plan45 again to proceed with China-Africa strategic cooperation in the next three 
years. Additionally, following Wen's speech of Deepening the New Type of China-Africa 
Strategic Partnership for Sustainable Development46, China announced The New Eight-Point 
Plan (中国对非洲合作新八项举措)47 to further encourage strategic cooperation between 
China and Africa. Aside from broadening the scale of projects and programs used to drive 
international development, the current global concerns regarding the environmental and 
climate changes were also brought to bear on China's foreign aid in Africa. 
 
Subsequent to putting forward these agreements and pledges, and in line with the focus on 
improving people's livelihoods and the newly added aim of providing developing countries 
with an accommodative developing environment, the Minister of the MOC Chen Deming48 
explained in regards to the next phase of China's foreign aid implementation:  
 
The New Eight-Point Plan is primarily aimed at improving Africa's self-development 
capacities. That is in practice, we should keep on building up our HRDC capacity, train 
more technical and management professionals to accelerate African countries' 
infrastructure development, improve African people's livelihoods, take further effective 
measures to reduce poverty and upgrade education and medical standards, support 
more Chinese enterprises to invest in the cause of African people's livelihoods and 
create more employment opportunities to deliver the benefits directly to the hands of 
African people. (MOC, 2009b)  
 
Not only did The New Eight-Point Plan continue the principles of China's previous pledges, 
but evolve in accordance with this new promise, the implementations of China's foreign aid 
became increasingly versatile.  
 
Provided with these continuingly adjusted foreign aid aims and objectives, in the interest of 
upgrading China's foreign aid capacity to accommodate these changes, in the 9th National 
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Conference on Foreign Aid49, Wen addressed the key points to improve the performance of 
China's foreign aid:  
 
Further foreign aid has to be alert to the aspects of foreign aid distribution: pushing the 
balance further towards LDGs, inland and island countries, increasing the proportion of 
projects that favour local people. It just also be aware of foreign aid quality: upholding 
scientific appraisal, adequately plan foreign aid projects and improving on feasibility 
research. Additionally, besides focusing on bring up recipient countries' development 
capacities, attentions also needs to be placed on upgrading foreign aid mechanism: 
speed up the process of building an active, effective and flexible foreign aid processing 
mechanism. (Xinhua, 2010)  
 
Explicitly pointed out the existing issue of the unbalanced development of China's foreign aid 
and the growing requirements of international development assistance, not only was Wen's 
instructions highlighted the immediate need to improve China foreign aid capacity, but the 
ways to further adapt China's foreign aid to African conditions were also brought forward. 
 
Shortly after this conference, Wen attended the UN High-Level Meeting on the MDGs50 for a 
second time. With the experiences attained in implementing China's previous Six Measures 
for Foreign Aid, and realistic expectation of achieving the MDGs under current circumstances, 
Wen pointed out the difficulties caused in recent years by natural disasters and the global 
economic crisis. Whilst calling attention to China's present concerns for developing countries' 
livelihoods and economic development, Wen once again put forward a (New) Six Measures 
for Foreign Aid (对外援助六项新措施)51 to assist developing countries to achieve their 
MDGs. Largely planned in reference to the previous Six Measures, these measures expanded 
the list of qualifying countries and products exempt from import duty as well as extended 
the debt relief terms. In addition to these items, China also repeatedly pledged a number of 
projects and programs considering Africa's agricultural, educational and human resources 
development. 
 
In order to realise Wen's instructions and China's global promises, the Central Committee 
designated the following year (2011) as the Year of Foreign Aid Quality (援外质量年). The 
Minister of the MOC Chen named five objectives to its annual foreign aid development 
agenda: "Steadily increase foreign aid scale, promote foreign aid legal construction, improve 
the quality of foreign aid works, boost foreign aid capacity building, and carry out foreign aid 
research"52. Guided by these objectives, as well as promptly releasing 12 codes of practices 
and initiating 19 research projects in the same year, the MOC enforced comprehensive 
evaluations of China's foreign aid delivered since its first modern pledges made in 2006. 
Throughout these evaluations, not only were the foreign aid management institutions and 
delivery enterprises sent to seminars to study China's foreign aid policies; but after 
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inspecting the planning and implementation standard of each projects and programs, the 
MOC rescinded the qualifications of enterprises that had delivered substandard outcomes, 
and rewarded those who had achieved excellences.53 
 
Moreover, besides these efforts in improving China's foreign aid capacity, the MOC released 
an official publication in April revealing how China's foreign aid works. Mainly concerned 
with obtaining domestic and international support, demonstrating China's determinations in 
global poverty reduction and comprehensive development, and sharing China's foreign aid 
experience with the international community, The White Paper on China's Foreign Aid54 
systematically explained China's foreign aid policy, key areas of focus, financial resources, 
and funding and implementation approaches. Albeit in the context of this paper, the primary 
figures of China's foreign aid were at large provided in a vague and indistinct manner, it was 
nevertheless the first attempt by Beijing to make China's foreign aid transparent.  
 
After emphasising improving foreign aid quality in 2011, themed on Open Up New Prospects 
for A New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership55, the 5th Ministerial Conference of the 
FOCAC convened in Beijing in 2012. On the basis of celebrating the progress of China-Africa 
cooperation since 2006 and the realisation of both the old and new Eight-Point Plan (FOCAC, 
2012c), Hu pointed out that tremendous changes that had taken place in the world in those 
past six years. Not only was the impact of the global financial crisis still affecting developing 
countries, but uncertainties and destabilising factors in international developments also 
increased (FOCAC, 2012a). Given such a situation, he proposed five priority areas for foreign 
aid to be used to advance the China-Africa strategic partnership, which were:  
 
To expand cooperation in investment and financing, to increase development assistance 
and deliver the benefits to the African people, to support African integration and help 
Africa bring up overall development capacity, to carry out people-to-people friendship 
tying actions, and to promote peace and stability in Africa to create a secure developing 
environment. (FOCAC, 2012b)  
 
In the interest of furthering the China-Africa strategic partnership, this proposal inherited the 
principles of China's previous international commitments; and more, with concerns to open 
up new prospects for development, it pointed out additional needs for promoting cultural 
exchange as well as African integration. Guided by these development prospects, this 
conference was concluded with a Declaration56 and an Action Plan57 once more to direct 
China-Africa strategic cooperation in the next three years. By this stage, not only was the 
development of China's foreign aid in Africa began evolving towards fulfilling China's political 
and economic pursuits, but it was also sought to caring for both Africa's individuals and the 
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unity of Africa as a whole. 
 
All in all, concerning the future development of China's foreign aid in Africa, China's foreign 
aid is currently placing attention on three key areas: First, while continuously focusing on 
people's livelihoods improvement, in order to enhance African countries' development 
capacities, "further assistance is going to be increased in the forms of HRDC instead of the 
then concentrated hardware projects"58; Second, to improve the outcomes of China's foreign 
aid and to accommodate the influence of China's foreign aid across African borders, "China is 
going to promote its foreign aid on the sub-regional level, and drive the common bilateral 
foreign aid towards multilateral cooperation"59; Third, to encourage exchanges in between 
governments, enterprises and the peoples, that is, to create a supportive environment for 
China's enterprises going out, "China is going to extensively boost China-Africa friendship 
development at the individual level, initiate and support media visits, research activities and 
other forms of cultural exchange programs"60. 
 
2005 to 2012 was the comprehensive development period of China's foreign aid in Africa. 
Following a decade of peaking economic interests, Hu's proposal for building a harmonious 
world eventually brought China's traditional foreign aid back to the diplomatic frontline, and 
successfully integrated it into China's business expansion on the African continent. Especially 
after the 2006 FOCAC meeting, and the successively implemented Plan[s] and Measures, 
China's traditional foreign aid entered a phase of rapid development so as to achieve the 
objective of improving people's livelihoods. As evidenced by the rapidly elevated bilateral 
relationships – from the mutually beneficial cooperative relationship to the mutual progress 
emphasised strategic partnership; from the quest for sustainable development to the calling 
for new prospects, by pursuing both politically and economically emphasised development 
cooperation, China's foreign aid has become ever effective in accomplishing the demands of 
China and Africa. 
 
In the wake of this contemporary framework, China's foreign aid was made able to achieve a 
number of improvements under the administration of the MOC. With regards to China's 
traditional foreign aid, while putting forward Multilateral Training Programs to associate all 
the participating countries, and introducing Bilateral Training Programs to satisfy the specific 
need of an individual country,61 five national institutions62 were appointed to accommodate 
China's rapidly expanding HRDC programs from 2008. In the interest of improving the 
efficiencies of Medical Teams, its allocation principles were adjusted so as to prioritise the 
regions with established Chinese foreign aid hospitals, so that the Medical Teams could be 
better integrated and thus enhance overall outcomes.63 In addition to these changes made 
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in the implementation process, besides the above mentioned inauguration of the codes of 
practices, research projects, and supervision tours, China also established a Foreign Aid 
Expert Database (援外专家库) and a Foreign Aid Project Database (援助项目数据库) to 
further enhances its foreign aid capacity.64  
 
Regarding China's commercial interests emphasised foreign aid approaches, what needs to 
be particularly clarified is that although the old and new Eight-Point Plan seems to have 
introduced two new funding methods to China's foreign aid in Africa – the China-Africa 
Development Fund (CADF, 中非发展基金) and the Special Loan for the Development of 
African SMEs (非洲中小企业发展专项贷款), neither of these funding methods are foreign 
aid. In spite of their specified arrangements aiming to encourage Chinese enterprises to set 
up cooperation businesses in Africa and to support the development of African small to 
medium sized businesses, or as explained by Chen, "[To support] the development of local 
infrastructure, people's livelihood, agricultural, employment, environmental protection, and 
in particular the capacity building for the host country to achieve an independent and 
sustainable future" (cited in CDB, 2009, p.5), both of these China Development Bank (CDB, 
中国发展银行) managed funding methods are operating on a complete commercial basis.  
 
In sum, as a result of the balance and integration of foreign aid development priorities, along 
with the deepening strategic relationship of China and Africa, China's traditional foreign aid 
was taken to the heart of China's African diplomacy once again, and it was successfully 
merged into a modern development plan concerned with both friendship building and 
economic benefits. Through the successively settled Declarations and Action Plans, indeed 
the old and new Eight-Point Plan and Six Measures, not only China's foreign aid continued to 
focus on the development of Africa's hardware, but it also began to balance the emphasis 
towards Africa's social development as well as improving its own capacity. In contrast to past 
foreign aid that was particularly biased towards prompting recipient countries' economic 
development, and was primarily the result of inter-government cooperation, it can be said 
that China's current foreign aid is gradually transforming into a people focused and most 
importantly, people benefited comprehensive development assistance.  
 
The Lead of China's Foreign Aid in Africa at Present 
 
To survey the current aims and objectives of China's foreign aid, following the introduction of 
The Grand Economic Strategy in 1994, China's foreign aid development initially went to one 
extreme where it placed predominate emphasis on economic interests. Leading to the 
intention of transforming its previously donation-based foreign aid to mutually beneficial 
cooperation, China promptly integrated its internal and external economic and trade into its 
foreign aid; and further, replaced its long favoured turnkey projects with cooperative 
enterprises. Entering the past decade with China's steadily increasing global responsibility, 
China appointed new objectives to its traditional foreign aid and duly integrated it with the 
business orientated contemporary foreign aid (Wang and Zhu, 2008). As summarised by Hu 
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and Liu, "When Western countries gradually reduced their investments in Africa in the late 
1990s, China has rightly confronted Africa's development difficulties, and adequately placed 
its foreign aid emphasis on African countries' economic development as well as their urgent 
needs of improving people's livelihoods" (2009, p.20).  
 
Built on these revised aim and objectives, China's foreign aid achieved rapid development in 
the new century (Zhang, 2006b). Not only have the implementation approaches of China's 
foreign aid progressed with a variety of methods developed to cope with African countries' 
diverse development needs, upon convening the routine planning meetings of the FOCAC, 
this multilateral liaising platform has significantly promoted cooperation between China and 
Africa, and swiftly advanced the focuses of China's traditional foreign aid from infrastructure 
to education, science and technology, cultural and other people's livelihoods related sectors. 
In addition to these improvements, the present-day development of China's foreign aid also 
placed particular attention on its beneficiaries and practicality, that is, the emphasis on 
enhancing African countries' human resource development and the ways to realise this 
emphasis. A typical metaphor utilised by Chinese scholars is to say that China's foreign aid in 
Africa has successfully evolved from providing a "blood transfusion" to encouraging "blood 
production" (Shu, 2010, p.85). 
 
In view of these adjustments to China's foreign aid in Africa, on the basis of upholding the 
consistently followed determination of helping African countries achieve self-reliance, the 
development of China's foreign aid at present can be summarised as follows. On the one 
hand, it keenly focuses on the improvement of itself – advancing foreign aid planning and 
implementation approaches, promoting foreign aid quality and upgrading institutional 
mechanisms. On the other hand, it progressively chases the objective of improving African 
people's livelihoods – promoting higher education, health and medical standards, questing 
for the enhancement of African countries' development capacity. And then, to a broader 
extent, it facilitates Africa's integration and push for regional stability. In a word, along with 
the commitments raised through FOCAC and international meetings, not only has China's 
current foreign aid adjusted to both its political and economic interests, but it has also at the 
same time, developed to accommodate Africa's development concerns.  
 
China's Foreign Aid in Africa: 
The Current Planning and Implementation Approaches 
当代中国对外援助的计划和实施 
 
Having explored the aims and objectives of China's current foreign aid above, this section 
details the planning and implementation approaches China developed as a result. Aimed at 
improving our understanding of China's foreign aid practices as well as building up the 
measures required for the subsequent investigation of China's foreign aid performance, this 
section is structured in three parts that closely examines China's foreign aid institutions, 
funding and implementation methods. In accordance with The White Paper (2011), the MOC 
is the administrative ministry authorised by the State Council to oversee foreign aid, along 
with the Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation, the China International 
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Centre for Economic and Technical Exchanges and the Academy of International Business 
Officials which are in charge of foreign aid implementation management. Given the earlier 
finding that China's foreign aid currently employs three primary funding methods and eight 
implementation methods, this section now explores: how are each of these institutions and 
methods related? And, how is China's foreign aid operated? 
 
The Planning of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对外援助的规划 
With regards to the planning of China's foreign aid, the authority over decision-making has 
always resided in the hands of the Central People's Government.65 Since the first foreign aid 
China delivered in the 1950s, the State Council has continuously introduced and reformed 
foreign aid institutions and mechanisms so as to finally arrive at this current point in which 
the MOC, the MOF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC, 1954-present, 外交部) lead 
twenty-one central and provincial institutions in a joint participation foreign aid planning 
arrangement. Through the foreign aid planning process, the MOC is primarily concerned with 
the economic aspect of foreign aid and mainly deals with the establishment of foreign aid 
policies, the drafting of country specific foreign aid plans and the coordination of foreign aid 
implementations. The FMPRC on the other hand, is responsible for the political aspect of 
foreign aid such as the foreign aid principles and the decisions on supply. Additionally, the 
MOF controls the distribution of China's annual foreign aid budget (Huang and Hu, 2009). 
 
Aside from these larger foreign aid planning responsibilities, there are other institutions that 
take part in China's foreign aid according to their specialities, and they undertake planning 
for specific foreign aid projects and programs. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture 
arranges agricultural experts to transfer the required technologies to Chinese agricultural 
sites while the Ministry of Health allocates medical personnel, medicines and medical 
equipment to dispatch Medical Teams. In addition to these planning responsibilities, the 
management of these specialised project and program implementations are also passed to 
these institutions. Furthermore, adhering to the Notification of Adjustments of Foreign Aid 
Project Management66 implemented by the MOC in 2008, the implementation management 
of China's primary foreign aid methods; namely, Complete Project Aid, Goods and Materials 
Aid and HRDC, were likewise assigned to the subsidiary public institutions of MOC to further 
enhance administrative efficiency.67  
 
However, what needs to be particularly pointed out is that although the participation of 
specialised institutions have gradually increased in recent years, representing the Chinese 
government negotiates and signs off foreign aid agreements, the MOC remains the most 
important foreign aid institution of China (He, 2010). Altogether within the MOC, there are 
seven departments and institutions associated with the policy making, management and 
liaison of China's foreign aid. 
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The Policy Making Departments 
对外援助的政策制定机构 
 
1. Department of Western Asian and African Affairs of the MOC68 
商务部西亚非洲司 
Liaising with all of the Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Offices stationed in the West 
Asian and African region, this department collects and researches country specific data and 
provides policy suggestions to the ministry. Apart from bringing together foreign aid related 
information, it also files other reports investigating the recipient country's trade, economic 
cooperation, and cultural backgrounds. 
 
2. Department of Aid to Foreign Countries of the MOC69  
商务部对外援助司 
The Department of Aid to Foreign Countries is the central administrative division of China's 
foreign aid. On the basis of planning for China's annual foreign aid, this department does the 
following: internationally, it negotiates with the recipient country's government in regards to 
developing foreign aid agreements; and domestically, it supervises the institutions managing 
foreign aid and further, develops and enforces foreign aid policies and codes of practices.  
 
3. Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC)70  
商务部国际贸易经济合作研究院 
As a subsidiary academy of the MOC, the CAITEC only respond to the researches initiated by 
the ministry, and it publishes internally circulated journals and statistics. This academy also 
edits and releases China's official publications such as The White Paper on China's Foreign 
Aid. Besides general economic and trade focused researches, it has a dedicated China-Africa 
Research Centre that was established in 2010. 
 
The Implementation Management Institutions 
对外援助的执行机构 
 
4. The Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation  
商务部国际经济合作事务局 
Established in 2003, this executive bureau is appointed and commissioned by the MOC to 
manage the implementation of Complete Project Aid, promote foreign aid services and 
support Chinese enterprises going out. Primarily concerned with the management of 
Complete Project Aid, it organises the project bidding, tendering enterprises verification, 
supervision and inspection of contract execution as well as the construction of Complete 
Project Aid expert teams and database. In addition, this executive bureau also currently 
manages the implementation of Technical Aid.  
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5. China International Centre for Economic and Technical Exchanges (CICETE)  
中国国际经济技术交流中心 
The CICETE was founded in 1983 as a subsidiary public institution of the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic and Trade. It was first assigned to manage the cooperative projects between China 
and the United Nations' organisations such as the UNDP71 and the UNIDO72 to promote 
human resources exchanges and to increase economic and trade cooperation to support the 
modernisation of China. It was later appointed to provide training courses for Chinese 
foreign aid personnel and to procure China's Humanitarian Aid supplies. In 2008, the CICETE 
was additionally assigned to the implementation management of Goods and Materials Aid. 
 
6. Academy for International Business Officials (AIBO)  
商务部培训中心 
Being the only associated training centre of the MOC, the AIBO is one of the first the State 
Council approved Foreign Aid Training Centres (援外培训基地). When AIBO began to engage 
in HRDC programs in 1998, it was initially assigned to provide economic seminars for the 
developing countries' commercial officials. Subsequent to the foreign aid management 
adjustment in 2008, it became the principal coordinator of China's HRDC programs. In 
addition to preparing training courses for high-level officials, the AIBO was also appointed to 
arrange specialised training courses and associated training centres. 
 
The Liaison Office 
对外援助的联络机构 
 
7. Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office73  
中国驻外使(领)馆 
Since China established its first Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office in Vietnam in 
1956, these worldwide offices have become the frontline communication and management 
institutions of China's foreign aid. Principally focused on the local environment research, 
contract negotiation, foreign aid personnel protection and implementation supervision, the 
office not only assists in the planning of China's foreign aid, but it also supervises the foreign 
aid project and program deliveries, as well as monitoring effectiveness and sustainability 
after project submission. 
 
How China Processes Its Foreign Aid 
 
In the process of providing foreign aid, the involved institutions closely liaise and cooperate. 
When the MOC draws up country specific foreign aid plans, it seeks advises from the FMPRC 
and MOF along with other participating institutions to assist and manage specialised foreign 
aid projects and programs. To be specific, the exercise of China's foreign aid usually begins 
either with a Letter of Intention from the recipient country to the local Economic and 
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Commercial Counsellor's Office or with recommendations from the local Chinese embassy. 
Upon a feasibility consultation within the office (normally the request far exceeds China's 
foreign aid planning74), the initially approved requests or accepted recommendations are 
sent back to the MOC for a final decision. While most of the proposals are processed within 
the ministry, projects that exceed 100 million CNY (approximately 12.5 million USD) need to 
be put to the State Council for further approval. Once approved, the Department of Aid to 
Foreign Countries then assigns responsibilities to the relevant implementation management 
institutions. 
 
In October 2008, the MOC, FMPRC and MOF established the Foreign Aid Inter-agency Liaison 
Mechanism (对外援助部际联系机制)75 to improve collaboration between China's foreign aid 
institutions, and this mechanism was upgraded to the Foreign Aid Inter-agency Coordination 
Mechanism (对外援助部际协调机制)76 in February 2011. This latest mechanism is jointly 
participated in by: the International Department of the CCCPC, the Ministry of National 
Defence, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the 
Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Transport, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Health, the People’s Bank of 
China, the China EXIM Bank and the China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation. It is aimed 
at ensuring the comprehensiveness of China's foreign aid and to maximise the contribution 
foreign aid makes to China's domestic development agenda.  
 
The Funding Methods of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对外援助的资金 
Concerning the financial resources underpinning China's foreign aid, China currently utilises 
two financial resources: China's annual government foreign aid budget and the EXIM Bank 
raised commercial capital to finance its five primary funding methods: Grant, Interest-free 
Loan, Low-interest Loan, Concessional Loan and Preferential Buyer's Credit. Despite the 
concerns raised by Brautigam of the latter two funding methods, "One is aid, the other is 
not" (2009, p.173), of particular concern to this study is China's traditional foreign aid which 
depends on being solely funded by the Chinese government budget and used for the 
promotion of recipient countries' economic development and welfare. Hence only the Grant, 
the Interest-free Loan and the Low-interest Loan are considered as foreign aid in this study, 
provided that the profitability grounded Concessional Loan and Preferential Buyer's Credit 
are not meeting this criteria. Building from these points, and minus the earlier terminated 
funding method of the Low-interest Loan,77 this section elaborates on China's traditional 
foreign aid funding methods of the Grant and the Interest-free Loan.  
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Before going further it is important to note that, as an initial step towards drafting country 
specific foreign aid plans, China first plans its foreign aid budget by individual country – that 
is, it has a Country Specific Foreign Aid Budget (国别援款). Despite China's overall foreign aid 
policy framework, when the MOC and other participating government institutions draw up 
foreign aid plans, the standard practice is to first calculate and submit an annual foreign aid 
budget plan to the State Council as per each recipient country. Once approved, the planned 
budgets are then distributed by the MOF to each government institution for the building of 
foreign aid packages. When the recipient countries' request exceeds China's foreign aid 
planning for that specific country, in particular, the "single mega project" as referred to by 
Chinese officials78, China disaggregates the funding application and finances the project over 
successive annual budgets. In extreme situations, for example when a project demands the 
budget of several succeeding fiscal years, China will then propose to the recipient country to 
finance the project with a combination of Grant and Concessional Loan.79  
 
1. The Grant  
无偿援助 
Grants are the primary funding method of China's traditional foreign aid. Whilst mainly used 
for insolvent recipient countries or HIPCs, they focus on projects and programs related to 
improving people's livelihoods. Besides China's currently favoured HRDC programs, Grants 
are also utilised to deliver Complete Project Aid such as hospitals, schools, and low-cost 
housing according to the recipient country's requests. Additionally, Grants are employed to 
fund Technical Aid as well as other supportive foreign aid methods, such as Medical Teams 
and Overseas Volunteer Programs. What needs to be particularly pointed out is that a margin 
of the foreign aid budget planned for Grants are also used to finance China's Humanitarian 
Aid. Upon the delivery of Humanitarian Aid, the expenditures are accounted for in that 
country's next annual foreign aid budget plan.80 
 
2. The Interest-free Loan  
无息贷款 
Financed in the same way as the Grant, the Interest-free Loans are likewise solely reliant 
upon China's annual government foreign aid budget and focus on the project and programs 
related to improving people's livelihoods. Owing to the non-profit nature of such projects 
and programs,81 the tenure of Interest-free Loans are usually 20 years, and this period 
includes: 5 years of use, 5 years of grace and 10 years of repayment (Government of China, 
2011, p.7). Since the implementation of The Grand Economic Strategy in 1994, China has 
only kept a minimal amount of Interest-free Loans available for developing countries that 
have relatively sound economic foundations. In accordance with the principle of "to lighten 
the burden on recipient countries as far as possible"82, these loans are expected to be 
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gradually transformed to Grants.83  
 
How China Calculates Its Foreign Aid 
 
Since the inauguration of the Concessional Loan in 1995, China's foreign aid expenditures 
have been closely monitored by the EXIM Bank and the MOF in the categories of Loans and 
Government Budgets, respectively. Brautigam suggests that to estimate China's foreign aid, 
three areas need to be assessed: "Ministry of Finance external assistance expenditure, China 
Eximbank concessional loans, and debt relief" (2009, p. 168). In contrast, this study believes 
that in order to learn the extent of China's foreign aid, two references should be primarily 
considered. First, as Zhou pointed out, "With concerns to China's current calculation, only 
direct financial transfers between governments are regarded as aid, including the proportion 
of government subsidised interests of Concessional Loans, but not the rest of the capital that 
this subsidised interests has brought" (2008a, p.40). Second, according to a senior Chinese 
official, "Debt Relief is contributed from China's earlier84 overdue (write-off) Interest-free 
and Low-interest loans"85.  
 
Therefore, while China has yet to adopt the DAC introduced foreign aid statistical system, this 
study suggests that to understand the expenditure of China's traditional foreign aid, the 
National Bureau of Statistics (国家统计局) published China Statistical Yearbook is the way to 
collect data on the entire annual government budget of China's foreign aid. This budget 
includes China's expenditures for infrastructure, agricultural projects, human resources 
training courses, dispatching medical teams, as well as the subsidised proportion of 
Concessional Loan interests, with the only exceptions of the rest of the Concessional Loan 
capital and Debt Relief. To be specific, in line with the approach proposed by this study, these 
annual statistics includes the expenditures channelled by the funding methods of Grant and 
Interest-free Loan,86 and these two funding methods financed implementation methods of 
Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid, Goods and Materials Aid, HRDC, Medical Teams and 
Overseas Volunteer Programs.  
 
Moreover, whilst this annual government foreign aid budget also includes a margin for 
Military Aid, Humanitarian Aid, International Multilateral Aid and subsidising the interests of 
Concessional Loan, it only funded a part of the Fund of Foreign Aid Joint Ventures and 
Cooperative Projects.87 To be exact, this particular fund was formed with repayments from 
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China's early Interest-free Loans, Low-interest Loans, and the Fund of Multiple Foreign Aid 
Forms, with the latter fund collected from the margins of China's foreign aid budget in the 8th 
Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) period. Hence under these circumstances, although this fund has 
been operating on a commercial basis since its establishment, it is not sufficient to argue 
that, "China have used some of their foreign aid money to support joint ventures between 
Chinese firms and firms in developing countries" (Brautigam, 2009, p.166), without making 
clear that this fund is both currently individualised and is also the result of China's early 
attempts in generating financial benefits from its (traditional) foreign aid.  
 
The Implementation Methods of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对外援助的方式 
With consideration given to the delivery of China's foreign aid, utilising the funds of Grant 
and Interest-free Loan, China at present offers six foreign aid implementation methods in 
accordance with the ODA criteria introduced by the DAC: Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid, 
Goods and Materials Aid, Human Resource Development Cooperation, Medical Teams and 
Overseas Volunteer Programs. Whilst China's foreign aid is primarily focused on improving 
recipient countries' productivity, development foundations and local health and education 
standards, these implementation methods are being comprehensively employed in the 
development areas including industry, agricultural, economic infrastructure, public facilities, 
education, medicine and public health, as well as clean energy and coping with climate 
change (Government of China, 2011, pp.20-26). 
 
1. Complete Project Aid  
成套项目援助 
Managed by the Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation, Complete Project 
Aid has always been the primary implementation method of China's foreign aid. It refers to 
the projects where China is responsible for providing project survey, design, construction 
equipment and materials, engineers and technical personnel (sometimes also the marketing 
of the final product). As of 2009, according to The White Paper (2011), China has provided 
2,025 Complete Project Aid projects in total in developing countries which have accounted 
for 40% of China's foreign aid expenditure (ibid., p.10). These projects are distributed across 
a range of sectors including Agriculture (215), Public Facilities (670), Economic Infrastructure 
(390), Industry (635) and Others (115). 
 
2. Technical Aid  
技术合作援助 
As Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid is also currently managed by the Executive Bureau of 
International Economic Cooperation. Since its inauguration in the 1960s, Technical Aid has 
focused on transferring technical and management skills after the completion of Complete 
Project Aid. Thus it was previously integrated with Overseas Training Programs, Medical 
Teams, and a variety of other Individual Programs as well as Management Cooperation. 
However, in the 1990s, owing to the failing outcomes of Management Cooperation and the 
individualisations of HRDC and Medical Teams, China gradually scaled back its Technical Aid 
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and at present only provides short-term onsite training following the implementations of 
Complete Project Aid projects.88 
 
3. Goods and Materials Aid  
物资项目援助 
Under the management of the CICETE, Goods and Materials Aid was one of the earliest 
introduced implementation methods of China's foreign aid and it was primarily utilised to 
assist China's neighbouring countries who was still battling with foreign invasions. Currently, 
Goods and Materials Aid is mainly concerned with the foreign aid that provides the recipient 
country's livelihoods supplies, technical products and individual equipment. Likewise, it 
supports Complete Project Aid projects in regards to the required construction materials and 
equipment. After the delivery of goods and materials, the CICETE is also responsible for 
providing warranty services as well as training courses for the operation of the delivered 
equipment. 
 
4. Human Resource Development Cooperation (HRDC) 
人力资源开发合作 
Initially integrated with Technical Aid, the beginning of China's HRDC programs can be traced 
back to the 1950s, when China offered studentships for North Korean refugee children to 
study in China. Presently, with China's rapidly increased attentions on recipient countries' 
development capacities, HRDC has achieved substantial development in the aim of building a 
harmonious world. In contrast to the situation in 1998, when only 28 African officials 
attended the very first African Economic and Management Officer Seminar, in 2008, 10,515 
people were training in China in over 150 different subjects.89 Currently, China's HRDC is 
organised in two categories: Bilateral and Multilateral Seminars (China to multiple recipient 
countries), and the courses are offered in three levels: Official, Technician and Student.90  
 
5. Medical Teams  
援外医疗队 
Also Introduced at the very beginning of China's foreign aid, Chinese medical teams first 
appeared in Egypt in 1956, they then became a permanent feature of China's foreign aid in 
1963. Since 1985, Medical Teams has been directly managed and dispatched by the Ministry 
of Health. In addition to medical personnel, it includes the supplies of medical equipment, 
medicines, as well as training courses to local doctors and nurses. Other than emergency 
situations, Chinese medical teams work in two-year shifts in the recipient country, and 
following the take off of China-Africa relationship in the 1970s, China has implemented this 
practice91 which teams up Chinese province with the recipient country to provide sustained 
medical services.92 
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6. Overseas Volunteer Programs93  
援外志愿者  
Commissioned by the MOC, the Chinese Young Volunteers Association (CYVA, 中国青年志愿
者协会) undertakes the recruitment, training and dispatch of Chinese overseas volunteers. 
Being one of the most recently introduced foreign aid implementation methods, it is aimed 
at delivering the benefits of China's foreign aid directly to local people. Offered in programs 
lasting in duration from six months to two years, the volunteers are dispatched to the 
recipient countries' education, health or other social development related domain. Currently, 
the majority of these programs are organised in Chinese Language Courses. In spite of a 
recent government report suggesting that "demand has yet to be found in most African 
countries"94, it is expected to expand in Physical Education and Information Technology.95 
 
How China Packages Its Foreign Aid 
 
In the pursuit of China's successively introduced foreign aid objectives, the implementation 
methods of China's foreign aid complement one other and are based on collaboration. 
Besides the specialised foreign aid works of Medicals Teams, HRDC and Overseas Volunteer 
Programs which are organised according to China's Plan[s] and Measures promised in the 
FOCAC and international meetings, the primary feature of China's foreign aid – Complete 
Project Aid, is usually determined individually. Provided the importance of Complete Project 
Aid which often forms the foundation for other foreign aid implementation methods (such as 
Technical Aid and Goods and Materials Aid), as well as China's limited foreign aid capacity 
and requests that tends to far exceed China's planned country specific foreign aid budget, 
China has some guidelines for determining Complete Project Aid projects regardless of its 
claimed requests based foreign aid approach. 
 
As a senior Chinese official96 pointed out, although China has yet to issue official instructions 
for identifying definitive criteria for accepting foreign aid proposals, it has preferences which 
are (in descending order): the project must be within budget allowance, the project at large 
is in accordance with the need of the recipient country, the project is mainly concerned with 
improving people's livelihoods (schools, hospitals, etc), it is easy to operate and maintain (as 
with landmark projects), it is non-productive or technology based (economic infrastructure), 
it involves agricultural development. Hence, on the basis of noting that China has an annual 
foreign aid budget plan for each of its recipient countries and, to some extent, it also has a 
framework for packaging its foreign aid, this finding contrasts Davies et al.'s suggestions that 
"there is no fixed aid model [from China] and that disbursements are based on the requests 
received from the recipient country" (2008, p.51).  
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The Practices of China's Foreign Aid at Present 
 
Inspecting China's current foreign aid practices, along with the successively introduced and 
continuously refined foreign aid aims and objectives, the exercising of China's foreign aid has 
become increasingly proficient and versatile. With considerations given to the planning and 
implementation management of China's foreign aid, on the basis of introducing specialised 
institutions to cope with the expanded foreign aid focuses, China first brought forward the 
twenty-four institutions jointly participated Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism to boost 
the cooperation amongst foreign aid institutions. With the specialised institutions directly 
managing projects and programs in their speciality, the MOC then established subsidiary 
public institutions to manage the implementation of China's primary foreign aid features to 
improve its foreign aid process. Moreover, concerning China's foreign aid implementation 
approaches, China restructured its main foreign aid funding methods and adapted its foreign 
aid implementation methods to coordinate with its further specified foreign aid objectives. 
 
As a result of these contemporary advancements, instead of the previous dilemmas caused 
by rival political and economic interests, the integrated application of Concessional Loans, 
Preferential Buyer's Credits and government's foreign aid budget has granted China with the 
opportunity to realise both mutually economic benefits and friendship building; and further, 
through the utilisation of Complete Project Aid in the assistance given to Africa's hardware 
development, and exercise of Technical Aid, Goods and Materials Aid, HRDC, Medical Teams 
and Overseas Volunteer Programs in the assistance of Africa's social development, the focus 
of China's foreign aid was also made able to extend to both African people's livelihoods and 
development capacity. Given these efforts that China has made in improving its foreign aid 
practices, it can be said that the development of China's foreign aid in Africa at present has 
been competently advanced to pursue the goals of promoting Africa's health and education 
standards, productivity and development foundations. 
 
Chapter summary 
 
Looking through the current evolution of China's foreign aid in Africa, from the inauguration 
of The Grand Economic Strategy in 1994 to the opening up of New Prospects for A New Type 
of China-Africa Strategic Partnership in 2012, China's foreign aid has developed to an extent 
where it is seeking to accomplish both China and Africa's development demands. Leading to 
Africa's growing importance to China's domestic development, as well as China's interest in 
the balancing of political and economic benefits, China has placed its foreign aid emphasis 
on chasing mutual economic benefits and supporting strategic partnership building. Albeit 
China's economic benefits grounded contemporary foreign aid approaches to some extent 
altered the fundamental purpose of development assistance, with particular attention called 
to China's traditional foreign aid that is aimed to improve African people's livelihoods, bring 
up Africa's development capacities and facilitate Africa's regional integration, the principal 
aim of China's foreign aid in Africa has remained consistent with the determination to help 
African countries achieve self-reliance. 
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Built on the calming international landscape after the end of the Cold War, the development 
of China's foreign aid in this period first gave way to its domestic economic development 
needs. Primarily owed to the financial insufficiency caused by the previous donation based 
foreign aid practices, and the unsuccessful attempts in pursuing mutually benefits, the 
development of China's foreign aid was immediately directed to the business ground after 
the integration with foreign economic and trade. On the basis of extensively promoting the 
profitability grounded Concessional Loan, and the Fund of Foreign Aid Joint Ventures and 
Cooperative Projects, these commercial approaches quickly boosted cooperation between 
Chinese and African enterprises and, as a result, China escaped the financial burdens of 
simply being a foreign aid donor and began to realise Africa's great potential to contribute to 
its domestic economic development. However, upon obtaining this sound outcome, China 
has gone on neglecting its traditional foreign aid and continued to follow commercial 
thinking and established the multilateral liaising platform of the FOCAC. 
 
Moving on to the 21st century, along with the sound progression of China-Africa relationship 
and China's elevated international responsibility, China's proposal of building a harmonious 
world dramatically changed its foreign aid development. Not only did China swiftly resume 
the exercise of traditional foreign aid and use it to emphasis the objective of improving 
people's livelihoods, but through the successive FOCAC and international meetings, China 
also put forward Plan[s] and Measures to drive its traditional foreign aid in the direction of 
advancing Africa's development capacity as well as assisting Africa's regional integration. At 
this stage, while China's international commitments bring additional economic cooperation 
opportunities, by utilising both government funds and commercial capitals, China achieved 
its political interests with the financial benefits generated by the Concessional Loan and 
other commercially operated contemporary foreign aid approaches. Its economic interests 
on the other hand, were also successfully secured with the recipient countries' development 
centred traditional foreign aid.  
 
Moreover, to accommodate this integrated foreign aid development, several refinements 
were also made in order to improve China's foreign aid capacity. In addition to setting up the 
EXIM Bank and allocating specific funds to support the newly introduced business orientated 
foreign aid approaches, China gradually revised its foreign aid planning and implementation 
approaches in response to the return of traditional foreign aid. To be specific, in order to 
upgrade China's foreign aid administrative capacity, China first assigned twenty-four central 
and provincial institutions to jointly participate in foreign aid planning and implementation 
management. And then, in the interest of reassuring foreign aid quality, China introduced a 
number of codes of practices to oversee its foreign aid implementation. Thirdly, with the 
view of explaining the works of China's foreign aid, China for the first time made its foreign 
aid relatively transparent. And lastly, leading to the swift expansion of foreign aid focuses, 
China further refined its foreign aid implementation methods with the aim of promoting 
comprehensiveness in assisting Africa's development.  
 
To conclude the study of the current development of China's foreign aid in Africa: from the 
quest for economic development to the building of a harmonious world, China's foreign aid 
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has evolved from an economic and trade integrated grand economic pursuit to economic and 
political interests both being considered comprehensive development assistance. Not only it 
increasingly attends to the improvement of itself, but by combining traditional foreign aid 
and economic benefits grounded contemporary foreign aid approaches, that is in essence, 
employing friendship building purposed foreign aid as an initiative to facilitate enterprises 
going out, China's foreign aid is now seeking to fulfil the political and economic development 
requests of both China and Africa. Instead of the previous foreign aid attempts which were 
predominately aimed to promote economic development, by shifting the emphasis towards 
recipient countries' people's livelihoods, human resources capacities, indeed that are in 
effect their development strengths, China's current foreign aid has become notably more 
insisted on assisting African countries' capacity building.  
 
Subsequent to understanding the development of China's foreign aid, what has been found 
to be particularly irresponsible is that while identifying China's foreign aid objectives in Africa, 
and learning from its foreign aid planning and implementation approaches, the outcomes of 
China's foreign aid in Africa has been continuously left in the dark by Beijing. In view of the 
objectives of building African industrial and agricultural foundations, reducing expenditure 
while consolidating foreign aid outcomes and improving people's livelihoods, has China 
achieved any of these objectives? Or more immediately speaking, how is China's foreign aid 
influencing Africa's development at present? With these questions in mind, the next chapter 
takes this study to Africa where the exercises and outcomes of China's foreign aid are plainly 
demonstrated. On the basis of observing and assessing three foreign aid packages that were 
being implemented according to the afore identified objectives and approaches, chapter five 
attempts to empirically understand the development of China's foreign aid, as well as the 
effectiveness and sustainability of China's 60 years of friendship commitments. 
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Chapter Five: China's Foreign Aid in Africa – Assessments 
 
Having understood both China's foreign aid objectives in Africa and its foreign aid planning 
and implementation approaches more broadly, chapter five addresses the next step towards 
improving our understanding of this theme. This chapter meets the second objective of this 
study: that is, to understand the effectiveness and sustainability of China's foreign aid in 
Africa. In order to survey the performance of China's attempts in helping African countries 
achieve self-reliance, as well as the factors that affect this performance, it asks two questions: 
How has China's foreign aid been influencing Africa's development? And how have China's 
foreign aid outcomes been affected? With these aims in mind, this chapter brings the focus 
to the implementation sites of China's foreign aid in Africa. In doing so, it observes and 
assesses three traditional foreign aid packages that have been implemented according to the 
successive development of China's foreign aid objectives: to build African industrial and 
agricultural foundations (1958-1978), to reduce expenditure while consolidating foreign aid 
outcomes (1982-1993), and to improve people's livelihoods (2005-present). 
 
To maximise the scope of these assessments, besides selecting cases on the basis that each 
one must coincide with China's distinct foreign aid objective in Africa of the given periods for 
both demonstration and comparison purposes, in view of extending the assessment in terms 
of China's foreign aid implementation methods, the method of Complete Project Aid is duly 
determined owing to its underlying character of frequently forming the foundation for other 
implementation methods.1 It is through this thinking that chapter five understands China's 
foreign aid in Africa to the maximum possible extent while taking into consideration both its 
objectives and practices. As a result, the Magbass Sugar Complex in Sierra Leone, the Ghana 
National Theatre and the Lekma Hospital (also in Ghana) have been selected as case studies 
to represent China's industrial and agricultural projects, landmark projects, and people's 
livelihoods projects, respectively. In addition to each being a Complete Project Aid project, 
these projects are also in association with other implementation methods including Goods 
and Materials Aid, Technical Aid, HRDC and Medical Teams. 
 
What needs to be addressed before looking at the case studies is that, while putting forward 
specific foreign aid objectives in Africa, China has no restrictions on the projects and 
programs that are not coinciding with the particular objective in that given period. According 
to The Eight Principles, "In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly 
respects the sovereignty of recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for 
any privileges"2, China's principally request based foreign aid approach requires its foreign 
aid liaising institutions – the Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Offices only to propose, 
but not to interfere, and also to respect the final decisions made solely by the recipient 
governments.3 Therefore, apart from China's foreign aid objectives, there may also be other 
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projects and programs delivered to the recipient country at the same time. For example, in 
spite of China's most recent objective of improving people's livelihoods, upon one recipient 
country's foreign aid request, China delivered 20 vehicles to that recipient country for its 
government's use.4 
 
The study of China's foreign aid performance in Africa investigates the effectiveness and 
sustainability of China's foreign aid objectives and approaches. Whilst it observes and 
assesses China's foreign aid packages, this investigation draws particular attention to the 
factors that have affected and continue to affect China's foreign aid outcomes, regardless of 
whether these factors are underpinned by political, economic, or other social science 
subjects concerned with social, institutional and technological behaviours. Such a study is 
not only significant to the understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa, but it is also 
essential to the fundamental purpose of this study – to improve the outcomes of China's 
foreign aid. To achieve these objectives, this chapter brings in exclusive observations of 
China's foreign aid planning and implementation exercises; and further, draws on extensive 
interviews with foreign aid officials, workers, and academics. In addition to this, at the end of 
each primary case study, available government data on other similar projects and programs 
are also supplied to supplement the arguments raised by this study. 
 
To "Build African Industrial and Agricultural Foundations" (1958 – 1978) 
以“帮助非洲国家建立自己的工业，农业基础”为导向的援助 
 
From the beginning of China's foreign aid in Africa to the end of the Cultural Revolution, 
China's foreign aid has been predominantly influenced by its political underpinnings: that is, 
the obligations of proletarian internationalism. Whilst its aims in Africa evolved from the 
desire to support African peoples' liberation movements, to unite African countries against 
the imperialist world, and then to assist African countries achieve self-reliance, China's 
foreign aid has consistently concentrated on the objective of building African industrial and 
agricultural foundations. However, at the early stages, Africa was a completely new continent 
for China's foreign aid. Thus, in an attempt to identify the most appropriate measures for 
planning practical and effective foreign aid suited to African conditions, China dispatched a 
delegation to Africa at the turn of 1964 to explore its economic, cultural, and environmental 
characteristics as they contrasted with China's familiar Asian neighbours. 
 
Based on this research visit to Algeria, Mali and Guinea, with consideration to improve 
Africa's long-suffered economic insufficiencies and shortage in human resources, as well 
China placed the immediate foreign aid emphasis on providing African people's livelihoods 
related necessities, in the interest of fulfilling its principal aim of helping African countries 
achieve self-reliance, China also confirmed its long-term foreign aid objective on supporting 
the development of African industrial and agricultural foundations, with a Complete Project 
Aid and Technical Aid combined approach. Abiding by these practical instructions, with the 
foremost guidance of The Eight Principles overseeing foreign aid implementations, not only 
                                                          
4
 This example was provided by a Chinese official. Interview with Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 6 
August 2011. 
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was China's industrial and agricultural foundations building centred foreign aid materially 
contributed to its return to the UN in 1971, by the end of 1978, it was providing 41 African 
countries with development assistance. 
 
Given the rapidly growing number of delivered projects as a result of two decades of prompt 
industrial and agricultural foundations building, in the mid-1980s, how to help the recipient 
countries to sustain the project effectiveness soon became an increasingly prominent issue. 
Owing to the often advanced technology of China's foreign aid and the insufficiently carried 
out technology and management transfers, a number of delivered projects failed to achieve 
the planned outcomes. In order to improve this situation, the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
and Trade rolled out the Technical Aid package with various Management Cooperation 
methods in 1984. On the basis of this new implementation approach, Chinese experts were 
encouraged to be more involved in the operation of the delivered projects so that while they 
were providing technical guidance and training, they were also encouraged to participate in 
project management. 
 
In summary, through the delivery of industrial and agricultural foundations to Africa, China's 
first foreign aid objective fulfilled its political pursuits and provided some development 
assistance to Africa. However, subsequent to the inauguration of domestic reform in 1978, 
not only did China revise this rather sound foreign aid objective, but by the early 1990s, it 
had gradually reduced its Technical Aid. Based on this evidence as well as China's concern in 
reducing foreign aid expenditure, the following question arises: What caused the scale back 
of the arguably essential Technical Aid? Furthermore, considering the achievement of China's 
political interests, how has the realisation of this objective been effected? Next, this study 
looks at these concerns through the example of the Magbass Sugar Complex project in order 
to investigate the effectiveness and sustainability of China's industrial and agricultural 
foundations building promised foreign aid. 
 
Magbass Sugar Complex,5 Tonkolili, Sierra Leone, 1982 – 1995 and 2003 – present 
马格巴斯糖联 
The Magbass Sugar Complex is a Low-interest Loan funded Complete Project Aid project 
delivered to Sierra Leone according to an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement 
settled in October 1972.6 As well as a sugar refinery and sugar cane fields, the complete 
packaging of this project also included a fertiliser field and a year of technical cooperation 
(Technical Aid). Whilst it was agreed in the first year that China and Sierra Leone established 
diplomatic relationship, this project is believed to be one of the many foreign aid projects 
that China has delivered to Africa as appreciation for supporting its return to the UN.7 
Whether it was the Chinese or Sierra Leonean government who proposed this particular 
Sugar Complex project is untraceable today; although, as a senior Chinese official suggested, 
it was "most likely to be selected from an achievable project and program list based on Sierra 
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 Unless otherwise noted, all figures presented in this case study have been collected from the Fujian Provincial 
Chronicle. See http://www.fjsq.gov.cn/showtext.asp?ToBook=217&index=134, accessed 3 March 2012. 
6
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2 September 2011. 
7
 Sierra Leone is one of the 11 countries which both proposed and agreed to bring China back to the UN. 
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Leone's foreign aid request"8. 
 
In February 1973, four months after the initial agreement, the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Liaison assigned the project implementation to Fujian Provincial Foreign Aid Department. 
This department then immediately dispatched a 13-member team of experts to inspect the 
local conditions. Following a 6-month geological survey, this provincial department identified 
three locations out of eleven proposed areas in the Northern Province of Sierra Leone, and 
submitted a report to the Chinese and Sierra Leonean governments for further review as to 
which location would be best suited to the project. Subsequent to selecting Tonkolili District 
for project implementation in November of that same year, an 11-month project planning 
process lastly resulted in drawing up a contract for the creation of 1,280 hectares of sugar 
cane fields (including 280 hectares of green manure crops), a 400-ton per day sugar refinery 
(by-producing 6,000 litres of alcohol), and an estimated annual production of 150 days.  
 
After the construction began in January 1977, the Fujian Provincial Foreign Aid Department 
dispatched 779 agricultural experts and professional workers to facilitate the implementation 
of the project. On the basis of finishing the contract, this department also additionally 
formatted 1,850 hectares of land, constructed a 460kw water pumping station, a 70.12km 
cultivation channel, a 98.2km commuting route, and supplied 13 categories of supporting 
equipment totalling 108 units. By the time the full completion of the Sugar Complex was 
reached in April 1981, the cost of the project added up to 21.9 million CNY (approximately 30 
million USD at the time). After a year of technical cooperation, running of the project was 
officially transferred to Sierra Leonean government in February 1982. Immediately following 
the transfer, the local government contracted the Chinese experts and technicians again to 
further participation in the project operation.  
 
Observation 
In general, the Magbass Sugar Complex is a comprehensively designed foreign aid project in 
comparison to the modern turnkey projects. "Particularly in terms of the overall packaging, it 
is indeed rather considerate", asserted the general manager Li Mao, who has been working 
in the Sugar Complex for over a decade9. But to look more closely at the outcomes: when the 
Sierra Leonean Civil War broke out in 1991, more than 50 Chinese experts and technicians 
were still working on site and the whole refinery was in need of an overhaul. The sugar cane 
fields were largely disintegrating and, as Lai summarised, "The 14 years of production at 
Magbass relied heavily on China's continuous financial supports, mechanical parts supplies, 
productive material import tax exemption, and protective retailing policy" (1995, p.8). After 
more than a decade of supplying technical and management support to the Sugar Complex, 
it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that the project is not sustainable at all. The 
project planning seems to be fairly thoughtful, yet the project is unsustainable, so we must 
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 As further explained by this official, "At the early stages of China's foreign aid development, according to the 
recipient country's foreign aid requests, China normally proposes a list of project and program offers that it 
considered to be possible to deliver". Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 6 August 
2011. 
9
 Interview with Li Mao, General Manager of Magbass Sugar Complex (1991-1995 and 2003-present), Freetown, 
Sierra Leone, 3 September 2011. 
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ask: what happened at Magbass? 
 
Firstly, [a senior Chinese technician pointed out] the location of the project is most 
definitely inadequate, it is right in the middle of Sierra Leone, hence the transportation 
cost is high since Sierra Leone produces nothing that is required by the Sugar Complex, 
so everything has to come from China. Although arguably no one would construct such 
an agricultural-industrial project in the city, this location is far too inland […]. And then 
with concerns to the field, it is also not even remotely close to the suitable condition for 
growing sugar cane.10  
 
Although the location is within a traditional farming region, neither the field conditions nor 
the transportation links seems to up to standard for producing sugar at an industrial level. 
However, did Chinese experts at the beginning survey the location of the project? A senior 
Chinese official admitted that the reason behind that decision was primarily due to President 
Siaka Stevens'11 strategic attempts to neutralise the tense situation in Tonkolili district in the 
1970s.12  
 
Even though off the official record, a report from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
indicated that: 
 
When Siaka Stevens came to power in 1968, he faced increasing pressure on various 
issues from prominent natives of Tonkolili District who were in the Army or were 
members of his APC party… Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front 
hailed from the Tonkolili District.  
 
Setting aside the question of whether utilisation of a foreign aid project to maintain regional 
peace is rational or not, when looking at the nature of the Magbass Sugar Complex, we must 
understand that "as an industrial foreign aid project, indeed all productive projects require a 
supportive environment in terms of the location and the quality of the local work force"13. In 
fact, "to implement the project in Tonkolili hardly makes any sense", as pointed out by a 
Chinese technician who was injured twice during the previous strikes by local employees14. 
 
Apart from the problems raised by choosing the location based on Sierra Leonean politics, 
"China's feasibility study was also problematic", explained one Chinese manager during a 
conversation over lunch15. "What China did was a field condition study, but it did not take 
into consideration the surrounding social environment". A Chinese technician replied: "That 
is because there are no such employment issues in China"16. Another said: "Five thousand 
years of history has taught us basic morality and farming skills". While still another pointed 
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 Interview with Chinese technician, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 3 September 2011. 
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 Siaka Stevens was appointed President of Sierra Leone in between 1971 and 1985. 
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 Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2 September 2011. 
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 Interview with Li Mao, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 3 September 2011. 
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 Interview with Chinese technician, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 3 September 2011. 
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 Interview with Chinese manager, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 3 September 2011. 
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out that, "if we weren't laid-off when our factories were privatised back at home, no one 
would've come here". Tonkolili District is considered to be a "lesser developed region" in 
Sierra Leone, and the local residents are "more traditionally behaved… even our own Sierra 
Leonean people would not deal with them", as pointed out by a former local employee, who 
resigned after three months of apprenticeship in the Sugar Complex17. In view of these 
strong comments on the social conditions, and despite China's efforts in supporting the 
project, the Magbass Sugar Complex had a rather challenging beginning.  
 
By 1995, it was already considered to be a "dated and problematic project" (Lai, 1995, p.8). 
During the period when Chinese experts and technicians were contracted , six institutions 
from both China and Sierra Leone were either directly or indirectly making decisions on the 
development of the Sugar Complex.18 In addition to this confusing institutional set up, "the 
[decision-making] responsibilities were unevenly distributed, for example, while the Chinese 
teams were supervising production, the local managers only cared about and fought for the 
welfare of local workers"19. "Local employees asking for bribes20" was also a common scene 
in Magbass, as a group of Chinese employees pointed out21: "From bags of sugar to bribing, 
they [the local workers] believe that is what they deserve, and you wouldn't get anything 
done without it". However the paradox was that, "the local government repeatedly accused 
the Sugar Complex of not contributing enough to the country", explained the leader of the 
interviewing group, "That is simply because everyone of you gets a share [and thus reduces 
the profit margin]".  
 
Aside from the tangled management of the project, and taking into consideration China's 
limited foreign aid capacity in the 1980s, the execution of Technical Aid was also largely 
questionable. As a senior Chinese manager pointed out: "None of the Chinese experts or 
technicians could speak English or any local language, and there was a lack of appropriately 
trained translators, so communications were mainly done through body languages in the 
Complex; therefore, no one had a clue about what each other was saying"22. Although in the 
end, some of the local employees managed to acquire some skills based on Chinese-offered 
training and through months of work experience, it was impossible for the Chinese experts 
to establish successful technology and management transfers. As a result of this, less than 
half of the full-time technical apprentices had learnt the skills needed to work individually.23 
By the early 1990s, frustrated anticipation with China's foreign aid to the local conditions 
eventually had negative consequences.  
 
As Lai highlighted: 
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 Interview with former local employee who had worked for 3 months in the Sugar Complex in 2006, Freetown, 
Sierra Leone, 5 September 2011. 
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 3 of these institutions were from China: the Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison, the Fujian Light Industrial 
Department, and the Fujian Agriculture Department. 
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 Interview with Li Mao, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 3 September 2011. 
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demand". 
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 Interview with a group of Chinese employees, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 4 September 2011. 
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 Interview with senior Chinese manager, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 3 September 2011. 
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The most confusing issue is the endlessly postponed Major Overhaul Contract. Whilst 
the Sugar Complex was operating with machineries that breaks on a daily basis, the 
Sierra Leonean government has decided to enforce import tax on China's granted 
replacement equipment and mechanical parts. It was impossible for the Chinese 
government to implement such a contract. (1995, p.9)  
 
"Even without the civil war, the Sugar Complex was going nowhere and was desperately in 
need of complete management reform"24. For 14 years, from the official hand over of the 
project in 1982, until the Sierra Leonean Civil War fully broke out in 1995, the operation of 
the Sugar Complex continuously depended on China's technical and financial support. 
 
Nevertheless, the story of China's foreign aid in Sierra Leone that focused on building 
industrial and agricultural foundations does not end here. In August 2002, fuelled by the 
encouragement of the Chinese government in resuming the productions of its earlier 
delivered projects, an expert team formed by COMPLANT and Si Chuan Africa-Asia Company 
(formally a provincial foreign aid department) visited Magbass upon the request of the Sierra 
Leonean government. Despite the "near-terminal" damage done to the Sugar Complex 
during the Sierra Leonean Civil War (Huang, 2004, p.58), COMPLANT found that there was 
potential in the complex. "It is still comparatively cheaper to rehabilitate the Sugar Complex 
rather than build a completely new project", asserted Li, the current general manager25. A 
year later, a 30-year Lease Contract on Magbass Sugar Complex was agreed between the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security of Sierra Leone and COMPLANT, with concessional 
terms of import tax, company income, and work permit exemptions. Upon this agreement, 
the rehabilitation was started immediately and completed two years later in 2005. At this 
point, the Magbass Sugar Complex came back into production. 
 
As promising as such progress sounds, China's domestic economic take off did not seem to 
have provided any positive influence to its approach of managing a productive foreign aid 
project in Africa. "Problems remained" was the most frequently heard response during this 
fieldwork. Despite this new lease-based cooperative management approach that has been 
specifically developed to reduce government influences and to stimulate productivity, an 
almost identical set of complications has subsequently surfaced. "Besides the usual bribes 
collected by the local government, the quality of the local work force is even worse than 
before", complained a Chinese employee, who refused to provide his name even under 
promises of anonymity26. "Most of the local workers are former rebels, they are very hard to 
work with", he continued. Because the Sugar Complex is still a SOE, COMPLANT was required 
to employ a large number of ex-rebels by the local government. Although no official figures 
were disclosed, the anonymous interviewee estimated that a minimum of 40% of current 
local employees are former rebels.  
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 Interview with senior COMPLANT official, who was stationed in the Complex during the 1980s, Beijing, China, 
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 Interview with Li Mao, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 3 September 2011. 
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Given this further worsened social condition, a worrying scene was consequently brought to 
Magbass. "Since we came back in 2002, strikes have become the biggest problem here", 
pointed out by general manager Li27, "they occur twice a year at least, and the reason is 
simple and consistent – salary". Despite the lack of actual income figures, Li argued that the 
Sugar Complex is providing the same salary level as other European industries operating in 
the capital, assuming Li's figures are correct, for a small village like as Magbass, such salary is 
considerably more than the regional average.  
 
As general manager Li continued:  
 
And none of these strikes were legitimate. We were supposed to be given 21-days prior 
notice, but all the strikes happened without warning and during the busiest harvest 
season28. In such a situation the strike must be resolved in their favour. If not, they will 
stop other people from working too, and the strike leader will close all the routes in and 
out of the premises, so nobody can come to replace them, and no one can leave unless 
they [the striking workers] get a pay rise. In fact, we have just raised their salary again, 
and he [an injured Chinese technician] was just trying to switch on the sugar cane 
processor.  
 
The local manner in which Sierra Leonean workers exercise their rights is certainly not what 
the Chinese employees were prepared for; however, there are always two sides of every 
story. As two groups of local employees argued: "We should be paid more for working here, 
it is a very hard job, we have to fight for ourselves, or we will not get what we want"29. This is 
a logic that coincides with Brautigam's findings regarding the stealing issue in Magbass, 
where her interviewee argued: "If you don't want us to thieve, pay us better. That was the 
whole problem" (2009, p.261). Concerning the whole problem, a senior Chinese investor in 
Sierra Leone pointed out what could arguably be the real issue, "The lack of language skills 
that made us blind to the local laws"30. Indeed, prior to the first official Investment Guide 
Series31 published in 2009, the Chinese management barely understood any local legislation, 
especially in terms of protecting their own rights.32 "And because of that", the investor 
added, "the Chinese people working in Africa are well-known for using money to get things 
sorted out. As for the African employees, who doesn't want more money?". 
 
With concerns leading back to the language issues that have troubled China's foreign aid 
from the very beginning, the two groups of local employees also shared their opinions on 
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this everlasting obstacle. "Most managers and technicians here don't speak any English at all, 
and they don't want to talk to us", one worker said. While another pointed out: "We can't 
learn anything from waving hands". Has China's technology transfer not improved at all since 
the coming of the new century? As a Chinese technician explained:  
 
Even with our translator, the difficulties in training local people are beyond your 
imagination. They don't have any knowledge of basic chemistry and machinery. It is 
easy to tell them when to open a valve, but why open this valve at this particular time? 
You cannot explain this question to someone who doesn't even know the character of 
alcohol.33  
 
Returning to the same arguments raised more than two decades ago, it is apparent that the 
Chinese experts are still struggling with the local conditions, conditions that include language 
– local or English – and the lack thereof. Undoubtedly, "as much as we [COMPLANT] have 
tried to implement technology and management transfer, it has yet to be accomplished"34. 
 
Moreover, besides the strike-fighting management and the miscommunication in Magbass, 
frequent resignations and movement of local employees have also become an increasingly 
significant issue in recent years. With the discovery of iron mines in Tonkolili in 2008 and the 
subsequent entrance of a European mining company (African Minerals Limited), the Sugar 
Complex lost almost a quarter of its local employees in the following year.35 "Although in 
Magbass, we are paying as much as the European factories, we are still falling short in terms 
of working conditions and welfare benefits", admitted general manager Li36, "given that the 
government restricted 40% of our products to local market, there is not much room for 
welfare improvement based on our current pay rate". Apart from this, "regular runaways are 
also not uncommon", one Chinese technician pointed out37, "a notable number of local 
employees left right after the training courses with the jump suit, boots, and other safety 
equipment the Complex had provided. There are so many jobs in town nowadays, that it is 
not only Magbass, but other Chinese companies too that are losing employees to European 
companies".  
 
In addition to the complications grounded in social and institutional behaviours, two years 
into COMPLANT's management and operation, the 2007 Sierra Leonean presidential election 
had a significant impact on the Sugar Complex as it became involved in the rivalry of the 
People's Party (SLPP) and the All People's Congress (APC). As a result, the Lease Contract of 
the Magbass Sugar Complex, which was agreed by the SLPP, was repeatedly described by the 
APC as "a humiliation to Sierra Leone and a forfeit of the country's sovereignty. This contract 
has cost significant benefits to the Sierra Leonean people"38. It followed that with the defeat 
of the SLPP, the APC immediately repealed most of the concessional terms so that "the tax 
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exemptions and work permit exemptions were all gone"39. At the time of fieldwork in 2011, 
the Magbass Sugar Complex was operating with a number of obstacles both inside and 
outside of the premises. Although as general manager Li's optimism suggested, "the Sugar 
Complex is still running, and we are going to hire a lawyer to defend ourselves"40, the future 
of the Magbass Sugar Complex remains challenging. 
 
Whether the Sugar Complex subsequently hired a lawyer is unknown. After the fieldwork 
finished at the end of 2011, general manager Li also left Magbass in early 2012. However, 
with its new appointment in view of improvement, the problems are remaining. According to 
Sierra Leone News Hunters, residents in seven villages surrounding the Sugar Complex have 
expressed their dissatisfaction about the project operations in their different communities. 
Mainly concerned about the poor management and limited social contribution of the project, 
the local residents pointed out that, "workers in the company are dismissed unlawfully" and 
"the Chinese have never helped them in terms of scholarships for their children or even 
building schools" (2012). Regardless of whether the latter concerns should be responsible of 
a Sugar Complex, on the other hand, the Paramount Chief "urged his people to stop stealing 
from the project" (ibid.). Furthermore, according to a very recent report, the Magbass Sugar 
Complex was charged by the Labour Committee for over non-compliance with environmental 
concerns (The New Citizen, 2014). 
 
Assessment 
To assess the outcomes of the Magbass Sugar Complex project, during the Technical Aid and 
Management Cooperation periods, this project has achieved its objective of building African 
industrial and agricultural foundations, and it has to some extent fulfilled China's principal 
foreign aid aim of helping African countries achieve self-reliance. Prior to the Sierra Leonean 
Civil War, the Sugar Complex managed to produce 6,000 tons of sugar annually, which 
equalled 25% of Sierra Leone’s sugar imports; and it also produced as a by-product 500,000 
litres of spirit. Furthermore, during the lease period of COMPLANT (since 2005), production 
reached 8,000 tons of sugar annually (Corkin and Burke, 2006, p.39). Not only has the 
Magbass Sugar Complex ended Sierra Leone's dependency on import sugar while at the 
same time benefiting Sierra Leone's economic development, it has also provided permanent 
employment for more than 300 local people, and seasonal employment for 1,500 additional 
local people. Until 2014, the Magbass Sugar Complex remained the only sugar producing 
enterprise in Sierra Leone.41  
 
However, alongside these achievements, there also are a number of shortcomings that have 
affected the outcomes of the Sugar Complex. For instance, concerning the effectiveness of 
the project, because of the feasibility study only considered the geological condition of the 
recipient country, this oversimplified foreign aid allocation approach first made it had to deal 
with unknown local conditions. And then, due to the influences of the local decision-makers 
who favoured the political impacts of the Sugar Complex instead of its practical purposes, 
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the project was further put into more complicated situations. Moreover, in addition to the 
multi-pronged management approach which created conflicts between the Sugar Complex's 
need for production and local employees' demand for social welfare, as a result of the donor 
country's restrictive policy of non-interference with the recipient country's internal affairs, 
the operation of the Sugar Complex was forced to tolerate regular bribes collected by the 
local government. These conditions brought forth significant financial loss, and also further 
worsened the local institutional environment.  
 
In consideration to the sustainability of the Sugar Complex project, it is clearly demonstrated 
that there is no possibility of sustaining production without technical and financial support 
from the donor country, as general manager Li suggested, "In addition to China's continual 
provision of production materials and equipment, there was a minimum of 78 Chinese 
experts and technicians working on site at any given time between 1982 and 1995, fully 
responsible for the operation of Sugar Complex"42. It was the donor country's incompetent 
Technical Aid and indeed the shortage of foreign aid professionals that primarily caused this 
disappointing outcome. Furthermore, apart from this issue of unsuccessful technology and 
management transfers to the recipient country, the domestic political competitions in the 
recipient country and the excessive local brain-drain situation also contributed to the 
untenable operation of the project. All in all, in spite of the seemingly satisfactory outcomes 
delivered by the Magbass Sugar Complex at first glance, there are three major factors that 
have affected its effectiveness and sustainability:  
 
1. Political interference 
The political influence on this project originated from both the donor and the recipient 
countries. First, there was the recipient government's repeated interferences, which first saw 
this project introduced into a domestic conflict zone and then later led it into an awkward 
political rivalry. Second, there was the donor's country's restrictive foreign aid policy – The 
Eight Principles. Although arguably these principles to some extent guaranteed the foreign 
aid implementation standards, given the dominate political emphases of such a guidance, it 
also prohibited the donor country from enforcing positive solutions to the recipient country's 
management behaviours, regardless of whether these behaviours indulged local corruption 
or undermined the eventual foreign aid outcome. 
 
2. Limited foreign aid capacity 
Given the donor country's limited foreign aid capacity, its incompetent project planning and 
implementation caused many noticeable complications to the project outcomes. Aside from 
the incomprehensible project planning which failed to consider the local conditions at the 
beginning, there were also issues with the tangled project management and the shortages of 
appropriately skilled foreign aid professionals. As a consequence, not only was this project 
continuously involved in complex situations, but it was also sent to divergent development 
directions as well as failing in technology and management transfers. In the end, regardless 
of the donor country's efforts of Management Cooperation and Lease Contract, these issues 
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to a degree pushed the recipient country to foreign aid dependency.  
 
3. Unsupportive institutional environment 
In addition to the political interferences and the donor country's limited foreign aid capacity, 
the neglected brain-drain situation by the recipient country has also notably harmed the 
positive outcomes of the project. Owing to the extremely limited number of skilled local 
employees, and the unmatched welfare and income standards between emerging and 
traditional enterprises and donors, the lack of control over employment migration has 
caused an estimated 20% of domestic brain-drain. As a result, in the consequently created 
employment competition between foreign companies in Sierra Leone, particular attention is 
called to the uncompetitive China's foreign aid and low-level of wages, welfares and so on. 
The project outcomes were further worsened due to the hefty loss of employees.43 
 
Sincere But With Only Limited Capacity 
 
To conclude the study of China's foreign aid that focused on building African industrial and 
agricultural foundations in a project in Sierra Leone, China's first foreign aid objective only 
delivered some development assistance. As estimated by a senior Chinese official:  
 
The survival rate of the early industrial and agricultural projects is less than 5%... not 
only have these projects generally failed in the sustainability aspect, extreme cases such 
as the Rice Processing Factory in Sierra Leone (which has not operated at all due to the 
inexistence of rice grain) are also no rarity to China's foreign aid in this period.44 
 
Albeit there is an absence of detailed official statistics on China's industrial and agricultural 
projects in Africa, with concerns to the general outcomes of these projects, Shi pointed out 
that, "by the end of 1985, most of the effective and sustained industrial projects survived on 
China's continuing support" (1989). Whereas with regards to the scale of these projects, The 
White Paper recorded 635 Industrial Projects and 215 Agricultural Projects, making up 41.9% 
of Complete Project Aid projects that China has delivered globally up until 2009 (2011, p.10). 
 
Based on available statistics, the majority of effective and sustained projects have seen 
similar situations as the Magbass Sugar Complex project assessed above, for example: the 
Mulungushi Textile Factory delivered to Zambia in 1983, which first transformed from a joint 
investment project to Grant project in 1979, and then survived with Chinese Management 
Cooperation from 1984 (Lin, 1997, p.6); the Conakry Match and Tobacco Factory delivered to 
Guinea in 1964, which first requested an overhaul and an additional Tobacco Cultivation 
Centre in 1972, then a complete upgrade in 1976 (Government of China). Even considering 
some exceptional examples, such as the Rwanda Cement Factory (transferred in 1984, 
Management Cooperation until 2006), which both fulfilled the domestic need and achieved 
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exportation (MOC, 2004), and the Burundi Bujumbura Textile Factory (opened in 1980, 
equipment first upgraded in 1997, and then again in 2006), which obtained significant profits 
(Lin, 1997, p.7), the result of foreign aid dependencies of China's industrial and agricultural 
projects in Africa are nonetheless plainly obvious. Without continuous Chinese support, 
these projects would all have failed.  
 
Given these almost identical results, it can be seen that as well as China's determination in 
building African industrial and agricultural foundations being affected by the political impacts, 
the contrasting social behaviour and the underdeveloped local institutional environment, the 
outcomes of these projects were fundamentally undermined by China's incompetent foreign 
aid planning and implementation. To be specific, in addition to the inept allocation approach 
which initially overlooked the local conditions, and the restrictive foreign aid principles that 
rigidly prohibited China's involvement in local affairs, China's lack of adequate foreign aid 
professionals and management approaches have directly driven its foreign aid to insufficient 
project operations and unsuccessful technology and management transfers. Although after 
China's domestic reform, the newly founded cooperative foreign aid approaches improved 
the project sustainability in the short-term, provided with the remain politically tied foreign 
aid principles and the unimproved Technical Aid, both these factors have steered China's 
industrial and agricultural foundation projects to disappointing results.  
 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Liu, "With the deepest belief in proletarian internationalism, 
China's attempt in building African industrial and agricultural foundations was sincerely 
minded in assisting Africa's development"45. Albeit it at large failed to deliver the promised 
development assistance, the exercise of this foreign aid objective significantly improved 
China's foreign aid capacity and to some extent benefited Africa's development. By the early 
1990s, regardless of China's improving domestic economy, given that the revised Technical 
Aid continued to failing in sustaining delivered industrial and agricultural projects, China 
stopped this foreign aid implementation method and invited its further productive foreign 
aid requests to the newly inaugurated Concessional Loan. While adopting commercial 
funding to improve the outcomes of productive foreign aid projects as well as to fulfil China's 
economic interests, in consideration to China's political interests concerned, government 
budget funded traditional foreign aid, it has continued with the delivery of less financially 
demanding and less technical landmark projects. 
 
To "Reduce Expenditure While Consolidating Foreign Aid Outcomes" (1982 – 1993) 
以“减少支出，巩固援外成果”为重点的对外援助 
 
Following the rapid development of China's diplomatic relationships in the early 1970s, the 
excessively delivered industrial and agricultural foundations building focused foreign aid 
induced tremendous challenges to China's domestic development. As a result of the break 
out of the Cultural Revolution and China's successful return to the UN, China's political 
interests emphasised foreign aid and pushed the ignorance of economic considerations, 
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indeed the over acceptance of foreign aid requests ensued domestic financial burdens to 
China. In view of this situation, and provided the stabilising international environment and 
China's government reforms, China implemented the reform policy and adjusted its foreign 
aid approaches. Subsequent to which, not only the political dominance to China's foreign aid 
was finally concluded, but these changes saw the newly awakened economic interests swiftly 
evolve into The Four Principles used to guide China's further foreign aid implementation. 
 
As an Africa centred, economic interests emphasised addition to The Eight Principles, The 
Four Principles continued to build on the concepts of non-interference with each other's 
internal affairs and mutual respect, while remaining faithful to the aim of helping African 
countries achieve self-reliance. On the basis of abiding by the terms introduced by The Eight 
Principles, it placed additional emphasis on the realisations of mutual benefit, practical 
results, diversified implementation forms and the achievement of common progress. In line 
with this revised guidance, and acting on the newly raised foreign aid objective of reduce 
expenditure while consolidating foreign aid outcomes, the Chinese government immediately 
reinstated limits for its foreign aid budget and requested that further foreign aid be based on 
improved feasibility studies, with specific attention to be paid to the appropriateness of the 
recipient country's local conditions.  
 
Further, in order to improve the planning and implementation approaches of China's foreign 
aid according to this new objective, China first upgraded its Technical Aid with Management 
Cooperation to promote project sustainability. And then, in the interest of reducing foreign 
aid expenditure and planning projects and programs that directly benefits the local people, 
China introduced the less financially demanding and less technical landmark projects. In 
addition to concern for African countries' shortages in management and human resources 
capacity, this landmark project planning was also proposed in consideration of maintaining 
African countries' confidence in China's foreign aid. As pointed out by a Chinese official, 
"Provided the overall reduction of foreign aid budget in the 1980s, landmark projects can 
make up the friendly relationship pursued by the Chinese government, and that is the reason 
why most of China's landmark projects were named with friendship"46.  
 
Owing to the conservative nature of landmark projects, this new planning approach allowed 
for both China's financial shortages and African countries' disadvantages in development 
capacities. However, it has fundamental limitations in providing adequate development 
assistance, let alone providing for the need to "increase income and accumulate capital"47 as 
promised by The Eight Principles. At present, while landmark projects remain the secondary 
choice of China's foreign aid planning,48 the effectiveness and sustainability of these projects 
are still largely undiscovered. Therefore, given the significant number of landmark projects 
that China has delivered, and is still delivering to Africa, the question arises: how have these 
projects been influencing Africa's development? And, should China carry on delivering 
landmark projects as development assistance? Next, this study brings these queries to one of 
                                                          
46
 Interview with Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 29 August 2011. 
47
 The 5
th
 principle of The Eight Principles, see Appendix I. 
48
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Accra, Ghana, 20 August 2011. 
102 
 
the most iconic Chinese landmark projects in Africa – the Ghana National Theatre, to find out 
the outcomes of China's friendship projects. 
 
National Theatre, Accra, Ghana, 1992 – present 
加纳国家剧院 
The Ghana National Theatre is an Interest-free Loan funded, Complete Project Aid project 
agreed during President Jerry Rawlings' visit to Beijing, 18 September 1985.49 Located in the 
downtown of the capital city of Accra, this multi-functional theatre is fitted with a 1,500-seat 
Drama Hall, Rehearsal Rooms, Office Buildings, and a range of other supportive facilitates. 
After the agreement, this project was contracted to Hangzhou Architectural Design Institute 
for design and allocated to China Guangzhou International Economic Technical Cooperation 
Company (GIETC is a subsidiary provincial enterprise established by the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic and Trade) and China Radio and TV (CRTV) for construction. The total cost was 60 
million CNY (approximately 15 million USD at the time) (GIETC). Upon completed in 1992, the 
theatre was immediately transferred to the Ghanaian government and went into operation.  
 
After more than a decade of service, the Ghanaian government approached China again for 
foreign aid regarding the rehabilitation of the theatre in 2005. Considering the significance of 
the project and the historical ties between China and Ghana, China granted 2 million USD for 
the request, and using this money, it repaired equipment and upgraded the theatre to 
modern standard (FMPRC, 2005). To mark the opening of the renovated theatre, not only did 
the Ghanaian government adopt the theatre's image for its newly released 20,000 Cedi 
currency, but during Jia Qinglin's50 visit in 2007, the initial Interest-free Loan provided for 
the project was waived along with other debts that had been due before 2005 (MOFCOM, 
2007). Currently, the National Theatre houses three resident companies: the National Dance 
Ensemble, the National Symphony Orchestra, and the National Drama Company.  
 
Observation 
With all the projects possible to launch using China's principally request based foreign aid 
planning approach, why would Ghana have requested help creating a National Theatre while 
still being rated by the UN as a Least Developed Country in 1985? This is one of the primary 
questions that encouraged this entire study, and it has always been the most confusing of 
them all. Naturally, this was one the first questions that the researcher asked when arriving 
at the National Theatre for the first time. As explained by one of the theatre's senior 
employees, who seemed rather intrigued: 
 
We are trying to develop, and we have the people to develop performing arts, that 
including, music, singing, dancing, comedy. All of these subjects are being studied in 
schools and universities, and when all these people graduate, where are they going to 
have the office to practice, to bring up the young ones? There was no such place at that 
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time.51  
 
Regardless of the importance of the performing arts in Ghana, indeed in Africa as a whole, in 
the 1980s, 60 million CNY would have built hospitals, schools, or many other non-productive 
but reasonably development based projects. But a theatre was even more important in 
Ghana than such projects because "art can also diagnose a lot, people can go to theatres to 
cure mental problems that even psychologist cannot do. Also there were hospitals, roads, 
and malaria centres. Although not enough, but we do have some. As for arts, there were 
nothing", argued a senior manager who has been with the theatre since the construction52. 
"Before the theatre", he continued, "there was only a small drama studio in Accra with less 
than 100 seats, but Ghana needed something big, a theatre for everybody. So Ghana asked 
China for help, and then China made two offers: a stadium or a theatre. At that time, the 
theatre planning had already come out, so it was the obvious choice". 
 
Although arguably a straightforward reason, whether the Ghanaian planning or the Chinese 
offers really are the adequate development solution for a Least Developed Country remains 
controversial. However, in the particular case of Ghana, as further explained by the theatre's 
employees, "Ghana as a whole country, it has its priority needs, but development also needs 
to be level. No one sector should develop further than the other. If road develops further 
than industries, what is the point? They should complement each other"53. And then, as 
another employee said: "Even though Ghana had other problems at that time, Ghana also 
needed a theatre. If the Chinese hadn't give us the theatre, we don't know who will give us, 
may be it will take another 50 years"54. Further, as explained by a young drum player, "Now 
in the West Africa sub-region, there are a lot of conflicts. So it's a good idea that we have a 
theatre, where everybody can sit down and have a laugh. That is the reason why Ghana is in 
still peace"55. 
 
For an even development progress or for peace building? In contrast to the perspectives of 
the theatre employees and musicians, politicians saw the project in another light. As pointed 
out by a senior government official who was at the negotiation table in Beijing in 1985:  
 
Relationship usually develops informally, it builds without frames or structures, and the 
theatre project is how it started… At that time, China and Ghana had just begin 
rebuilding our relationship and looking for cultural cooperation, so it was natural to 
settle the aspirations on a National Theatre. Besides, the Ghanaian government also 
recognises the expertise of China in cultural development and building construction… 
After the theatre, we have done a few projects, and China and Ghana are now known to 
each other much better. So in recent times, especially after President Mills'56 visit to 
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Beijing in 2010 in regards to a framework agreement with the Chinese government, we 
have decided that China and Ghana should do it within a more comprehensive 
package.57  
 
Expert in cultural development or not, China was only just recovering from the chaos of the 
Cultural Revolution at the time. While both China and Ghana were striving for development, 
it is not hard to realise that from a political standpoint, the National Theatre project was only 
regarded as a gift or, in political terms, a sign of commitment to the relationship. Whether it 
was going to be a theatre or a stadium was to a large extent irrelevant, as long as there was a 
project that demonstrated the intentions for bilateral relations. In this particular instance, 
the National Theatre definitely made a contribution to improving the relationship between 
China and Ghana. However, as a foreign aid project that was framed in terms of development 
assistance, neither cultural needs nor relationship building seems to be the adequate answer. 
As Brautigam plainly pointed out in a case study of building the Bo City Stadium in Sierra 
Leone, "They don't meet our definition of what a poor country 'should' do with pledges of 
aid" (2009, p.138).  
 
Nevertheless, while the National Theatre certainly fulfilled its political responsibilities, how 
has it actually contributed to society as a theatre? "The theatre is not accomplishing what it 
should, because it is supposed to promote arts, put up small theatres and support traditional 
arts in all ten regions in Ghana, so arts can really meet the whole country", pointed out one 
of the theatre's employees highlighting the aims put forward in The Ghana National Theatre 
Act (1991)5859. "But due to government financial constrains, it was impossible for the theatre 
to achieve that", added another employee: 
 
And now the government has stopped funding us from last year, we don't know how 
long this theatre will stay open. It is true that the theatre has to be self-sufficient, but it 
takes time, and we have not been very lucky. Chairman Mao led China to development, 
but in Ghana, we have not been able to do so. There is always some other decision 
made for something else. The theatre is here 20 years, but the policy is still the same.60  
 
Whilst the interviewees refused to discuss the unlucky details of the claimed government 
constrains, and noting the importance of supporting policies for a state-owned property, 
with considerations regarding the operation of the theatre, it seems to have a more obvious 
issue – why has a ticket-selling theatre required two decades of government support? As one 
management employee explained: "We are losing a lot of programs. The resident companies 
hardly stages any shows, and sponsorship is also very difficult to find in Ghana. Since each of 
the companies has their own directors, sources and bank accounts, they prefer to play and 
earn elsewhere"61. Another pointed out: "Only some of the internal generated funds were 
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used to support the saloon, most of them were used for the end of year party"62. Yet another 
employee picked up on this point of mismanagement: "Someone also says that maybe we 
should bring back the white man, so they can manage it for us"63. 
 
As desperate as the current situation sounds, with limited government support and a rather 
slack management approach, the reason why the theatre still struggles to sustain itself is 
becoming clear. In addition to the domestic conditions, as this employee added, "Do you see 
the air conditioning? It has stopped running for two years. We don't have the money to fix it, 
but it also shows that the Chinese product is not very good, this is a new system that they 
installed in 2005"64. With concerns moved to the project built quality, as this study later 
found out with one Chinese official:  
 
Nothing lasts forever. Particularly when you are not servicing it as you should. When 
China rehabilitated the theatre in 2005, one of the primary reason why we updated the 
equipment is because they are beyond repair. Ghana does not have the technicians to 
maintain the equipment, nor the funds.65  
 
As well as a first-hand experience, this is likewise a concern that highlighted one of the major 
issues with China's foreign aid in Africa. In terms of the foreign aid packaging, what technical 
standards should China adopt to? The local standard, or according to The Eight Principles: 
"The best-quality equipment and materials manufactured by China"66? More to the point, 
with regards to the Made in China perspective of China's foreign aid, a complement was also 
offered by one of the National Theatre's senior managers:  
 
There always are some lazy people trying to blame the others. The Chinese people 
came here to build the national theatre, they requested for a place to stay near the 
project site. Why? To cut down the transportation cost, to cut down on man-hours 
wasted on the journey. At the same time, we were also putting up the International 
Conference Centre, the contractors went further away to accommodate in a fancy hotel. 
When the Chinese come to work, they are fully equipped with working clothes on. The 
other guys, when they come here, they are in fully air-conditioned buses. And when the 
buses were found unpaid for custom duty and confiscated, it became a big problem for 
them to move the project people to the site. Whereas the only time the Chinese 
stopped working is because the locals stole the materials, and when the project is 
delayed, they [the locals] turn back to blame them [the Chinese].67  
 
The initial plan was to build a theatre for the local people to enjoy and arts graduates to 
perform, but the resident companies are not staging any programs that earn a ticket to 
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sustain the theatre. The initial plan was to develop a good relationship between China and 
Ghana, the proof of which saw Ghana ending up with a state-owned, subvention demanding 
foreign aid project. The initial plan was considerate of both China's financial shortages and 
African countries' limited development capacities, but then China had to eventually come 
back to maintain the project. When all these issues are added up, it is obvious that even 
today, Ghana's domestic management and human resources capacities are still unable to 
coping with a state-owned theatre. Although such conclusion might have overlooked the 
sound political outcome – the stable and close relationship developed in between China and 
Ghana, but as a development promised foreign aid project perhaps, the end-result of a 
financial burdening theatre was not really a sound gift for Ghana at all, and this raises the 
broader question of whether or not China should continuing to deliver landmark projects. 
 
To provide an update of the running of the project after fieldwork, in October 2012, one 
report suggested that the National Theatre appointed a new Executive Director and a new 
Deputy Executive Director in view of "[they could] play a pivotal role in the development of 
institutions linkages and mutually beneficial relationships between the National Theatre of 
Ghana and other artistic and cultural institutions in Ghana and aboard" (Modern Ghana). 
However, according to a visiting note entitled Save Ghana's National Theatre Now published 
two years later, the situation of the theatre "required that I [the author] inquire about some 
few issues concerning the maintenance of the place" (Sarpon, 2014). As the author pointed 
out, "Filthy fountain in front of the theatre… the mountain of garbage heaped just at the 
entrance…", whilst additionally stating that, "the National Theatre houses at least three 
resident companies… but performances either within or outside the country are least heard 
of" (ibid.). Assuming this visiting report was done objective, the Chinese workers might be 
coming back to the premises very shortly for the second time.  
 
Assessment 
To assess the outcomes of the National Theatre project, we return to the principal architect's 
revisiting report in 1996, which reported: "the National Theatre staged almost 300 plays in 
the past two years" (Cheng, p.5), and elaborated that this project appears to have benefited 
the recipient country's cultural development in the short-term. Considering the theatre has 
also provided employment opportunities for three performing arts companies, a number of 
administrative staffs, as well as supporting for the current political relationship between 
China and Ghana, it seems to have contributed to the recipient country in the long-term. 
Further, since the theatre adopted a commercial approach as a result of the termination of 
government subvention in 2010, it has to some extent improved in aspects related to 
sustainability.68 However, while the practical results of this improvement are yet to be seen 
as far as the theatre's designated purpose of promoting cultural development goes, it has 
indeed failed in terms of both project effectiveness and sustainability.  
 
In spite of the immediate development benefits, the overall political successes, and recent 
financial improvements, there are a number of factors that have harmed the ability of the 
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theatre to promote cultural development. Regarding project effectiveness in particular, even 
though there was continuous policy support granted by the local government and successive 
financial assistance packages delivered by the donor country, this did not solve the problem 
of a lack of an appropriate management approach. As one senior theatre employee put it: "It 
is common for the staff to not show up until 11 am"69. Moreover, such absences of the 
resident companies and administrative employees have had knock-on effects on the ability 
to promote cultural development. They have also driven to financial insufficiencies in the 
project. Because detailed records do not exist, it is impossible to determine whether the 
absences of main employees led to insufficient project funding or vice versa, but both of 
these factors have had a negative impact on effectiveness of this project.  
 
As for the sustainability of the project, in addition to the problems caused by the absences of 
main employees, the continuation of the National Theatre was substantially limited by the 
inadequately planned project standard. As the principal architect suggested, the project 
planning was conducted jointly by both donor and recipient countries, and further it was 
planned and implemented in accordance with the donor country's foreign aid principles so 
that the project "reflected our [the donor country's] latest technological achievements in this 
ground" (Cheng, 1996, p.6).70 As a result of failing to package the foreign aid according to 
the recipient country's technical and management development conditions, not only has the 
project demanded a great deal of local government supports, the donor country was also 
brought back to provide further assistance in the maintenance and functional upgrade of the 
project. With all these brought together, there are two major factors that have affected the 
effectiveness and sustainability of this project:  
 
1. Limited foreign aid capacity 
Because of the donor country's limited foreign aid capacity, the project outcomes were 
fundamentally undermined by its inadequate project planning which failed to accommodate 
the recipient country's technical and management development conditions. Although in this 
particular case, the advanced technical standard arranged and implemented for the project 
benefited the recipient country's cultural development in the short-term, provided the lack 
of planning on additional technical and management support to begin with, the unsuitable 
project standard has materially restricted the long-term effectiveness and continuation of 
the project.  
 
2. Unsupportive institutional environment 
Aside from the claimed government constraints, which according to the interviewees, to 
some extent sabotaged the financial outcomes of the project, based on the available project 
details, the lack of policy enforcement from the local government has substantially harmed 
the project operation. In spite of the recipient country's efforts in introducing legislation 
related to the running of the project, the unsatisfactory execution of such legislation and the 
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uncontrolled budget allocation have driven this project to complete financial meltdown. The 
behaviour of its employees in the meanwhile have also made major contribution to its failing 
situation. 
 
Foreign Aid Subject to Domestic Development 
 
To summarise the study of China's foreign aid that was planned to reduce expenditure while 
consolidating foreign aid outcomes, whilst it was primarily realised in the implementation of 
landmark projects, China's second foreign aid objective has, at least with regard to the 
National Theatre in Accra, not been able to deliver adequate development assistance. Albeit 
there are no official statistics regarding landmark projects, as for the distribution of this 
particular type of foreign aid projects, an early study conducted by Law indicated that, "the 
building of sports stadia is one of the most prominent forms of Chinese aid to Africa: China 
has constructed, or plans to construct, stadia in 17 African countries; present almost every 
country along the West African coast has a Chinese-built stadium" (1984, pp.337-38); and 
further, The White Paper listed the building of 85 Conference Buildings, 85 Sports Facilities, 
12 Theatres & Cinemas, 143 Civil Buildings and 37 Municipal Facilities, which made up 17.9% 
of China's Complete Project Aid projects delivered globally prior to 2009 (2011, p.10).  
 
In addition to the Ghana National Theatre project assessed above, China's landmark projects 
are generally characterised by the unattainable sustainability of such projects. As this study 
found out the following projects all are evident failures: the National Stadium delivered to 
Sierra Leone in 1979, which subsequently required two Chinese Grants for rehabilitations in 
1992 and 2002 (MOC, 2003b); the Benin Cotonou Friendship Stadium delivered in 1982, 
which first required repair of its tennis court in 1988, and then maintenance of its Light 
Tower in 1993, and major rehabilitation in 2002 (MOC, 2003a); and the Uganda Stadium 
delivered in 1994, which required maintenance in 2011 (MOC, 2010b). Even considering the 
relatively less demanding projects such as Palaces or Civil Buildings, they too have required 
additional assistance in their up keep. For instance, the Zaire People's Palace delivered in 
1979, required major rehabilitation in 2012 (MOC, 2012); while the Djibouti People's Palace 
delivered in 1985, required a complete upgrade in 2011 (MOC, 2010a). 
 
In light of these almost identical results, taking into account China's already problematic 
Technical Aid which was purposed to transfer the required technical and management skills 
to recipient countries, China's landmark projects were substantially undermined by its 
inadequate foreign aid planning. As plainly summarised by a Chinese scholar, "When the 
foreign aid package does not match the recipient country's development conditions, it is not 
going to have sustainable outcomes"71. "Take for example the National Stadium delivered to 
Tanzania in 2004", as she further added72, "it is closed most of the time due to its massive 
running costs. However, the smaller sports centre next door is as busy as a Sunday market. 
Although these [landmark] projects provided some development assistance to the recipient 
country, the practical value is extremely low". Moreover, as a result of inadequate project 
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planning, "China has to protect its landmarks, and a significant amount of foreign aid budget 
has been wasted on maintenance rather than providing further assistances"73. 
 
Nevertheless, whilst China was recovering from domestic development chaos in the early 
1980s, the alteration to the less expensive landmark projects has fulfilled both of its political 
and economic interests. Although on the other hand, this new foreign aid project planning 
has to a large extent failed to provide adequate development assistance to Africa, it has 
undoubtedly benefited development of bilateral relationships. At the end of 1994, with 
further reforms quickly taking place, the newly introduced Concessional Loan drove China's 
foreign aid in a completely different direction. Not only has this commercial fund based 
foreign aid funding method finally led China's foreign aid to greater mutual benefits when it 
comes to development cooperation, it has propelled China's economic development swiftly 
forward. However, regardless of this significant improvement to foreign aid coming into the 
contemporary era, with concerns to China's political interests emphasised traditional foreign 
aid, it remained consistently with the choice of landmark projects. 
 
To "Improve People's Livelihoods" (2005 – present) 
以“改善人民生活”为目标的民生项目援助 
 
Subsequent to switching to the delivery of landmark projects in the 1980s, China's foreign 
aid progressed and led to an awakening of its economic interests. First, concerning a rapid 
increase in domestic development demand, China has trialled a variety of management 
cooperation methods to reduce expenditure and consolidate its foreign aid outcomes. And 
then, it has introduced the Foreign Aid Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects to attempt to 
create greater financial benefit. Further, at the end of the Cold War and upon conversion to a 
nascent market economy, China launched the funding method of Concessional Loans to take 
over further foreign aid requests of productive projects. As a result of these changes, China's 
foreign aid developed into two divergent paths in the 1990s that aimed to accomplish both 
of its political and economic pursuits. However, given the significant success of Concessional 
Loans which continuously bring China financial benefits, the development of China's political 
interests emphasised traditional foreign aid was to a large extent unattended.  
 
After being overshadowed by the spark of Concessional Loan for almost an entire decade, 
the government reappointment in 2002 and China's fast growing international responsibility 
have finally brought its attention back to the development of traditional foreign aid. In line 
with the goal of building a harmonious world proposed by Chairman Hu which subsequently 
advanced China's foreign aid objective to improve people's livelihoods, China resumed the 
promotion of traditional foreign aid. To implement this new objective, rather than solely 
relying on government budget funded traditional foreign aid as previously approached, China 
introduced traditional foreign aid, Concessional Loan, Zero Duty Treatment and Debt Relief 
combined Eight-Point Plans through FOCAC ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, additional 
Measures were also being presented through UN High-Level meetings to further accelerate 
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its involvement in Africa's development. 
 
According to these Plans and Measures, China's foreign aid at this stage begins to focus on 
long-term impacts instead of temporary sensations. As the Minister of MOC Fu emphasised: 
"Let the recipient countries share China's development experience, future foreign aid have to 
be planned with a minimum of five-year consideration"74. While continuously developing 
foreign aid planning and implementation approaches, in order to comprehensively benefit 
African countries' development, China has also put forward a number of supplementary 
adjustments to the objective of improving people's livelihoods. In particular, on the basis of 
focusing on medical and health related development, China determines to improve Africa's 
human resources capacity to provide Africa with the ability to develop. And then, to drive 
common bilateral foreign aid towards integrated multilateral cooperation, China pushes for 
foreign aid collaboration in the African sub-regions. Finally, to promote cultural exchanges, 
China encourages the development of China-Africa friendship at the individual level.  
 
In sum, whilst pursuing financial benefits through the business orientated loan approaches, 
and improving people's livelihoods with the HRDC, Medical Teams and Overseas Volunteer 
Programs supplemented traditional foreign aid,75 China's current foreign aid in Africa is 
purposed to accomplish both its political and economic pursuits. However, with particular 
attention called to its recipient country's development centred traditional foreign aid that 
this study is concerned, provided it seems to have successfully facilitated Chinese enterprises 
going out, how has it been improving African people's livelihoods? Or in other words: In view 
of the adjusted and improved objectives, planning and implementation approaches of 
China's traditional foreign aid, has it managed to enhance African countries' self-reliance 
capacities without creating further foreign aid dependency? With these concerns in mind, 
this study travels to the recently transferred Lekma Hospital project in Ghana, to observe and 
assess the results of China's foreign aid at present.  
 
Lekma Hospital, Teshie, Ghana, 2010 – present 
中国–加纳友好医院 
The Lekma Hospital (known as the China-Ghana Friendship Hospital in China) is a Grant 
funded, Complete Project Aid project that was implemented according to China's first 
Eight-Point Plan.76 With a budget of 51 million CNY (approximately 7.7 million USD at the 
time), it is comprised of an Outpatient Building, a Medical Technology Building, a Ward (100 
beds), an Auxiliary Building, an Anti-malaria Centre and a range of supplementary medical 
equipment and medicines.77 The complete contract was won by China GEO-Engineering 
Corporation (CGC), while the provisioning of medical supplies was sub-contracted to China 
National Pharmaceutical Foreign Trade Corporation (SINOPHARM FOREIGN TRADE). 
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Located in Teshie, a suburban district of Accra, the construction of the Lekma Hospital was 
started in April 2009 and finished over a 15-month period (including the installation and 
testing of all medical equipment). Upon completion in December 2010, it was transferred to 
the Ghanaian government and immediately achieved total Ghanaian ownership. Currently, 
the hospital employs 20 doctors, 128 nurses and 34 maintenance workers.78 What is also 
worth noting is that, since the Lekma Hospital was the first hospital delivered of China's 30 
promised hospitals in Africa, its successful transfer to the local government also marked the 
beginning of the realisation of China's 2006 FOCAC pledges (MOC, 2009a). 
 
Observation 
Medical Aid mainly refers to the dispatching of medical teams, the provisioning of medical 
equipment and medicines, the building of hospitals, and the training of medical professionals. 
It is arguably one of the most needed development assistance in Africa. Since China sent its 
first Medical Teams to Egypt in 1956, in accordance with The White Paper, altogether it has 
dispatched 21,000 medical personnel overseas by the end of 2009. Further, in 2009 alone, 
"60 Chinese medical teams composed of 1,324 members provided medical services at 130 
medical institutions in 57 developing countries" (2011, p.15). Although in the particular case 
of Ghana, China's first medical team only arrived in 2009, Ghana welcomed its first Chinese 
hospital as early as 2000 (Dangme East Hospital). Given the previous medical aid and hospital 
building experiences in Ghana, the Lekma Hospital seemed to be a rather straightforward 
project on paper. However, problems with this hospital appeared even before it opening in 
December 2010. 
 
To begin with, while the construction of the hospital was fully completed in July 201079, it 
opened five months later. Why was there such a delay? Some explanations follow: "No, the 
training was already done, it only took a month. The delay was due to the schedule of the 
president who insisted on being present and announcing the opening of the hospital", 
argued the managing director of CGC, Feng Nian80. On the other hand, the hospital director 
Boasiako pointed out that he was the only "almost" available hospital director at that time, 
and he was initially assigned to direct another hospital and unexpectedly allocated to Lekma 
Hospital81. Lastly, one Chinese informant said, "The reason is because the local government 
wanted China to operate the hospital as well. Ghana has a National Health Insurance Scheme 
where the government is responsible for the cost of medical services and medicines. If China 
takes over the hospital, then the local government would be seen to be providing medical 
services at no further expense"82.   
 
In spite of what actually happened, none of these scenarios (real or imagined) indicates a 
promising beginning to the friendship hospital. However, in view of these dilemmas, the 
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question is: Did Ghana really need another hospital? Or, more strictly speaking, did Ghana 
have the capacity to operate another hospital? "300 beds should be the capacity for this area, 
but this hospital lacks focus. There is no CT83 needed for a 100 beds hospital", pointed out 
Boasiako84, who seemed fairly confused. "I was initially told that China would be delivering 
an Anti-malaria Centre in Ridge Hospital85, and then somehow China decided to build a 
general hospital instead". This point was later clarified by a senior Chinese official, who said: 
"Building an additional sector of a hospital is a lot less recognisable than building a hospital 
on its own, right?"86 Livelihoods improvement project or landmark project, why not both? 
China believed that this was possible, especially since "the location was very carefully 
selected, it was close to a slum area where there used to be no hospital at all"87.  
 
Although arguably politically minded, while there is nothing that seems to be drifting away 
from China's primary objective of improving people's livelihoods, it is hard to criticise this of 
China's last-minute adjustment, and setting aside the dilemmas above noted, the Lekma 
Hospital was successfully opened by the then Vice President John Mahama88  on 23 
December 2010. Since then, as reported by China Energy Conservation and Environment 
Protection Group (CECEP)89: "As of 21 January 2011, the Lekma Hospital has already treated 
more than 2,000 patients… it is the biggest, most comprehensively equipped, first class 
General Hospital and Anti-malaria Centre so far delivered by the Chinese government in 
Ghana" (CECEP, 2011). However, with no further confirmation on this rather sound result by 
Boasiako, he pointed out another side of the story: "after the hospital opened, I had to see 
the Health Minister immediately for equipment such as a bench chair for patients, office 
equipment for us and so on. None of which were included in the hospital contract".  
 
Was this the result of inconsiderate Chinese project planning or incompetent Ghanaian 
preparation? While Boasiako responded the question with a smile, he continued discussing 
the terms that are included in the contract:  
 
The construction of the building is generally OK, although there are some defects, such 
as half of the door locks do not work. The immediate problem is the equipment – some 
are malfunctioning, some are not working at all, and some are not here. For instance, 
the X-Ray, the CSSD (Central Sterile Supply Department) and the CT are not powered, 
these machines require a built-in power supply in the construction and that is not 
properly done; the X-Ray doesn't comes with the back plate, film, and the chemical 
analyser in the laboratory is missing cables; the gas plant that supplies oxygen to the 
ward and theatres is not working; besides the limited capacity (8), the mortuary has 
never worked; an ambulance like vehicle was provided, but that is only an ordinary van 
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with flat seats and oxygen cylinders, and that is broken down after 2 months…90 
 
As the examples rapidly piled up, this interview, initially agreed for only 30 minutes, quickly 
turned into a half-day discussion, and we were soon joined by a radiologist, who approached 
us hastily with relief in his voice when asking, "Are you the engineer?"91 Upon finding out 
that this research was studying China's foreign aid, he continued with Boasiako's complaints. 
"The hospital is not doing well at the moment. If I want to take an X-Ray of a patient, I have 
to ask him to go to another hospital", he explained. This is a straightforward description of 
the current status of the hospital. Continuing, he said, "apart from the unleaded doors of the 
X-Ray room and the seriously outdated CT equipment, both of the operating boards and the 
unconnected power distribution cabinets are labelled in Chinese. It requires a lot more than 
a medical degree to get this equipment into operation". On realising that there are no 
specialist engineers in the hospital, nor in Ghana, SINOPHARM FOREIGN TRADE attempted to 
teach the radiologist to connect the power cables to the machines through the medium of 
webcam. "I am not that skilful", the radiologist admitted, "I am a doctor".  
 
Meanwhile, Boasiako tried to switch the topic to possible solutions, saying:  
 
It would be much better if China could send some experienced doctors to help us, not 
only with the equipment, but also for the herbal treatment department. Although we 
do have some local specialists, they are not experienced. We also need acupuncturists, 
people who can teach proper massage. These departments are all still closed.92 
 
But then he further pointed out that, "Ghana is short of medical staff, a lot of the doctors 
went to developed countries. This hospital is put together with doctors from other hospitals, 
and we are still trying to locate a malaria specialist". Since the Chinese-run hospital attempt 
failed at the very beginning, Chinese medical teams also seems to be pulled away from 
participation in the Lekma Hospital project.93 In addition to the notable shortage of doctors, 
indeed the many unavailable departments and an anti-malaria centre remaining an empty 
room with packed equipment, the immediate way out for the hospital is directly pointing at 
China's HRDC programs. 
 
Purposed for "helping recipient countries build up their self-development capacity" as stated 
in The White Paper (2011, p.5), China's HRDC offers around 200 training programs to Ghana 
annually. Seven of these programs are medical related with a total of 19 places.94 "Although 
these programs are not specifically designed for our [Ghanaian] immediate needs, the 
competition for a place is very intense", pointed out Boasiako95, and after a "very friendly 
presentation" to the Chinese embassy, he has managed to secure 15 places in all seven 
training programs. However, it turned out that, "some of the programs are really useful, but 
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others are barely relevant", explained one of the doctors who was enrolled in the Training 
Course on Malaria Diagnosis Technique and Equipment Usage for Anti-malaria Centres in 
Africa96. "The title suggests that it is for the diagnosis of malaria, but it is actually a dedicated 
laboratory training". "Besides the title, there were no details whatsoever", added another 
doctor97. "I am happy that China is trying to do something here, but I am also so frustrated 
because it could just have been better".  
 
So here we see inadequate project planning, sub-standard construction and uncoordinated 
HRDC programs. Despite China's development in foreign aid planning and implementation 
approaches, it has hardly made any improvement at all on these fronts. If anything, it has 
gone backwards. Hence, what went wrong with China's foreign aid planning? As a senior 
Ghanaian development planning official commented:  
 
I am sure somebody will eventually realise, that there is only a particular amount of 
money available. From the Ghanaian point of view, they were saying, "Let's get as much 
as we can, let us add to it overtime", and then you really depend on the best project, 
but it is never going to be. On the other hand, the Chinese are also saying "Oh, you did 
not plan ahead, we have this money, you want a hospital, and we built it for you", so 
nobody is insisting on comprehensiveness. For China in this particular view, not just to 
have a plan of this foreign aid portfolio for Africa, but with the area they have identified, 
when they go into any country, they must sit down and discuss comprehensively with 
the recipient country's planning authority, not only by name, but by scope, so that it can 
have the maximum impact on the people.98 
 
Furthermore, with concerns to the issues of implementation, while no prior hospital building 
experiences were discovered with CGC99, it is not hard to realise why the hospital had been 
constructed in such a way that it was literally disconnected from its equipment. Additionally, 
even though without detailed information on the bidding of the Lekma Hospital contract, 
this finding also suggests that there definitely were drawbacks in MOC's process of qualifying 
foreign aid implementation contractors. Whereas considering the quality and standard of the 
medical equipment – the outdated and broken down machines, while the responsibility is on 
SINOPHARM FOREIGN TRADE, as a senior Chinese official explained: "This is a Grant [funded] 
project, so all materials have to be imported from China. Although it is common for donor 
countries to restrict Grant foreign aid purchases to its own products, in the particular case of 
China's pharmaceutical equipment, that is where the problem lies"100, and how obvious this 
problem is – "Most ambulances in Beijing are also vans with flat seats at the back"101.  
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Since the opening of the Lekma Hospital, Boasiako has repeatedly been in contact with the 
Chinese embassy, and "the embassy said that they have to report back to China for further 
reviews and solutions. But they did promise that the missing equipment will arrive very soon, 
and all the problems will be sorted before December"102. With that reassurance, Boasiako 
was also asked to resolve an issue regarding his duty: "Last time when I invited the Chinese 
officials to see the problems, the only problem they bought up was that they are not happy 
that the China-Ghana Friendship Hospital plaque at the main gate is missing the Malaria 
Centre quote"103. By the time this researcher visited in August 2011, the problems that had 
been solved were: "Some X-Ray films, a Haematology Analyser, and three operating manuals 
in English"104 had been provided. Further, based on the request from the Chinese officials, 
an additional plaque was installed at the main gate stating China-Ghana Malaria Prevention 
and Treatment Centre. However, the centre was standing vacant.  
 
Albeit there are no detailed further information regarding the operation of Lekma Hospital, 
after the researcher left it at the end of 2011, one report stated that the Ghanaian Health 
Minister moved to solve problems facing the hospital in February 2013. By which time, the 
concerns already extended from the above found to "inadequate doctors and senior nurses 
at the hospital… unavailability of mosquito nets, inappropriate mortuary facility as well as 
water and electricity supply" (Ghana Health Nest). In addition to this, on the World Malaria 
Day that year (25 April), Modern Ghana published a report filed by Day Break revealed that 
not only the hospital is "decaying and a far cry from the original vision and project dreamed 
of and initialled by Ghana", but it also "not responded to basic health care contingencies" 
(2013). As a result, the report concluded, "Most residents in the outlying communities prefer 
visiting other nearby facilities, some of which are not as esteemed or reputable as the State 
facility, but which could be relied upon to deliver basic services" (ibid.). 
 
Assessment 
To assess the outcomes of the Lekma Hospital project, this project to some extent achieved 
its objective of improving people's livelihoods, even given its limited capacities. However, 
with regards to the fulfilment of China's principal foreign aid aim, it has generally not been 
able to advancing African countries' ability in achieving self-reliance. Although as estimated 
by Boasiako during fieldwork in 2011: "On the basis of successfully advance medicines and 
medical equipment against its future income, the hospital has the ability to provide basic 
medical treatment and housing inpatients"105, considering the situation of the hospital: the 
already terminated government subvention,106 the incomplete and malfunctioning medical 
equipment, and the shortages of specialist doctors, this estimation remains a tall order 
nonetheless. Further, while China's HRDC programs are yet to be beneficial, this project has 
indeed failed to attain its intended outcomes. 
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On the ground, after only eight months in operation, there are a number of drawbacks that 
have affected the Lekma Hospital's outcomes and future prospects. For instance, regarding 
project effectiveness, much as seemingly influenced by local considerations, it was the donor 
country's inappropriate foreign aid planning that first established an overly broad-concerned 
project unsuited to the recipient country's domestic conditions. And then, bearing in mind 
the recipient country's unsettled plans for project acceptance, the project operation was 
significantly postponed. More to the point, leading to the donor country's limited foreign aid 
capacity, not only did its underdeveloped technology fail to meet the recipient country's 
current requirements, but its problematic implementation supervising mechanisms have also 
led to sub-standard project constructions, as well as fragmentary delivery and delivery of 
deficient equipment. In that case, both the immediate and future outcomes of the project 
were further undermined.  
 
Moreover, considering the sustainability of the project, whilst the project is still not fully 
completed by contract terms, there is minimal possibility to sustain its outcomes with only 
partly delivered equipment. In addition to the consequences introduced by sub-standard 
construction and insufficient equipment delivery, there were also inadequately coordinated 
Technical Aid and HRDC programs, as well as excessive domestic brain drain. Even though as 
Boasiako claimed, "I am responsible for identifying the people who are dedicated to the 
hospital, and who are definitely going to come back after overseas training"107, the shortage 
of human resources remains a critical issue for the continuation of the project. On the whole, 
taking notice of the marginal political influences from both donor and recipient country, and 
the extent of outward brain flow, there is only one major factor that has affected the 
outcomes of the Lekma Hospital project:  
 
1. Limited foreign aid capacity  
Provided the donor country's limited foreign aid capacity, both its inadequate planning and 
incompetent implementation have led to disappointing project outcomes. Aside from the 
underlying deficiencies of the project which were primarily caused by the planning failure to 
take into account the recipient country's current domestic conditions, the donor country's 
lack of appropriate supervisory mechanisms and supportive measures have directly brought 
about sub-standard project implementation and absence of project operating personnel. As 
a result of these shortcomings, not only did the project barely achieve any positive outcomes, 
it was also immediately driven to restricted continuation.  
 
Good Will Orientated Business Initiatives 
 
To sum up the study of China's foreign aid that was purposed to improve people's livelihoods, 
China's current foreign aid objective has generally not been able to deliver the anticipated 
outcomes in Africa. Given that there are no official statistics on the allocations and scopes of 
China's people's livelihoods related projects and programs, The White Paper recorded 236 
projects in the category of Science, Education and Health Care, made up 11.6% of Complete 
                                                          
107
 Interview with Dr. Yaw Antwi Boasiako, Accra, Ghana, 23 August 2011. 
117 
 
Project Aid projects that China has delivered globally until 2009 (2011, p.10). In addition to 
this figure, according to China's FOCAC and UN pledges made between 2006 and 2010, China 
has in total promised to deliver 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centres, and 350 schools; to 
dispatch 3,000 medical experts; and to train 3,000 education and 9,000 medical personnel108. 
Moreover, with regards to the realisation of these pledges, a government report indicated 
that, "by the end of 2009… 30 pledged hospitals have all began construction; 30 anti-malaria 
centres and 100 rural schools have been completely transferred"109. 
 
Of these pledged projects and programs, aside from the Lekma Hospital project assessed 
above, this study has also identified and investigated two other people's livelihoods projects: 
the Sierra Leone-China Friendship Hospital and the China-Guinea Friendship Hospital110. This 
study has, unfortunately, found similar outcomes for all projects. To be specific: concerning 
the hospital project in Sierra Leone, though it was officially transferred on 13 May 2011, it 
was unable to open due to a lack of medical personnel and utility supplies. As pointed out by 
a Chinese informant: "Let alone the shortages of water and electricity, the whole country 
only has less than 80 doctors, so how can it operate a general hospital?"111 And then, given 
the uncoordinated support of Chinese Medical Teams,112 this project was renegotiated in 
March 2012 and a co-management between Shandong Qushan Hospital and the Ministry of 
Health of Sierra Leone was agreed to. On the basis of adopting a fully commercialised 
operating approach, this hospital eventually came into operation on 13 November 2012, 18 
months after the official transfer.113  
 
Regarding the China-Guinea Friendship Hospital project, while it was completed in July 2010, 
it was officially transferred to the local government nine months later on 13 April 2011 owing 
to an unsettled management agreement. After the transfer, in spite of the hospital benefiting 
from the assistance of a Chinese Medical Team in installing and operating Chinese labelled 
equipment, it was still unable to come into full operation due to "absences of initial capital 
and electricity"114. In the end, the hospital ended up depending on a power generator and 
medicines provided by China in addition to the original project. Subsequent to receiving this 
replenishment, the hospital finally managed to officially open and deliver most of its planned 
features a year later on 11 April 2012.115 Furthermore, a Chinese informant explained the 
impact of the intense domestic demand for medical professionals in Guinea: "While the local 
doctors only care about China's next donation of equipment and medicine, and showing up 
only part-time as they simultaneously take positions elsewhere; we [China] are not likely to 
fully hand over this hospital project any time soon"116. 
 
Taking into account these virtually identical outcomes in Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea, 
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despite China's efforts in adjusting its foreign aid objective to further accommodate recipient 
countries' needs, China's current foreign aid is substantially undermined by its incompetent 
foreign aid planning and implementation. As well China's inconsiderate foreign aid allocation 
and packaging which to a great extent neglected the recipient country's domestic conditions, 
as a result of the lack of appropriate implementation supervising mechanisms and effective 
supporting foreign aid methods, the failing implementation standards and uncoordinated 
HRDC programs have directly led to China's improving people's livelihoods centred foreign 
aid to have limited outcomes, and in extreme cases, to foreign aid dependencies. Albeit the 
co-management and Medical Team integration to some extent improved project outcomes, 
however, not only neither of these new approaches are standard foreign aid arrangements at 
present, but both of them have failed to overcome the setbacks brought on by incompetent 
foreign aid planning and implementation approaches.  
 
In general, since China decided to focus on traditional foreign aid once again, and since it 
decided to further promote its relationships with Africa, China's foreign aid has emphasised 
improving people's livelihoods and has been welcomed by almost every African recipient 
country. However, despite the fact that China's traditional foreign aid later introduced 
additional focuses of promoting Africa's human resource capacity, supporting Africa regional 
integration, encouraging cultural exchanges, and indeed developing its own capacity, it has at 
large not been able to improve African people's livelihoods as proposed. At present, albeit 
China's traditional foreign aid seems to have arrived at a development phase where in it is 
accomplishing both China's political and economic demands – promoting friendship building 
as well as supporting Chinese enterprises going out, given its still limited foreign aid planning 
and implementation capacities, the promising intention of helping African recipient countries 
achieve self-reliance is yet to be met. 
 
Chapter summary  
 
Looking at China's foreign aid in light of the above examples of project and program outcome 
failure, China's recipient countries centred traditional foreign aid has not been able to deliver 
adequate development assistance to Africa. From building Africa's industrial and agricultural 
foundations (with a Complete Project Aid and Technical Aid combined approach), to reducing 
expenditure while consolidating foreign aid outcomes (with landmark projects and assorted 
Management Cooperation), to improving people's livelihoods (with the integration of HRDC, 
Medical Team and Overseas Volunteer programs), on the basis of achieving its successively 
emphasised political and economic demands, China's traditional foreign aid has only worked 
in Africa to some extent. Whilst there were some short-term benefits provided by China's 
traditional foreign aid, considering the generally unsatisfactory long-term outcomes and 
disappointing prospects, China's traditional foreign aid has neither fulfilled its objectives in 
full, nor delivered sufficient development assistance without causing further complications, 
at least in the case studies examined.  
 
Whilst the case studies all demonstrated recipient country's influences on China's foreign aid 
to some degree, this study has found that the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa were 
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substantially affected by its limited foreign aid capacity. For instance, with regards to China's 
inadequate foreign aid planning, the insufficient understanding of African countries' diverse 
domestic conditions resulted in a number of pitfalls. Besides the oversimplified foreign aid 
allocation approach which at first overlooked the political, social and institutional behaviours 
of recipient countries and placed China's foreign aid into complicated situations, leading to 
the false notion on their technical and management development capacities, the improperly 
arranged foreign aid packages then further puzzled the circumstances where the technology 
based projects were only able to deliver short-term benefits, and the non-technology based 
projects struggled to be effective at all. In the end, together with fundamentally restricted 
foreign aid outcomes, the majority of China's foreign aid projects were only able to continue 
operating with additional inputs of foreign aid and continued Chinese help.  
 
In addition to the consequences caused by inadequate planning, with reference to China's 
incompetent foreign aid implementation, China's ineffective foreign aid administration also 
led to project outcomes characterised by foreign aid dependency. As a result, as well as the 
previously provided technical cooperation and China based training programs declined due 
to the lack of foreign aid professionals, the recent HRDC programs also failed to sustain the 
outcomes of the delivered projects. Although arguably the HRDC programs to some extent 
addressed the concerns over China's shortage of foreign aid human resources, it was yet 
another example of inadequate foreign aid planning. Likewise, the integration of HRDC and 
the coordination of all China's foreign aid implementation methods were found disorganised. 
Furthermore, since China has been delegating foreign aid implementations, and promoting 
traditional foreign aid as a way to encourage its enterprises going out, given the unequally 
developed supervisory mechanisms, the implementation quality of China's foreign aid has 
also become an increasing concern. 
 
To conclude the assessments of China's foreign aid performance: as much as China sought to 
improve its foreign aid effectiveness and sustainability, leading to the still underdeveloped 
foreign aid planning and implementation approaches, China has in general not been able to 
improve its foreign aid outcomes, or to deliver the proposed development assistance to 
Africa. Given that China's development agenda continues to lean heavily towards promoting 
the economic interests underpinning Concessional Loan rather than improving the recipient 
countries centred traditional foreign aid, as illustrated in the case studies, there remain many 
unresolved concerns. Such concerns include: a lack of understanding of African countries' 
diverse domestic conditions and an absence of adequate foreign aid administration. These 
concerns have hampered the continuous effort that China has made in promoting its foreign 
aid outcomes in Africa. In summary, as a result of China's limited foreign aid capacity, and 
regardless of its unending attempts and consistent determination to help African countries 
achieve self-reliance, China's foreign aid continues to face many challenges. 
 
After investigating the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa and identifying the factors 
that have affected these outcomes, attention is drawn back to the development of China's 
foreign aid: After more than six decades, why have the effectiveness and sustainability of 
China's foreign aid in Africa barely improved? Through pursuing the objectives of building 
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African industrial and agricultural foundations, reducing expenditure while consolidating 
foreign aid outcomes, and improving people's livelihoods; and advancing implementation 
methods of Complete Project Aid, Goods and Materials Aid, Technical Aid, HRDC, Medical 
Teams and Overseas Volunteers Programs… what reason is there for China's foreign aid to 
still be struggling to cope with Africa's domestic conditions? In order to find the answers to 
these questions, the next chapter brings this study back to the making of China's foreign aid. 
Along with looking at China's successes and failures in coping with the factors that have 
affected and are affecting its foreign aid outcomes in Africa, it reveals the underlying Chinese 
characteristics of China's foreign aid. 
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Chapter Six: China's Foreign Aid in Africa – Efforts & Concerns 
 
Subsequent to understanding the development of China's foreign aid in Africa and finding 
out the factors that affect its performance, chapter six directs the understanding of China's 
foreign aid further to its substance so as to meet the third and final objective of this study: 
that is, to understand the successes and failures of China's foreign aid in approaching the 
factors that affect its outcomes in Africa. Particularly after learning about the development 
of China's foreign aid and its disappointing outcomes in assisting Africa's development, one 
query has been repeatedly coming to mind: What has gone wrong with China's foreign aid? 
Seeing the arguably considerate foreign aid objectives, and the planning and implementation 
approaches that were continuously improved upon, for what reasons is China's foreign aid 
still struggling to really benefit Africa's development? Or, more immediately speaking, how 
can China's foreign aid be further improved? Aimed to find the answers to these questions, 
this chapter revisits the making of China's foreign aid and searches for the hidden problems 
that have led it to current outcomes in Africa. 
 
With the purpose of investigating the underlying characteristics of China's foreign aid, as well 
as exploring the possible solutions to the factors that affect its performance, chapter six is 
broken down into three sections with each one of them following part of the process in 
China's foreign aid: decision-making, planning and implementation. In the first section, this 
study examines the decision-making processes of China's foreign aid to delve into problems 
in putting forward its foreign aid objectives. As discovered from the development of China's 
foreign aid in previous chapters, China has introduced three objectives for foreign aid to 
Africa, namely: to build African industrial and agricultural foundations (1958-1978), to 
reduce expenditure while consolidating foreign aid outcomes (1982-1993), and to improve 
people's livelihoods (2005-present). However, besides China's own development concerns, 
this study has found that the objectives of China's foreign aid in Africa were heavily 
influenced by its domestic political consideration and a lack of scientific research – which 
arguably is the only way to identify appropriate foreign aid objectives. 
 
After understanding the underpinning of China's foreign aid objectives, the second and third 
sections of this chapter investigate China's foreign aid in practice. In the interests of grasping 
the essence of China's foreign aid planning, and assessing the drawbacks brought about by 
the insufficient understanding of African countries' diverse domestic conditions, the second 
section looks into the allocation approach and packaging of China's foreign aid. It discovers 
that whilst China's foreign aid was allocated on a friendship basis in Africa, the packaging of 
this equally depended on China's own considerations rather than the recipient countries' 
development conditions. Following on, the third section examines China's foreign aid 
implementation. For the purpose of figuring out the ineffective foreign aid administration 
resulted difficulties, it surveys the handling and supervision arrangements of China's foreign 
aid. In contrast to the previous sections which are aimed at understanding China's distinctive 
underlying considerations of foreign aid, this section places particular emphasis on its as yet 
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underdeveloped foreign aid capacity. 
 
In sum, the study of the successes and failures of China's foreign aid in approaching the 
factors that affect its outcomes in Africa investigates the shortcomings that China's foreign 
aid must overcome. Whilst being directed at the scenes behind the observable behaviours of 
the Chinese government and exploring the hidden problems that have led its foreign aid in 
Africa to have continuously limited outcomes, this chapter discusses the current weaknesses 
of China's foreign aid. As well understanding the underlying characteristics of China's foreign 
aid in Africa, this chapter also searches for possible measures to improve China's foreign aid 
outcomes in the foreseeable future. In order to do so, this chapter draws from unpublished 
government studies, exclusive interviews with Chinese foreign aid officials and academics, 
and brings in supplementary discussions with foreign aid participants from both China and 
Africa. Additionally, brief case studies are also introduced to support the arguments raised by 
this study and the key concerns surrounding China's foreign aid in Africa that were pointed 
out during interviews and discussions. 
 
Before going into the quest for problems in China's foreign aid, what needs to be particularly 
pointed out is that while this study is attempting to break down and differentiate the process 
of China's foreign aid, the decision-making, planning and implementation of China's foreign 
aid are indeed interconnected – after the decision-maker plans foreign aid objectives, the 
foreign aid participating institutions implement the foreign aid planning and the projects and 
programs accordingly. However, whilst these processes are very similar to each other (the 
decision-making of foreign aid objectives and the planning of foreign aid packages according 
to these objectives) and highly interact at times (both the planning of foreign aid packages 
and the implementation of foreign aid projects and programs are managed by the same 
institution), they all have their individual impacts on the eventual outcomes of China's 
foreign aid in Africa. It is on this ground, from the practical point of view, which this study is 
laid upon, and for the fundamental purpose of improving China's foreign aid outcomes, that 
this chapter examines these processes one at a time in separate but coherent sections. 
 
How China Decides Its Foreign Aid Objectives in Africa 
中国对非援助的决策 
 
Having consistently been aimed at helping African recipient countries achieve self-reliance, 
the development of China's foreign aid in Africa has seen three distinct objectives over the 
past six decades. In the period from 1955 to 1978, when China was striving to consolidate its 
communist regime and break out of the diplomatic isolation created by the capitalist world, 
China first utilised its foreign aid as a stepping stone to expand its relationship with African 
countries. Set against an international background in which both China and African countries 
were trying to pursue complete independence and become self-reliant, China placed its first 
foreign aid objective in Africa on helping them building their own industrial and agricultural 
foundations. Although this objective was established subsequent to a research visit led by 
the State Planning Commission to three African countries in 1964 – Algeria, Mali and Guinea, 
during its execution, not only did African countries' divergent local conditions exceed China's 
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expectations, but China's capacity was also weakened. As a result, this objective cost both 
China's domestic development and its foreign aid outcomes. 
 
In the interests of revising this situation and directing China's foreign aid towards mutually 
beneficial cooperation, during the period from 1979 to 1993, the inauguration of the reform 
policy drove China's foreign aid to the objective of reducing expenditure while consolidating 
foreign aid outcomes. Aimed at both preserving China's development capacity and coping 
with African countries' divergent local conditions, this objective was primarily implemented 
in the forms of the less financially demanding and less technical landmark projects as well as 
Management Cooperation. To a broader extent, this objective achieved its purposes – 
maintaining as it did vital assets for China's domestic development and benefiting African 
recipient countries' development in the short-term. Still, as for long-term effects, this 
objective neither managed to bring financial benefits to China nor sustained positive 
outcomes in Africa. As a result, China terminated its Management Cooperation in the early 
1990s and focused most of its attention on the creation of the Concessional Loan as it sought 
further economic benefits. 
 
Since this objective only requires relatively little financial input from Beijing, landmark 
projects remained the primary choice of China's foreign aid in Africa until the new century, 
when the contemporary takeoff of China-Africa relationship once again came to the 
attention of the Chinese government. By this time, a growing interest in Africa as a major 
partner in development as well as China's raising international responsibility led China's 
foreign aid to embrace a third objective – to improve people's livelihoods. However, despite 
this again revising the development assistance aim, the outcomes of China's foreign aid in 
Africa have stayed largely the same thus far. According to the case studies, it is still creating 
foreign aid dependencies while only marginally benefiting Africa's development. In light of 
these results, besides the already identified domestic development concerns such as the 
urgent need to improve China's diplomatic relations and the pressing demand to promote 
economic development, what continues to be obscure is what is fundamentally driving the 
development of Beijing's foreign aid objectives? 
 
The Foundation of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对非援助的基础 
Where the foreign aid focuses is one of the most important decisions that any government 
with foreign aid aspirations must make. Although it seems like a more technical process that 
mainly involves feasibility research, the considerations and criteria that determine it are far 
reaching. As Lancaster pointed out in a study of eight bilateral and multilateral donors (the 
United States, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden, Italy, the World Bank and the 
European Union), "Promoting economic development in recipient countries is typically only 
one of the objectives for which aid is given and not always the predominant one. Others 
include advancing political and security concerns… Domestic and bureaucratic politics also 
frequently play a role in aid decisions" (1999, p.74). However, in the particular case of China, 
its foreign aid decision-making is completely different from those of these traditional donors. 
For the most part, it is only the domestic politics that account for determining foreign aid 
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objectives. Hence, as an initial step towards understanding the decision-making process of 
China's foreign aid objectives, this study first explores its underlying considerations. 
 
As a senior Chinese official specified: 
 
Friendship (友好) and assistance (帮助) – these are the foundations of China's foreign 
aid. China's foreign aid is provided insisting on maintaining friendly foreign relationships. 
Regardless of the recently emerged economic interests of foreign aid, these must not 
interfere with the political interests of foreign aid at any time.1 
 
To elaborate on this point, as stated in one government report: 
 
China's foreign aid is a state behaviour. Its projects and programs are the substance of 
cooperation between the Chinese government and recipient countries' governments. 
China's foreign aid is not a business activity, nor poverty alleviation, and more is not 
commercial programs for enterprises to make profits.2 
 
Indeed, "it is concerned about maintaining national interests and national security"3, but in 
the main, in the words of the Chinese government: 
 
The goal of foreign aid is to through implementing foreign aid projects and programs, to 
build, to consolidate and to develop our [China's] friendly cooperative relationship (友
好合作关系) with developing countries.4 
 
It is built on this friendship emphasised foundation that China's foreign aid put forward three 
distinct foreign aid objectives in Africa. At the beginning when this friendship was exercised 
through the belief in proletarian internationalism, it was materialised in the building of 
African industrial and agricultural foundations to initiate China's friendly relationship with 
African countries. With the purpose of boosting their capacities to stand against imperialism, 
colonialism and hegemonism, as well as assisting these "brotherhood countries" (CCCPC, 
1958) to acquire economic independence and ultimately achieve self-reliance, not only did 
this friendship quickly evolve into "our [China's] obligation to proletarian internationalism" 
(Xinhua, 1963), but when installing foreign aid principles, it also insisted that China's foreign 
aid was something mutual rather than a kind of unilateral alms.5 Further, even when China 
was suffering from the most disastrous effects of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, it yet 
decidedly continued with friendship building through foreign aid to the detriment of China's 
own economic development.6 
 
                                                          
1
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2 September 2011. 
2
 Unpublished government document, October 2006, Discussions with Foreign Aid Participating Enterprises, p.4. 
3
 Interview with Prof. Liu Liyun, Renmin University, Beijing, China, 27 November 2011. 
4
 Unpublished government document, October 2006, Discussions with Foreign Aid Participating Enterprises, p.4. 
5
 The 1
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 principle of The Eight Principles, see Appendix I. 
6
 The issue of how foreign aid affected China's economic development during the 1970s is discussed in detail in 
chapter three in the "The Outrageous" section, see p.35. 
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Then came along the reform policy, which was primarily inaugurated to rescue China's own 
economic development. However, given the financial circumstance that China was in and the 
pressing domestic demand, this friendship was still transformed into "the necessary budget 
for foreign aid" (Wang, 1998, cited in Liu, 2009, p.51), with an additional claim that, "when 
we [China] are developed, we need to provide more assistance to other countries" (ibid.). At 
this stage, within the context of financial shortage and the experiences gathered from the 
previous period, this friendship was realised in landmark projects across the African recipient 
countries that begin their title with Friendship. They were funded so as to maintain friendly 
relationships with China and to aid social infrastructure development. In addition to this, 
China also introduced Management Cooperation to enhance its earlier foreign aid efforts. 
Meanwhile, although China began to explore financial benefits from its foreign aid with the 
view of reducing foreign aid expenditure, fundamentally, it is nevertheless intended to 
"actively develop equal and mutually beneficial relationships with all foreign countries" 
(CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, 1982a, p.5). 
 
Moving towards the end of the 20th century, the continuously failing foreign aid outcomes to 
some extent frustrated China's friendship building determination, and given the demand of 
economic development, China went on searching for mutual benefits from its contemporary 
foreign aid. Nonetheless, whilst promoting the financial benefits emphasised Concessional 
Loan, this friendship building was still carried on through the delivery of landmark projects 
using China's government budget funded traditional foreign aid. By the early 2000s, and with 
a much increased financial capacity, this friendship was directed to improving people's 
livelihoods to further advance China's friendly relationship with African countries. Aimed at 
raising their development capacities, this friendship emerged via health and educational 
projects and programs promised through FOCAC and international meetings, along with a 
stress on "the particularities of African human resources development in strengthening the 
China-Africa friendship"7, it also appeared in the rapidly expanded HRDC programs and led 
China's current foreign aid to a peoples focused development assistance. 
 
To put together these developments in China's foreign aid objectives in Africa, although it 
can be seen that the underpinnings of China's foreign aid have step by step progressed from 
the political interests dominated situation before the reform, to now where political interests 
and economic interests are both being considered – promoting friendship building as well as 
supporting Chinese enterprises going out, but to look more closely into this development, 
China's foreign aid is nevertheless driven by the underlying political consideration of building 
friendly foreign relationships. As one senior Chinese researcher affirmed, "In substance, the 
economic interests are nonetheless attached to the political interests of China's foreign aid 
rather than dictated its making"8. "It is owing to this friendship emphasis and the equality 
and mutually beneficial stresses there embodied, that the non-conditionalities underlining 
China's foreign aid is welcomed by all African recipient countries"9. 
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 Unpublished government documents, March 2008, Wu Speaks at the Conference on Foreign Aid Human 
Resource Development Cooperation to Africa, p.4. 
8
 Interview with senior Chinese researcher, Beijing, China, 22 November 2011. 
9
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Beijing, China, 2 November 2011. 
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Be that as it may, despite these foreign aid objectives all to some extent satisfying African 
recipient countries' development concerns while carrying through China's own development 
agenda, on the other hand, the friendship emphasis underpinning decision-makings has also 
resulted in complications both domestically and abroad. In particular, because of the 
insistence on friendship, the initial economic development of the People's Republic of China 
was much delayed. At the time when China was trying to recover its domestic development 
from the turmoil left by the feudal regime, this friendship emphasis first took up China's 
development resources to engage in foreign aid to African countries. And then, not only did 
this output keep raising, but when the Cultural Revolution broke out in the mid-1960s, it was 
already disturbing China's economic development. By the 1970s, this friendship building 
demand went on affecting the livelihoods of China's own people (Xue, 2013a). It was only 
until the inauguration of the reform policy in 1978, that the repeated stress of "act according 
to one's capability (量力而行)" (Shi, 1989) finally calmed this outrageous expenditure. 
 
Apart from hampering China's domestic development, subject to the friendship emphasis, 
the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa were also to some degree undermined. Given 
that neither China nor Africa placed sufficient attention on exploring appropriate foreign aid 
objectives for Africa, but instead simply relied on aspirations that can be characterised as 
friendship building, the objectives that China implemented hitherto have never been exact 
to the immediate development concerns of Africa. As admitted by an African development 
planning official: 
 
China doesn't seems to have a firm idea of what we [Africans] really need. But that said, 
nor does Africa. So while China's foreign aid is generally beneficial to our development, 
we just pick what China has got on offer.10 
 
In addition to this lack of insistency from the recipient countries, with consideration to the 
responsibilities of the donor country, a senior Chinese official also indicated that the current 
objective of improving people's livelihoods, and indeed all of China's foreign aid objectives, 
were primarily determined upon its principal decision-makers' personal visits to recipient 
countries and were predominately considered at only friendship building.11 
 
More to the point, considering that China has always regarded African countries as a whole 
in determining foreign aid objectives (Li, 2008a), as one senior Chinese official pointed out: 
 
Whilst all of our [China's] foreign aid objectives were extensively concerned for Africa's 
development difficulties, they were clearly lacking pertinences to each African recipient 
country.12 
 
In this situation, with both donor and recipient countries being indifferent to the immediate 
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 Interview with African development planning official, Accra, Ghana, 21 August 2011. 
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 Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2
 
September 2011. 
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 Interview with senior Chinese official, Beijing, China, 15 November 2011. 
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development concerns of the recipient country, indeed to Africa en masse, the overly broad 
settlement on friendship has directly limited China's foreign aid efforts. In a word, despite 
China's foreign aid objectives all duly determined according to the "observable development 
concerns"13 of Africa, given they were at the same time only emphasised on friendship and 
for the greater part influenced by decision-makers' personal preferences, not only did these 
objectives fail to adapt to the immediate development concerns of each African recipient 
country, but they were also only to some extent accommodating the general development 
concerns of the African continent. 
 
The Friendship Emphasis 
 
To take account of these fundamental pitfalls in determining foreign aid objectives, whilst 
China is now providing foreign aid to 51 African countries, and in 2009 alone, 45.7% of its 
foreign aid expenditures went into these countries (Government of China, 2011, pp.18-19), 
with the view of improving the efficiency of this input, and therefore really benefiting Africa's 
development, China needs to place specific emphasis on pushing forward its foreign aid from 
friendly help to practical development assistance. As well, "the decision-making of China's 
foreign aid objectives should be further allowed for scientific research" (Huang, 2007, p.10), 
and additionally adjusted to each recipient country's immediate development concerns 
rather than the general needs of the African continent as a whole.14 An African development 
planning official strongly called upon: 
 
China and Africa need to work a lot more closely together, to help us [Africa] strengthen 
our process and planning arrangements, therefore for us to be better able to program 
our national development structures, and to identify priority development areas where 
China can help.15 
 
All in all, despite more than 60 years of foreign aid experience in Africa, China is still unable 
to come up with adequate approaches for identifying appropriate foreign aid objectives, nor 
to help its African recipient countries setting up priority development areas. Not only are the 
decision-making goals of China's foreign aid objectives overwhelmingly and only emphasised 
on friendship, but they are also additionally influenced by the decision-makers' personal 
preferences. As a result of this fundamental lack of scientific research and pertinence, the 
objectives that China has introduced over the years have to an extent undermined both 
China's domestic development and its foreign aid outcomes in Africa. Given this friendship 
emphasis in the meanwhile also provides a rather flexible framework for China and Africa to 
explore appropriate foreign aid objectives that are unconstrained by other economic or 
political interests, in order to contribute the maximum impact on African recipient countries, 
China and Africa need to work much more closely together to find which areas one recipient 
country should focus the most on, and for China to assist. 
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 Unpublished government document, April 2007, Discussion With Foreign Aid Experts And Academics, p.8. 
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 Interview with African development planning official, Accra, Ghana, 21 August 2011. 
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Although the decision-making processes of China's foreign aid are heavily influenced by its 
domestic political consideration, this friendship emphasis does not interfere with the 
"aid-for-development" (Lancaster, 2006, p.7) norm, and to a large extent, the objectives that 
China has put forward do correspond to the general development concerns of African 
recipient countries. The next two sections investigate the practices of China's foreign aid. 
Provided the objectives that China has implemented until now have all generally been 
unsuccessful in contributing materially to Africa's development, and taking account of their 
arguably considered proposals (building African industrial and agricultural foundations to 
help them obtain economic independence, utilising less technical landmark projects to assist 
Africa's social infrastructure development, and improving African people's livelihoods to 
enhance their development capacities), how have China's underdeveloped foreign aid 
planning and implementation failed to deliver these intended development goals? And, how 
can they be improved so as to ultimately help African countries achieve self-reliance? 
 
How China Plans Its Foreign Aid in Africa 
中国对非援助的规划 
 
In regards to the planning of China's foreign aid in Africa, while China has been continuously 
increasing its foreign aid inputs and adjusting its foreign aid implementation methods, there 
still remain many drawbacks with its foreign aid planning approaches. In particular, this study 
has found that the oversimplified foreign aid allocation approach and the improperly 
arranged foreign aid packages are the main weaknesses of China's foreign aid planning in 
Africa. Not only have such issues led China's foreign aid into unknown local conditions, but 
they have also brought inappropriate technical and management standards to the recipient 
countries' development conditions, as well as inadequate coordination of foreign aid 
implementation methods. Even though China has been attempting to overcome these 
drawbacks for years, it is still unable to provide suitable solutions. In view of this situation, 
and given that planning of China's foreign aid in Africa has undergone significant evolution, 
how did China make progress on its foreign aid allocation and packaging? 
 
To recapitulate the development of the planning approaches of China's foreign aid in Africa: 
the distribution of China's foreign aid was at the beginning fully dependent on the recipient 
countries' relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States. During the middle of 
the 20th century when the political confrontation between communism and capitalism was at 
its peak, China's foreign aid was prioritised to neighbouring communist and Asian countries 
and African nationalist countries. Aside from this greater planning arrangement, the amount 
of foreign aid to each recipient country, as well as the packaging of China's foreign aid in the 
meantime, were also mainly settled according to China's principal decision-makers' political 
considerations. With political interests dominating China's foreign aid planning, subsequent 
to the research visit in 1964, the initial packaging of China's foreign aid in Africa was decided 
on industrial and agricultural projects, with a combined approach of Complete Project Aid 
and Technical Aid to help them make use of their natural resources, master technologies and 
ultimately achieve self-reliance. 
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Following the change of principal leadership in 1978, China's growing demand for economic 
development and a stabilising international environment directed the planning of China's 
foreign aid to prioritising domestic development. Along with the inauguration of the reform 
policy, China adjusted its foreign aid objective to reducing expenditure while consolidating 
foreign aid outcomes. In line with this adjustment, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the less 
financially demanding and less technical landmark projects became the primary choice of 
China's foreign aid packaging in Africa, and this was collaborated with the Management 
Cooperation integrated Technical Aid paying attention to the earlier delivered industrial and 
agricultural projects. At this stage, on the basis of China beginning to accept development 
assistance from traditional foreign aid donors – that is, the capitalist countries, its political 
bias towards communist and nationalist countries in providing foreign aid was also duly 
dropped, thus extending the reach of China's foreign aid to include a wider range of African 
countries, regardless of their political stances. 
 
By the mid-1990s, in the light of Africa's continuously raising strategic importance to China's 
domestic development, China's foreign aid planning was first steered to promote economic 
cooperation with the introduction of the Concessional Loan. Following substantial economic 
development in the early 2000s, China's foreign aid planning shifted to improving people's 
livelihoods, with prospects set for advancing both Africa's social and infrastructure 
development. Today, while being directed by the twenty-four government institutions jointly 
participating in the Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism, the planning of China's foreign 
aid is focused on the development sectors including: industry, agricultural, economic 
infrastructure, medicine and public health, education, public facilities, and clean energy and 
coping with climate change. Further, it is employing two funding methods of Grant and 
Interest-free Loan, and six implementation methods of Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid, 
Goods and Materials Aid, HRDC, Medical Teams and Overseas Volunteer Programs in the 
assistance of Africa's development. 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of this progress to China's foreign aid planning capacity, as identified in 
the case studies, China's insufficient understanding of African countries' diverse domestic 
conditions is still undermining its foreign aid outcomes. To be specific, regarding China's first 
foreign aid objective, which was packaged with industrial and agricultural projects as well as 
technical and management support, it was commonly planned only considering the political 
interests and natural environments of the recipient countries. Because of this oversimplified 
foreign aid allocation approach which fundamentally disregarded the political, social and 
institutional conditions of the recipient countries, not only did the unknown conditions of 
the local work force and management behaviours affect the operations of China's industrial 
and agricultural projects immediately after transfers, but this problematic planning also put 
the continuation of these projects in further complicated situations given the restrictiveness 
of China's foreign aid principles.16 As a result, whilst Chinese involvements were largely 
prohibited from local affairs, these projects widely ended in continuous dilemmas. 
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Subsequent to confronting this situation in the implementation of industrial and agricultural 
projects, by the time China proposed its second foreign aid objective centred on delivering 
landmark projects, Beijing began specifically asking for attention to be paid to the local 
conditions, and introduced Management Cooperation to promote the outcomes of the 
earlier delivered industrial and agricultural projects. However, depending on the remaining 
restrictive foreign aid principles emphasising "The Chinese government provides the 
best-quality equipment and materials manufactured by China…"17, although the planning of 
China's foreign aid was now taking into account the recipient countries' political, social and 
institutional conditions by adopting the less financially demanding and less technical [less 
recipient country involving] landmark projects, due to the largely neglected development 
conditions of the recipient countries, these landmark projects (which were often packaged 
with advanced technologies) only benefited the recipient countries' development in the 
short-term. Concerning their long-term effects, the Chinese government was required to 
provide additional foreign aid input to sustain the outcomes of these projects. 
 
Coming into the new century, the increased foreign aid inputs and adjusted implementation 
methods to some extent improved this situation as China began to aim for comprehensively 
assisting Africa's development. Following the intention of bringing up both Africa's social and 
infrastructure development, the planning of China's foreign aid benefited with a considerably 
expanded scope, a number of additional implementation methods and a multiple institutions 
jointly participated mechanism. However, despite these significant improvements, not only is 
the problematic foreign aid allocation approach still producing complications in Africa, but 
the improperly arranged foreign aid packages are also undermining the efforts that China has 
made in advancing other areas of its foreign aid. As a result, as well as often being involved 
in complex local situations, China's recently delivered foreign aid projects and programs have 
also failed to match the recipient countries' development conditions and coordinate with 
each other. In response to these unsatisfactory outcomes, this section now examines the 
allocation approach and the packaging of China's foreign aid in Africa to find out what 
problems are there buried in its foreign aid planning. 
 
The Allocation Approach of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对非援助的分配方式 
Regarding the allocation approach of China's foreign aid in Africa, at the beginning when 
China's foreign aid was primarily utilised for political purposes, its allocation was heavily 
influenced by its principal decision-makers' political considerations and to a large extent 
lacked financial assessments, feasibility studies, and other necessary processes of adequate 
planning. After the political chaos generated by the Cultural Revolution, and the realisation 
that political interests driven foreign aid allocation approach was broadly delivering 
disappointing outcomes and resulting in foreign aid dependencies, the allocation of China's 
foreign aid was then asked to be "planned comprehensively, with particular attention drawn 
to match the local conditions" (Shi, 1989). Particularly after the inauguration of the reform 
policy, as well as China opting for landmark projects in an attempt to minimise local 
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influences, it also laid out Management Cooperation with a view to overcoming the setbacks 
brought about by the differences between local conditions and China's understandings. 
 
However, regardless of these early attempts to cope with the recipient countries' divergent 
political, social and institutional conditions, by the time China returned its attention back to 
Africa in the new century with the newly adjusted foreign aid objective of improving people's 
livelihoods, along with another stress on "feasibility research"18 almost thirty years apart, a 
number of these people's livelihoods related projects are again found to be suffering from 
the recipient countries' local conditions. Not only were they led to have fundamentally 
restricted effectiveness, but as pointed out by both Chinese foreign aid experts and African 
officials, these projects are also facing substantial difficulties in terms of prospective 
development.19 In the light of this situation, and given that China has greater capacities for 
foreign aid now than ever before, what reasons are there for its foreign aid to still be made 
to have to deal with complex local conditions? And more to the point, after many frustrating 
experiences in Africa in the early years and successfully identifying the pitfalls, how in 
practice does China allocate its foreign aid at present? 
 
The Allocation Principles of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对外援助的分配原则 
"Traditional friendly countries (传统友好国家)"20 is the most commonly adopted concept by 
the Chinese officials interviewed for this study when inquired with the question: How does 
China allocate foreign aid to each of its recipient countries? As one of the most fundamental 
decisions that the Chinese government must make before drafting foreign aid plans, indeed 
prior to reviewing foreign aid requests, China determines the input of foreign aid to each of 
its recipient countries (Country Specific Foreign Aid Budget) according to the "level of 
friendliness"21. As a senior Chinese official indicated, "Even though the allocation of foreign 
aid was repeatedly requested to take into consideration the recipient countries' local 
conditions, the changes applied to the shares of foreign aid input to each recipient country 
over the years are only marginal"22. And, as specified by another official, "Except in extreme 
situations such as civil wars or diplomatic breakdown, whilst the amount of foreign aid to 
each recipient country is raised by a certain proportion every year, the percentage to each of 
them remained almost exactly the same as Prime Minister Zhou outlined in the 1970s"23. 
 
Further, this was elaborated by two more senior Chinese officials, saying: 
 
Although arguably traditional friendly countries almost always have better creditability 
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in terms of responding to our [China's] political interests and economic cooperation, 
frankly speaking, the allocation of our foreign aid is neither dependent on the recipient 
countries' strategic importance to China nor their economic potential, but it is solely 
rested with how traditionally friendly they are to China.24 
 
Whether the recipient country is politically stable, or institutionally suitable for a certain 
amount of foreign aid input; or in fact, whether the recipient country is in need of our 
foreign aid, these factors are not a part of our consideration for providing foreign aid. It 
is simply only friendship that matters.25 
 
Not only does there still lack a scientifically emphasised approach to the allocation of China's 
foreign aid in Africa, but even allowing for the continuously changing international relations, 
as another Chinese official pointed out: 
 
Carry on (沿袭) is practically what we [China] have been doing, and are doing at the 
moment. After Prime Minister Zhou sketched the foreign aid allocation framework, no 
one dared to make adjustments, and to be fair, it is still largely reasonable provided the 
friendship emphasis.26 
 
Moreover, as another senior Chinese official admitted about the current situation: 
 
Even if we [China] have encountered so much problems with some of the African 
recipient countries' divergent local conditions, such as changes of governing parties and 
local behaviours, it is not that we are not attaching importance to these conditions. On 
the one hand, we are strictly prohibited by The Eight Principles in participating local 
affairs; on the other hand, we are tied by the friendship determined foreign aid inputs – 
where you have to spend it all.27 
 
In spite of the potential challenging outcomes, as one other senior Chinese official asserted, 
"If the allocated budget weren't fully turned into foreign aid agreements by the third quarter, 
we [China] will even have to intentionally look for additional projects to fulfil it"28. It is owing 
to this friendship underlying consideration, that concerns over local conditions are only 
secondary to the friendliness emphasis (if not ignored outright). As a consequence, the 
divergent political, social and institutional conditions of the recipient countries have led the 
outcomes of China's foreign aid to various complications. 
 
Specifically, due to the failure to adapt to the political conditions of the recipient countries, 
China's oversimplified foreign aid allocation approach undermines its efforts in building 
friendly foreign relationships. This shortcoming caused substantial waste of China's 
development resources, and hampered the confidences of the Chinese people in providing 
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foreign aid when the recipient countries suddenly adopted a political change (as explored in 
the cases of Vietnam and Albania which turned against China at the end of the 1970s). 
Subsequent to introducing Management Cooperation in the 1980s, and of course people's 
livelihoods related projects more recently, this shortcoming has pushed a number of China's 
foreign aid projects into political situations in the recipient countries. As a senior Chinese 
official pointed out: 
 
One of the biggest challenges that our [China's] foreign aid is facing in Africa is actually 
their presidential electoral system. When the political leader of the recipient country is 
suddenly changed, the friendship that we have been building can be ruined as quickly 
as overnight.29 
 
And then, whilst causing this greater concern, the neglected political conditions of the 
recipient countries also sabotage the outcomes of China's foreign aid. As a senior Chinese 
foreign aid worker said: "Even with a relatively minor political alteration such as the change 
of the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, the outcomes of our [China's] foreign aid 
can also be affected given that the new Minister almost always has other concerns for the 
project operation"30. Particularly "when taking account of the commonness of the alterations 
of African ministerial-level officials, a lack of consistent development strategy will promptly 
drive our [China's] projects to a halt"31. In the worst scenario, as seen in one case study 
especially favoured by Chinese officials, the foreign aid ends up financing something like the 
CNADC's Cocoa Processing Factory in Ghana (a Concessional Loan funded project)32. Even 
when this project was under the recipient country's government for financial responsibilities, 
it never operated, not even for a day, because it was tied up in local political competitions 
and is currently still looking for ways to escape this dilemma.33 
 
Furthermore, in making attempts to "bypass the increasingly proficient democratic systems 
of the African recipient countries"34, the planning of China's foreign aid gradually led to 
include more turnkey projects, instead of the early prioritised BOT approach (Build, 
Operation and Transfer)35 which required considerable more involvement of the recipient 
countries. As a senior Chinese official indicated: 
 
Apart from opting for turnkey projects at every opportunity, we [China] are also looking 
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with favour on short-term projects and programs. Particularly when there is only one 
year ahead of the next presidential election in the recipient country, all of our new 
foreign aid agreements are most likely to be set up to be complete before then.36 
 
It is following this step by step less the recipient countries concerned foreign aid planning,37 
indeed, the regardless of "The Chinese government will see to it that the personnel of the 
recipient country fully master the technology"38 as stressed in The Eight Principles, all three 
previously examined case studies of hospital projects delivered to Africa of late have suffered 
with significant delays in operation and fundamentally limited effectiveness. 
 
With regard to the complications resulted by the ignored social conditions of the recipient 
countries, as asserted by a senior Chinese official: "The differences between African local 
workers and common labourers in China is amongst one of the most substantial impacts on 
China's foreign aid outcomes"39. Not only are the African workers generally found to be 
incompetent in terms of basic technical and management skills, but due to the lack of 
attention paid by the local government, the frequent resignations and movement of 
employees in the recipient countries and the shortage of human resources to begin with 
have also noticeably worsened the sustainability of China's foreign aid. Especially under the 
circumstances when China's Technical Aid was inefficient and the recent HRDC programs 
were unorganised, as a Chinese official pointed out: 
 
Whilst it was already needing a considerable amount of effort training local employees, 
the frequent migration of them have hugely affected our [China's] project operations. 
There is no wonder why a number of our early cooperation programs (Technical Aid) 
went on as long as two decades.40 
 
Moreover, in consideration of the overlooked institutional conditions of the recipient 
countries, as earlier identified the local governments were neither in control of brain drain 
nor aptly supporting the operations of foreign aid projects, as pointed out by several Chinese 
officials during interviews and discussions, "Most of the African recipient countries are (also) 
having difficulties reading the foreign aid contract"41. To be specific, one of the most 
common requirements of China's foreign aid is that the recipient countries prepare for the 
arrival of the foreign aid projects by providing "the supply of water, electricity, roads and 
levelled ground (三通一平)"42. However, as it turns out: 
 
Not only do most of the African recipient countries tend to make unexpected demands 
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half way through the project implementation, such as additional roads or an extension 
of the number of floors [of a building project], but they are also often unable to fulfil 
their part of the contract responsibilities and thus cause significant delays that require 
much additional foreign aid input.43 
 
The Packaging of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对非援助的组织 
Subsequent to understanding the oversimplified foreign aid allocation approach which at 
first directed China's foreign aid to the divergent local conditions of the African recipient 
countries, this study examines the packaging of China's foreign aid. As found to be the other 
contributing factor to the planning failure of China's foreign aid in Africa, since China opted 
for landmark projects in the 1980s, and gradually scaled back both its Technical Aid and 
Management Cooperation, the improperly arranged foreign aid packages have led the 
effectiveness and sustainability of China's foreign aid to further complicated situations. Not 
only was this a result of the absence of supportive implementation methods in the first place 
which broadly restricted the outcomes of China's foreign aid, but due to the inappropriately 
identified technical and management standards, its landmark projects were only able to 
deliver short-term effects or struggled to be effective at all. Moreover, even the effective 
projects were unsustainable without additional foreign aid inputs. 
 
At present, the packaging of China's foreign aid is put together by the MOC, FMPRC and MOF 
– twenty-four institutions jointly participating in the Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism. 
Aside from being supported by the specialised institutions in planning specific foreign aid 
projects and programs, it has also benefited from the expanded foreign aid focus and the 
specifically refined foreign aid implementation methods. However, in spite of these 
improvements, with regards to China's recently delivered people's livelihoods related 
projects and programs, as demonstrated in the cases studies, they are still largely unsuited to 
the recipient countries' development conditions. Equally, these projects and programs have 
also failed to coordinate with each other. In light of these current outcomes, after studying 
China's foreign aid project identification preferences and its foreign aid planning mechanism 
more broadly in chapter four, how does China practically package its foreign aid? And, how is 
the Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism bringing into play the advantages of the much 
diversified implementation methods? 
 
The Project Identification of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对外援助的项目选择 
"To deliver what kind of foreign aid projects and programs and utilising which method – this 
decision is still being made largely according to The Eight Principles"44, states one senior 
Chinese official who has been in the seat of reviewing foreign aid requests for more than two 
                                                          
43
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Beijing, China, 16 November 2011. See also "商务部关于进一步加快对外援
助项目实施进度的意见", Notice of the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries of the Ministry of Commerce on 
Further Promote the Implementation Process of Foreign Aid Projects and Programs. Ministry of Commerce [2005], 
No. 623. 
44
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 5 August 2011. 
136 
 
decades. "In short, it is basically what China has, and what the recipient country needs"45. 
After the State Council approves the planning for a Country Specific Foreign Aid Budget and 
allocates them to each corresponding government institutions, the Economic and 
Commercial Counsellor's Offices situated in the recipient countries are then tasked to begin 
to review foreign aid requests, or should the requests be "either too big or unrealistic"46, to 
make proposals for foreign aid projects and programs in accordance with the foreign aid 
objective of the given period. In practice, apart from the previously examined project 
identification preferences, the packaging of China's foreign aid in Africa is principally 
organised on the basis of "Keep in mind the primary principles, respond creatively to the 
practical situations"47. 
 
Even though the input of China's foreign aid is specifically allocated to each of its recipient 
countries, the packaging of this is exceptionally flexible. As one senior Chinese official 
indicated: 
 
As long as the projects and programs to some degree correspond to the primary 
emphasis on building friendly foreign relationships, and the budget in the application is 
within the allowance of that particular country, it will most likely be approved without 
any further investigations.48 
 
Whilst neither China nor Africa are especially clear on what Africa really needs, nor have 
either been able to propose an adequate approach to identifying priority development areas 
for African recipient countries, the packaging of China's foreign aid is consequently "referred 
back to the friendship emphasis"49; and, following this tendency, "The Chinese government 
provides the best-quality equipment and materials manufactured by China…"50 as addressed 
in The Eight Principles. Whether or not the foreign aid package is appropriate to the recipient 
country's current development capacities, it is (again) "not a part of our [China's] 
consideration"51. 
 
In general, "We [China] only take into account the natural environments of the recipient 
countries", stated one senior Chinese official52. Given that the allocated foreign aid budget is 
set up on a must-spend basis, the packaging of China's foreign aid can also be sometimes 
based on conjecture. Take, for example, the packaging of contemporary people's livelihoods 
related projects and programs. As one Chinese official explained, "With consideration to the 
current objective, most of the African recipient countries were actually requesting food 
supplies, as in bread. But we have been providing food for many years, so we changed it to 
schools"53. "Even if there is no one in the recipient countries to operate the schools, it cannot 
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always be food"54. This is one typical logic of China's foreign aid packaging at present. 
Moreover, looking at the other side of the situation, as repeatedly argued by another 
Chinese official during a discussion: 
 
In spite of some of the projects not quite suiting the development capacities of the 
recipient countries, every single project that we [China] delivered is agreed to by them if 
not proposed by them in the first place.55 
 
The Coordination of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对外援助的协调 
Paying specific attention to the coordination of China's foreign aid: Although China has made 
some efforts to reform this by launching the Inter-agency Liaison Mechanism in 2008 (and 
subsequently upgrading it to the Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism in 2011), these 
mechanisms only convene all the participating institutions on an annual basis.56 Further, as 
asserted by Guo, "Whilst there is no legislation laid down to govern this mechanism, and its 
administrating division57 is not an individual government institution, the orders enacted by 
one institution is very difficult to coordinate other participating institutions" (2014). On this 
ground, it is not hard to explain why "when a British official asked the Ministry of Health's 
International Cooperation Department where China was building the hospitals and malaria 
centres promised in the 2006 Beijing Summit, they replied that they had no clue, they were 
waiting for the Ministry of Commerce to inform them" (Brautigam, 2009, p.109). Even when 
a similar question was asked of the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries of the MOC itself, 
the reply was likewise unsettling: "We are waiting for higher-level instructions"58. 
 
With an eye to this situation, set aside the yet to be functional Inter-agency Coordination 
Mechanism (which could also arguably be a consequence of failure to have a respect for the 
recipient countries' development conditions), seeing the reliance on projects and programs 
that agree with the primary emphasis on building friendly foreign relationships, it is once 
more this friendship underlying consideration that has disoriented the packaging of China's 
foreign aid. As a result, due to the largely assumed development needs of the recipient 
countries, the general feasibility of China's foreign aid is called into question. As one senior 
Chinese official pointed out with regards to the recent tendency towards making 
international pledges (i.e. the Eight-Point plan[s] and the Six Measures): 
 
Given the pre-determined projects and programs, as well as the allocated foreign aid 
budget, the usual planning practice of 'looking for projects with money in hand' has 
caused a number of our [China's] hospitals and schools delivered to Africa of late, if not 
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all of them, to be unable to open or immediately falling into foreign aid dependencies.59 
 
Grounded on falsely identified project standards, the overall outcomes of China's foreign aid 
are fundamentally limited. Besides identified in the case studies in chapter five a tendency to 
be additionally being landmark for friendship demonstration purposes, as another senior 
Chinese official asserted: 
 
Whilst the planning of most of our [China's] hospitals and schools is not concerned for 
the recipient countries' development capacities in accepting the projects, these projects 
can only deliver limited development assistance if they are lucky enough to operate at 
all.60 
 
As well the earlier landmark projects, which were frequently found to have only short-term 
effectiveness at best, a similar pattern is quickly beginning to appear with the recent 
people's livelihoods related projects.61 In the meantime, "we [China] are trying to sort out 
this problem. For example, instead of planning for a university or a general hospital, we will 
think out primary schools and district clinics for better suitability"62. This minor alteration 
however does not seem to be adequate in coping with the much broader concern of African 
countries' generally limited development capacities.63 
 
Even considering the foreign aid projects that have to some extent reflected the immediate 
development needs of the recipient countries and suited their technical and management 
development capacities, the misleading positioning of the project sometimes also leads to 
further concerns. As a senior Chinese official pointed out: 
 
Under the implication of 'foreign aid should be superior than the current standard of 
living in the recipient countries', the project is largely appropriate to the recipient 
country's development capacity, or relatively comprehensively packaged, yet it can still 
be ended up in dilemmas.64 
 
According to an example given by another Chinese official with regards to China's preference 
for building rice projects in Africa instead of supporting their cassava cultivation: While rice is 
generally considered to be a classy food in Africa, in contrast to cassava which is considered 
to be a traditional and low-cost food, "given the significantly higher production cost of rice, it 
neither makes economic sense nor is acceptable to the general public of African recipient 
countries".65 
 
Furthermore, regarding the problematic coordination of China's foreign aid in particular, as 
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well as its contributions to the limited effectiveness of China's foreign aid, as several senior 
Chinese officials raised in a discussion, "Whilst the projects are commonly unable to match 
the recipient countries' development capacity, the supportive implementation methods are 
vital to the survival of China's foreign aid projects"66. In the absence of such measures after 
the transfers of Complete Project Aid projects, as investigated in the case studies, two out of 
three hospital projects looked at would never operate. "Although at present, China is 
beginning to integrate corresponding training programs into its people's livelihoods projects, 
the compatibility of these programs are still in need of principal adjustments"67. In the long 
run, as one more senior Chinese official summarised: 
 
It is that we [China] have to emphasis in friendship which has made our foreign aid 
unique and possibly of benefit to African recipient countries' development. However, if 
everything is referred back to the friendship emphasis and blind to the practical 
situation, it is not going to work for both China and Africa.68 
 
The Rather Vague Ideas 
 
Having in mind this friendship consideration that has fundamentally frustrated the planning 
of China's foreign aid in Africa, it can be said that similar to the decision-makings of China's 
foreign aid objectives, while following after the primary emphasis on building friendly foreign 
relationships, China only has very vague ideas allocating its foreign aid inputs and arranging 
its foreign aid packages. To practically improve its foreign aid outcomes in Africa, China needs 
to attach particular importance to the adaptations of its foreign aid projects and programs to 
the recipient countries' diverse domestic conditions. Specifically speaking, with regards to 
the allocation of China's foreign aid, the foreign aid input to each of its recipient countries 
should be adequately and promptly adjusted according to their local conditions. While it is 
not possible at the moment to make major alterations to the allocation framework per se, 
"attempts should be considered in the long-term country specific foreign aid planning so that 
the allocated budget can be preserved in the meantime and utilised in relatively suitable 
circumstances of the recipient countries"69. 
 
In addition to this greater arrangement, with concern to the project identification of China's 
foreign aid, as well as making allowances for scientific research, it should be appropriately 
adjusted to the development scheme and priority needs of each of the African recipient 
countries.70 Also, as discussed before in the assessment of the Lekma Hospital project in 
Ghana, subsequent to identifying the development areas it intends to focus on, China "must 
sit down and discuss comprehensively with the recipient country's planning authority, not 
only by name, but by scope, so that it can have the maximum impact on the people"71. 
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Especially concerning the adaptations of project standards, as Brown and Woods pointed out 
to the emerging donor governments (although China is definitely not among one of those 
lesser experienced): "More inclusive processes for setting standards need to be developed, 
so as to ensure that emerging donor governments… are all engaged in generating standards 
that countries and communities are in a position to implement" (2007, p.78). 
 
Furthermore, regarding the coordination of foreign aid projects and programs, apart from 
the additional efforts needed to improve the current Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism, 
one senior Chinese official has suggested, "The universal packaging of China's foreign aid 
should take note of the agricultural projects and programs that we [China] delivered to 
Africa"72, and use them as a guide to best practice. Given that each of the Agricultural 
Demonstration Centres came packaged with equipment and training programs,73 and all of 
the agricultural expert teams were integrated with minority language interpreters in the 
initial planning,74 "they have a much better chance of achieving the intended outcomes"75. 
To elaborate on the importance of arranging "self-sufficient foreign aid packages"76, as 
another senior Chinese official asserted: 
 
The planning of China's foreign aid should be paying a lot more attention to long-term 
effects. Instead of continuing to build new projects, priorities should be given to the 
continuation of existing projects. Indeed, that is the emphasis on integrating supportive 
measures to ensure existing projects are able to make the most and sustainable impacts 
on Africa's development.77 
 
In short, after decades of attempting to promote foreign aid outcomes, the underlying 
tendency of friendship-for-all remains standing as one of the most predominant drawbacks 
that is influencing China's foreign aid outcomes in Africa. Regardless of the advantages that 
this friendship emphasis is bringing to China's foreign aid, at the same time, it has made the 
planning of China's foreign aid neglect the local conditions of the recipient countries, the 
reliance on which also have caused China's foreign aid to be continuously unsuited to the 
recipient countries' development conditions. Whether the planning of China's foreign aid is 
intentionally emphasised on the level of friendliness, or as a consequence of not knowing 
the priority development areas of the African recipient countries, China needs to take the 
initiative to act upon these conditions. Not only should scientific research play a role in the 
planning of China's foreign aid in Africa, but with particular attention given to its projects and 
programs coordination, self-sufficient foreign aid packages in the meantime should also see 
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materially improved end results. 
 
How China Implements Its Foreign Aid in Africa 
中国对非援助的执行 
 
With concerns given to the implementation of China's foreign aid in Africa, on the basis of 
knowing that China has been continuously developing its foreign aid capacities in terms of 
both governing institutions and operating mechanisms, the outcomes of China's foreign aid 
have arguably scarcely achieved any significant improvements. Although as surveyed in the 
previous sections, the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa were affected by the 
friendship emphasised objectives and the largely inconsiderate planning, in addition to these 
concerns, the implementation approaches of China's foreign aid were problematic. 
Specifically, this study has found that the lack of foreign aid professionals and the unequally 
developed supervisory mechanisms are the principal deficiencies of China's foreign aid 
implementation. Not only have these issues caused the failing in technology and 
management transfers ever since the establishment of China's foreign aid, but they have also 
led to the recent decline in foreign aid implementation quality. In consideration of this 
situation, how did China build up its foreign aid implementation? 
 
To review the development of the implementation approaches of China's foreign aid: China's 
foreign aid was solely administrated by the Central People's Government and coordinated by 
the State Planning Commission at the beginning. After the establishment of the specialised 
ministries in the 1950s, the foreign aid administration was then taken over by them while the 
project and program implementation was delegated to their subsidiary institutions. In 1961, 
the administration of China's foreign aid was fully unified under the Bureau of Foreign 
Economic Liaison, and the Delivery Ministry In-chief Mechanism was set up to conduct 
China's foreign aid. Three years later, China's foreign aid gained its first upgrade as the 
bureau was elevated to the Foreign Economic Liaison Commission in 1964. By 1970, this was 
elevated again given the rapidly increasing foreign aid demands so that the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Liaison was therefore established. At the same time, the Complete Plant 
Export Company was also founded to manage the implementation of China's foreign aid 
whilst the Contract Ministry In-Chief Mechanism was introduced to organise the process. 
 
Into the 1980s, in accordance with the reform policy that was inaugurated to promote 
domestic development, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison, 
State Planning Committee and Foreign Investment Managing Committee merged into the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic and Trade. In this merger, the management of foreign aid 
implementation was completely delegated to the Complete Plant Export Company while 
SOEs were established to replace government subsidiary institutions for project and program 
implementation. At this stage, the Investment Responsibility Mechanism and the Contract 
Responsibility Mechanism were duly introduced to operate China's foreign aid, respectively. 
By the beginning of 1993, in order to further boost China's foreign aid capacity, the existing 
ministry was promoted to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, and the 
Complete Plant Export Company was transformed into the Complete Plant Import and Export 
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Cooperation Group as an enterprise implementing China's foreign aid. This new setup was 
conducted by the Enterprise Contract Responsibility Mechanism. 
 
Moving into the contemporary era, and with rapidly growing international responsibilities, 
China's foreign aid first concentrated on organising integral mechanisms to encourage the 
participation of SOEs and introducing codes of practices to govern the amplified foreign aid 
process. And then in 2003, in the interest of integrating its domestic economic and trade into 
overseas economic cooperation, China elevated the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation to the Ministry of Commerce and charged it with the complete administration 
of China's internal and external economic and trade affairs. After laying this foundation for 
current foreign aid implementation, not only has China's foreign aid further benefited with a 
number of dedicated databases coordinating foreign aid experts and projects and programs, 
but by fully delegating the implementation management to the subsidiary public institutions 
of the Ministry of Commerce and other specialised institutions, the administrative capacity 
and overall implementation arrangement of China's foreign aid were also better able to cope 
with the large increased in foreign aid works. 
 
However, despite these continuous improvements to the implementation capacity of China's 
foreign aid, as investigated in the case studies, its yet ineffective foreign aid administration is 
nevertheless delivering disappointing outcomes in Africa. To begin with, considering the first 
objective of China's foreign aid: the building of African industrial and agricultural foundations 
has instead resulted in foreign aid dependencies. Apart from some of the projects eventually 
making profits and becoming sustainable, the majority of China's foreign aid delivered in 
between the 1950s and 1970s suffered with unsuccessful technology and management 
transfers due to a lack of foreign aid human resources. Hence, when the second foreign aid 
objective was proposed in the 1980s, China specifically called for the less technical landmark 
projects and upgraded its failing in Technical Aid with Management Cooperation. Still, while 
the human resources of China's foreign aid remained largely unimproved, this fundamental 
issue went on affecting the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa so much so that China 
had to scale back its Technical Aid and terminate its Management Cooperation by the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
 
After focusing on delivering the less technical landmark projects for almost two decades, the 
introduction of the HRDC programs at the turn of the century to some extent improved this 
situation by providing technology and management training in China. Particularly after the 
inauguration of the third foreign aid objective in 2005, which emphasised Africa's social 
development, the rapidly expanding HRDC has significantly improved the diversity and 
capacity of China's foreign aid training programs. However, at this stage, due to China's 
incompetent foreign aid planning, the improperly arranged foreign aid packages have caused 
these HRDC programs to be at large uncoordinated with China's people's livelihoods focused 
foreign aid projects. At present, China only offers short-term onsite training following the 
transfers of Complete Project Aid projects that usually takes two weeks, and as assessed in 
the previous chapter, neither do the HRDC programs nor the extremely compressed onsite 
trainings meet the current demands of the recipient countries, or make up for the difficulties 
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brought about by the underlying deficiency of foreign aid professionals. 
 
Moreover, apart from this human resources capacity based drawback to China's foreign aid 
implementation, the supervision of which was commonly found to be problematic. 
Regardless of what The Four Principles promised: "The Chinese side will see to it that the 
signed contracts are observed, the quality of the work guaranteed…"78, and the continuous 
efforts that China has made in putting forward mechanisms and codes of practices to guide 
its foreign aid implementation, since the introduction of the market economic system in the 
early 1990s, the competitions consequently developed amongst foreign aid implementation 
parties have to a great degree threatened the quality of China's foreign aid. As a result of the 
shortage of foreign aid professionals and the unequally developed supervisory mechanisms, 
as a senior Chinese foreign aid worker mentioned: "While the projects that we [China] built 
in the 1960s are still up and running, the maintenance team has already come back twice on 
a recently transferred project"79. In reference to these complications, this section now delves 
into the handling and the supervisory mechanisms of China's foreign aid to explore the 
shortcomings that are hidden within its foreign aid implementation. 
 
The Handling of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对非援助的处理 
First, this study examines the handling of China's foreign aid. As learnt in chapter four, in the 
course of delivering foreign aid, the related departments of the Chinese government closely 
liaise and cooperate with each other. From the planning of foreign aid works to the eventual 
transfer, each foreign aid project and program are at the least processed through three 
institutions within the Chinese government. These are, the Economic and Commercial 
Counsellor's Office, the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries of the MOC, and the relevant 
implementation management institutions. In assistance to these primary institutions which 
take care of the negotiation, establishment, and implementation of foreign aid works, there 
are also the Department of Western Asian and African Affairs of the MOC and the Chinese 
Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation carrying out foreign aid research, 
a number of specialised government institutions providing planning suggestions and aiding 
in implementations of specific foreign aid projects and programs, as well as the State Council 
overseeing the whole process. 
 
However, given all of these institutions collectively processing China's foreign aid, and the 
recently founded databases in support, why are the human resources of China's foreign aid 
still turning out to be insufficient in assisting Africa's development? As explained by 
Brautigam earlier, "The Department of Foreign Aid80 is unbelievably small, with a staff of 
only about 100 (seventy professionals) in thirteen divisions81" (2009, p.109). Whereas with 
concern to the front line of China's foreign aid, she additionally revealed that: "The Chinese 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor's office attached to China's embassy will designate one 
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or more staff to oversee the aid program, trouble-shooting, monitoring, and checking up at 
their completion. These officials are not expected to be experts in development" (ibid.). As 
much as this is problematic, as surveyed by this study, the human resources foundation of 
China's foreign aid is even more hard pressed. Hence, as well as providing an update, this 
study goes into details regarding the institutions involved in the processing of China's foreign 
aid and further clarifies its professional capacity at present. 
 
The Human Resources of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对外援助的人力资源 
At the outset of China's foreign aid where the initial agreements are negotiated and signed, 
this study has identified similar circumstances as Brautigam found in 2009. Where located in 
the Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Offices attached to the Chinese embassies, there 
is generally only one person who is assigned to take charge of China's foreign aid full-time, 
and this person is not expected to be experienced in foreign aid.82 Apart from the Counsellor 
who is primarily involved in the negotiations of foreign aid items with the recipient country, 
this one person deals with the contract drafting, the liaison with the Ministry of Commerce; 
and, after the establishment of the foreign aid works, the supervision of the implementation 
and problem-solving. In the particular case of Africa, where the staffing of the Economic and 
Commercial Counsellor's Offices are also arranged according to the concept of traditional 
friendly countries, a minimum of 70% of these offices are staffed with less than 8 people in 
total.83 In these cases, this one person who is assigned to take charge of foreign aid is also 
often required to attend to other tasks at the same time. 
 
After sending the foreign aid proposal back to China for further review, the first department 
it reaches (the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries of the MOC) now has 15 divisions. In 
contrast to Brautigam's findings, there are only 4 divisions for Africa, and there is a general 
office taking charge of internal works. Other than these differences, there is also a division 
established after her research which organises international exchange and cooperation.84 As 
the central administrative department of China's foreign aid, as well as the largest 
department of the MOC, the staffing of the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries is in total 
set up for 96 people, plus an additional secondment of 80 people (mainly coordinated from 
other central and provincial economic departments).85 With particular attention on Africa, 
the 4 regional divisions on average have one person dealing with 3 recipient countries at a 
time.86 Taking account of the person who is assigned to handle foreign aid in the Economic 
and Commercial Counsellor's Office, as one senior Chinese official described the current 
situation, "There is an average of 1.3 people looking after each African recipient country"87. 
 
After the foreign aid requests are approved, these are then passed on to the appropriate 
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implementation management institutions for contract bidding, preparation and 
implementation of the agreed terms. Aside from the specific foreign aid works such as 
Medical Teams and Youth Volunteer Programs, which are assigned to specialised government 
institutions (each of these specialised institutions have one dedicated office for organising 
foreign aid related tasks), the primary features of China's foreign aid – Complete Project Aid, 
Goods and Materials Aid, and HRDC are thus processed by the subsidiary public institutions 
of the MOC. Of these, the Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation is set up 
with 96 staff spread between 17 divisions arranging Complete Project Aid and Technical 
Aid.88 The China International Centre for Economic and Technical Exchanges, on the other 
hand, has 18 divisions and employs 140 people in the management of Goods and Materials 
Aid. 89  Finally, executing and coordinating China's HRDC programs, the Academy for 
International Business Officials has 190 staff spread across 18 divisions.90 
 
As for the research departments of China's foreign aid: the Department of Western Asian 
and African Affairs of the MOC is set up with only 30 staff, whom are processing the 
information gathered from the Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Offices located in 13 
Asian and 53 African countries – that is an average of 5 countries per person.91 The Chinese 
Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation in the meanwhile has 4 people 
focusing on research related to development assistance (including the statistics of China's 
foreign aid). In addition to this, the China-Africa Research Centre housed within this academy 
has 10 researchers.92 Whereas with consideration to the databases that are constructed also 
in support of China's foreign aid implementation: in spite of accessible data that indicated 
that the Foreign Aid Expert Database had already registered 4,373 experts by the end of 
2008,93 the problem is that, as pointed out by one Chinese researcher, these foreign aid 
experts are all "experts in technical fields, such as construction and water exploration"94, but 
none of them are experts in development. 
 
In view of this significant shortage of foreign aid professionals, it is not hard to realise how 
the implementation of China's foreign aid in Africa encountered substantial difficulties over 
the past six decades – and indeed, continues to face challenging situations at present. 
However, after revealing these alarming figures and understanding the steady evolvement of 
the institutions involved in China's foreign aid, what this study has found to be even more 
confusing is that why have the human resources capacities of these institutions not 
improved along? As one senior Chinese researcher pointed out the dilemma: "It is because 
of the staffing plan (人员编制) set for these ministries"95. Due to the staffing arrangement of 
the Chinese government, the number of staff recruited in each government institutions is 
                                                          
88
 Interview with senior Chinese official, Beijing, China, 16 November 2011. 
89
 Interview with Chinese official, Beijing, China, 12 November 2011. 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 "Exclusive of the administrative staff and so forth", as this official added. Interview with senior Chinese official, 
Beijing, China, 16 November 2011. 
92
 Interview with senior Chinese researcher, Beijing, China, 22 November 2011. 
93
 Unpublished government document, January 2009, Strive for the Advancement of Both Foreign Aid 
Management and Promotion, p.14. 
94
 Interview with Chinese researcher, Beijing, China, 28 November 2011. 
95
 Discussion with Chinese researchers, Beijing, China, 22 November 2011. 
146 
 
strictly controlled. Whilst it is not possible to increase the human resources capacity of one 
government institution over another, the Adjustments of Foreign Aid Project Management 
implemented by the MOC in 2008 (which devolved its foreign aid implementation 
management to its subsidiary public institutions) was particularly purposed to cope with this 
situation.96 
 
"Of course this is much behind the rapid development of our [China's] foreign aid works"97, 
stated one senior Chinese researcher. Considering the possibility of establishing a dedicated 
institution administrating foreign aid as the traditional foreign aid donor countries, another 
Chinese researcher affirmed: "Highly unlikely to happen within the next two decades". It is 
built on this greatly restricted human resources foundation, that the current implementation 
capacity of China's foreign aid remains fundamentally the same as during the pre-reform 
era,98 regardless of the continuous institutional reforms and the adjustments of operating 
mechanisms that have been accomplished over the years. As a consequence, not only is "the 
lack of expertise of the seconding staff troubling the process of our [China's] foreign aid 
implementations"99, but as pointed out by another Chinese official: 
 
Not to mention that we [the MOC] are at the moment unable to provide any foreign aid 
planning suggestions longer than a one-year period, with regard to foreign aid research, 
evaluation, projects and programs coordination – these institutional functions are all 
extremely limited.100 
 
Furthermore, with particular concerns to the technical experts of China's foreign aid, whilst 
they are all seem to be amply located through the Foreign Aid Expert Database nowadays, as 
pointed out by one Chinese official: 
 
Consider our current foreign aid expert teams, including teachers, engineers, doctors 
and so forth. Despite that they are all competent in terms of their own specialities, they 
are helpless in terms of language skills.101 
 
Even though China is now organising language training courses for all of its foreign aid expert 
teams before their overseas duties, and is continuously focused on improving the capacity of 
its HRDC programs, neither of these attempts is delivering the intended result at present. 
The lack of foreign aid human resources with appropriate language skills remains one of the 
primary drawbacks that is affecting China's foreign aid implementation in Africa.102 Not only 
does this shortage repeatedly cause China's foreign aid in Africa to fail in technology and 
management transfers, it sometimes also drives foreign aid dependency amongst recipient 
countries. 
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The Supervision of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对非援助的监督 
After surveying the extremely limited human resources of China's foreign aid, this study now 
explores its supervisory arrangement. As identified to be the other factor that is also 
affecting the implementation of China's foreign aid in Africa, the unequally developed 
supervisory mechanisms have resulted in a number of difficulties in recent years. Particularly 
after the introduction of the market economic system in the early 1990s, the implementation 
quality of China's foreign aid has step by step declined. Although there are no official figures 
recording the unsatisfactory projects and programs, as asserted by several Chinese foreign 
aid officials and workers, and as assessed by this study, a notable proportion of the projects 
and programs delivered to Africa of late are "found to be sub-standard"103. Leaving aside the 
inadequately planned technological standard of the equipment, even the installation of such 
equipment and the construction of China's foreign aid buildings are also often turned out to 
be disappointing in terms of both the local standards and in comparison to the foreign aid 
projects that China had delivered previously. 
 
At present, the supervision of China's foreign aid is mainly carried out by the Department of 
Aid to Foreign Countries of the MOC. Besides administrating the entire foreign aid process, it 
is responsible for both the development and enforcement of China's foreign aid polices and 
codes of practices. Working in conjunction with this department, there is also the Economic 
and Commercial Counsellor's Office onsite overseeing the implementation of China's foreign 
aid as well as monitoring the operation after transfers. In addition to this basic arrangement, 
following the lead of the Central Committee which designated 2011 as the Year of Foreign 
Aid Quality, the MOC executed a comprehensive inspection of the projects and programs 
that China had delivered since its first modern pledges made in 2006. However, in spite of 
these supervisory measures introduced by Beijing, as investigated by this study in reference 
to the identified sub-standard implementation of China's recent foreign aid projects and 
programs in Africa, there still remain many drawbacks regarding the auditing and legislation 
setup of China's foreign aid. 
 
The Audit of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对外援助的审计 
With concerns to the calculation of China's foreign aid, as understood earlier, it is currently 
dealt with by the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, and it 
is summed by the National Bureau of Statistics and published via China Statistical Yearbook. 
Although such figures are virtually statistics, in other words, aggregates rather than the 
result of an in-depth audit, as a senior Chinese official asserted, "It is the only calculation of 
China's foreign aid at the moment"104 (This only refers to China's traditional foreign aid 
which depends on being solely funded by the Chinese government budget. The Concessional 
Loan, on the other hand, is separately administrated by the EXIM Bank). Since China's foreign 
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aid has always been implemented as a state behaviour, that is, it has no relevance to the 
Chinese people, there has never been an auditing mechanism or department established. As 
for the need to keep a detailed record for the Chinese government itself, the argument is 
even more straightforward, as this official further pointed out the initial thought of Beijing: 
"Foreign aid is our [China's] gift to our friendly countries, what is the reason for an audit?"105. 
 
Quickly is the reasoning referred back to the friendship emphasis again, in fact, it was only in 
2010 that the need for auditing foreign aid was first brought forward.106 While the progress 
on this request is unknown, the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic 
Cooperation is now only putting together two sets of figures which sum up China's total 
foreign aid expenditures and foreign aid expenditures by specific countries. Whereas with 
regards to the other part of auditing – the evaluation of China's foreign aid implementation, 
the Financial Management and Planning Division of the Department of Aid to Foreign 
Countries of the MOC has 10 staff monitoring the execution of the whole of China's foreign 
aid.107 Even though it is briefed by the one person from the Economic and Commercial 
Counsellor's Offices onsite and is now aided by the Foreign Aid Expert Database, this remains 
the weakest link in China's foreign aid implementation.108 In fact, as far as this study is 
concerned, the MOC practically only sees the completions of China's foreign aid projects and 
programs, but whether they are serving the intended purposes or not, stays only with the 
ones who are receiving them.109 
 
The Regulations of China's Foreign Aid 
中国对外援助的立法 
Regarding the construction of rules and regulations for China's foreign aid, subsequent to the 
inauguration of The Eight Principles in 1964, it has became the only norm for China's foreign 
aid works (Huang, 2007). Aside from The Four Principles which was later brought in as an 
addition to The Eight Principles, China has been continuously setting up internal mechanisms 
and codes of practices to conduct its foreign aid implementation. For example, following 
introducing enterprises to take part in foreign aid deliveries in 1983, China implemented the 
Contract Responsibility Mechanism to administrate the process. After the launch of the Fund 
of Foreign Aid Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects in 1998, China installed the Measures 
for the Management of the Fund of Foreign Aid Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects to 
supervise its application. However, despite these attempts in regulating the implementation 
of China's foreign aid, none of them has the restraining force of law.110 At present, similar to 
the much needed foreign aid auditing mechanisms, there has not been any legislation laid 
down to legally govern China's foreign aid implementation. 
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Given the deficiency of both adequate auditing mechanisms and effective legislation, albeit 
this at first glance highlights the considerably lagged development of China's foreign aid 
supervision, as one senior Chinese official pointed out, "It is because of that we [the MOC] 
are significantly short of hands"111. "It is not the first time that we [the MOC] have been 
asked to improve on evaluations and take the current rules and regulations up to a 
legislation level, but with less than 20 people put together (the Financial Management and 
Planning Division and the Laws and Regulations Division of the Department of Aid to Foreign 
Countries of the MOC), even the ongoing tasks are more than demanding"112. It is again as a 
result of the substantial shortage of foreign aid human resources, that the implementation 
capacity of China's foreign aid has been materially undermined. Not only has the consequent 
lack of adequate auditing setup caused China's foreign aid to have incompetent evaluations, 
but due to the underdeveloped legislation, the existing rules and regulations cannot be 
effectively enforced to govern the implementation of China's foreign aid.113 
 
With both of these drawbacks brought together, provided that China's development agenda 
continues to lean heavily towards promoting economic interests and indeed supporting its 
enterprises going out, the unequally developed supervisory mechanisms have immediately 
pushed the implementation of China's foreign aid to "dangerous zones"114. On the basis that 
the criteria for qualifying foreign aid implementation parties are now "overwhelmingly 
stressed on their business competitive capacities, and specifically laid upon their ability of 
staying out rather than their practical project implementation quality"115, in addition to the 
works of China's foreign aid are no longer guaranteed, as further pointed out by a senior 
Chinese official: 
 
Whilst our [China's] foreign aid subtly progressed from 'strictly a political mission' to 
additionally considering 'establishing businesses in recipient countries', the regardless 
of the implementation quality [even] to some extent confused the primary emphasis on 
building friendly foreign relationships.116 
 
Given China's foreign aid in Africa is at present not being supervised at either end – neither 
concerned with the workmanship of the implementation parties nor the foreign aid 
outcomes after transfers, the implementation quality of China's foreign aid continues to 
decline. 
 
The Obvious Short of Hands 
 
Following up these shortcomings that have fundamentally impaired the implementation of 
China's foreign aid, it can be seen that as much as China sought to advance its foreign aid 
capacities, in order to materially improve its foreign aid outcomes in Africa, it is still in need 
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of sorting out its phenomenal shortage of foreign aid human resources. To be specific, with 
regard to the lack of professionals in the offices: whilst the staffing plans of the current 
foreign aid institutions cannot be increased, and a dedicated foreign aid institution is highly 
unlikely to be established in the foreseeable future, the MOC should search for measures to 
further devolve its foreign aid management to public institutions or specialised institutions 
to keep up with the rapid development of China's foreign aid.117 On the basis of additionally 
concentrating the administrative responsibility of the MOC and allowing it to be fully focused 
on foreign aid planning and construction of foreign aid regulations, China should also take 
steps to train human resources specialised in development to assist in both the MOC and the 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Offices to improve efficiency.118 
 
As for the research and supervision of China's foreign aid in particular: aside from passing on 
these tasks to other government institutions, as a senior Chinese official suggested, the MOC 
could also sub-contract them to professional institutions, such as academic institutions and 
auditing agencies, to promote the scientific research and the transparency of China's foreign 
aid.119 Especially in consideration of the research of China's foreign aid, given that it is at 
present not contributing adequately to both the decision-makings of China's foreign aid 
objectives and the planning of China's foreign aid projects and programs, as He called on: 
 
It is not sufficient to gather experiences and train human resources through 'learning by 
doing' any more… Whilst delivering foreign aid large-scale, we [China] should also focus 
on building up our own foreign aid research capacity. (2010, p.19) 
 
Moreover, in view of the versatility of the Foreign Aid Expert Database and its conveniences 
under the current staffing arrangement, in addition to continuously expanding its capacity, 
efforts should be likewise made to introduce development specialised experts to be included 
in the database.120 
 
With attentions calling to the shortage of foreign aid experts with appropriate language skills 
in the field: China needs to be appropriately addressing this "the most prominent but least 
considered"121 issue and bringing it to urgent attention – whether to advance the language 
training for foreign aid experts, or to include interpreters as an integral part of the expert 
teams as China has done with the agricultural expert teams. Additionally, as one Chinese 
official recommended, giving an example of China's Foreign Aid Medical Teams: 
 
While retaining the criteria of senior doctors to ensure the performance of our [China's] 
Medical Teams (one of the primary criteria for participating in China's Medical Teams is 
that the member must be qualified for Associate Chief Physician or above), we could as 
well invite some of the doctors from the younger generation with adequate language 
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skills to join in.122 
 
Besides further expanding the diversity of the foreign aid expert teams, as another Chinese 
official suggested, "If our [China's] training programs can be better coordinated with the 
implementation of our foreign aid projects, as carried out during the construction of projects 
instead of after the transfer, this should also help a lot"123. 
 
In summary, after delivering foreign aid to Africa for more than half a century, the shortage 
of foreign aid human resources is still one of the most fundamental shortcomings that is 
undermining China's foreign aid outcomes in Africa. Not only has it directed China's foreign 
aid to fail in technology and management transfers, but it also led China's foreign aid to have 
continuously declined in implementation quality. While it is not possible to rectify this 
shortcoming with a simple increase in administration capacity, China needs to seek other 
ways to boost its foreign aid human resources. As explored by this study, the viable solutions 
include: an expanded participation of other professional institutions, advanced trainings for 
foreign aid human resources, and improved coordination of foreign aid human resources and 
HRDC training programs. Nevertheless, in spite of the possibilities for improvement provided 
by these solutions, in the end, it is still the concerns over human resources capacity. Indeed, 
the staffing arrangement of the Chinese government needs to be addressed. Before 
successful measures can be taken, the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa is going to be 
continuously kept in challenging situations. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
Looking through the above identified Chinese characteristics of China's foreign aid, it can be 
find that after more than six decades of continuous developments, China's foreign aid today 
is still left with a number of fundamental shortcomings that are undermining its outcomes in 
Africa. On the basis of the successively implemented objectives of building African industrial 
and agricultural foundations, reducing expenditure while consolidating foreign aid outcomes, 
and improving people's livelihoods; the noticeably broadened foreign aid planning focus of 
both Africa's social and infrastructure development; and the step by step refined foreign aid 
implementation methods of Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid, Goods and Materials Aid, 
HRDC, Medical Teams and Overseas Volunteer Programs, China's overall foreign aid capacity 
has only improved to some extent. Whilst China's foreign aid in the meantime is only aimed 
at building friendly foreign relationships, as this study found out, in the interest of materially 
improve the outcomes of China's foreign aid in Africa, Beijing needs to pay attention to two 
primary concerns on the instant. 
 
First off, there is the underlying consideration of friendship. Although on the one hand, this 
friendship emphasis has brought China's foreign aid both uniqueness that is welcomed by 
almost all African recipient countries, and the planning framework that is unconstrained by 
other economic or political interests; on the other hand, it has substantially simplified the 
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decision-makings of China's foreign aid objectives and confused China's foreign aid planning. 
To be specific, whilst the foreign aid objectives in Africa that China has implemented thus far 
were all practically decided upon its principal decision-makers' personal visits to African 
recipient countries, and only concerned about building friendly foreign relationships, the 
consequently neglected scientific research and other necessary processes of decision-making 
have made these objectives only to a small degree adapted to the general development 
concerns of Africa. Meanwhile, given that China has always taken African recipient countries 
as a whole in drawing up these objectives, they also never made alterations for each African 
recipient country's immediate development concerns. 
 
With regard to the planning of China's foreign aid, subject to this friendship emphasis, the 
allocation of China's foreign aid overlooked the local conditions of the African recipient 
countries. In as much as the level of friendliness determined foreign aid input and the 
emphasis on it must-be-spend, the majority of China's foreign aid projects delivered to Africa 
had to deal with complex local political, social and institutional conditions. As a result of not 
knowing the priority development areas of the African recipient countries, the tendency of 
relying on friendship as a prime determinant has then led China's foreign aid to be often 
planned inappropriate to their development conditions. In the end, following the rather 
vague ideas in planning foreign aid projects and programs in Africa, not only was the general 
effectiveness of China's foreign aid widely restricted owing to the oversimplified foreign aid 
allocation approach, but it depended on the ineptly arranged foreign aid packages and the 
incompetent coordination of supportive foreign aid implementation methods, the universal 
sustainability of China's foreign aid were also further limited. 
 
Secondly, there is the shortage of foreign aid human resources. Whilst China's foreign aid has 
continuously boosted in scale, expanded in focusing areas and diversified in implementation 
methods, the largely unimproved foreign aid human resources foundation has materially 
constrained the implementation of China's foreign aid. As well the lack of foreign aid human 
resources in the administrative departments, a number of institutional functions of China's 
foreign aid were thus disabled, such as foreign aid research, supervision and coordination of 
foreign aid projects and programs, leading to the lack of expertise of the seconded staff in 
these departments, the normal processes of foreign aid implementation were also to some 
extent troubled. Further, apart from hampering the administrative capacity of China's foreign 
aid, as a consequence of the shortage of foreign aid experts with competent language skills 
in the field, unsuccessful technology and management transfers is at present still remaining 
one of the primary failures that is affecting the overall outcomes of China's foreign aid in 
Africa and a major cause of foreign aid dependencies. 
 
As for the improvement of these fundamental shortcomings: whilst the friendship emphasis 
does not necessarily lead to unsuccessful foreign aid outcomes, and it is the primary drive of 
China's foreign aid, the decision-making of China's foreign aid objectives should additionally 
allow for scientific research to aid in identifying the priority development areas of African 
recipient countries, and further attend to their individual development needs. At the same 
time, given that it is not possible to alter the level of friendliness determined foreign aid 
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allocation framework, China could attempt to modify its long-term country specific planning 
so that the allocated foreign aid budget could be used in appropriate situations. In addition 
to these, considering the packaging of China's foreign aid, as well as it also needs to have a 
greater regard for scientific research, and accordingly adjusted to each African recipient 
country's needs, attention should be paid to the generation of foreign aid standards that the 
recipient countries are in a position to implement. Moreover, apt coordination of foreign aid 
projects and programs should also be duly stressed. 
 
With concerns to the shortage of foreign aid human resources, on the basis of attaching 
sufficient importance to this prominent issue that has practically undermined China's foreign 
aid implementation from the very beginning, China should introduce additional training for 
its existing foreign aid officials and experts in the immediate agenda. Whilst a dedicated 
foreign aid institution is highly unlikely to be established in the near future, and given the 
currently set staffing arrangement, further devolvement of foreign aid management and 
other attainable measures for distributing foreign aid works should be primarily considered. 
In particular to foreign aid research which is essential to both satisfying foreign aid objectives 
and suitable foreign aid packages, attention needs to be specifically called to participation of 
academic institutions. Further, concerning the shortage of foreign aid human resources in 
the field, solutions can be explored via adequate coordination of specialist human resources 
and more integrated HRDC programs. Improved administration of the Foreign Aid Expert 
Database should also benefit the eventual outcomes. 
 
To conclude the survey of the successes and failures of China's foreign aid in approaching the 
factors that affect its performance in Africa: subsequent to repeated efforts made to adjust 
foreign aid objectives, advance foreign aid planning and implementation approaches, there 
still remains a number of fundamental shortcomings that undermine China's foreign aid 
outcomes in Africa. Even though driven by the underlying political consideration of building 
friendly foreign relationships, China has managed to boost its foreign aid capacity in some 
respects, it is at present still urgently in need of sorting out the concerns over the emphasis 
and the reliance on the friendship underlying consideration, as well as the phenomenal 
shortage of foreign aid human resources. In sum, as this study found out, if China could 
account the adaptation of its foreign aid to African countries' diverse domestic conditions as 
serious as it is emphasising on friendship, if the input to the improvement of China's foreign 
aid capacity can catch up to the growth of its foreign aid input to Africa, then China's foreign 
aid may be more effective in helping African countries achieve self-reliance. 
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Chapter Seven: Concluding Remarks 
 
With the aim of improving our understanding of China's foreign aid in Africa, and promoting 
China's foreign aid outcomes, this study has surveyed one of the fastest expanding but least 
explored foreign aid practices in the contemporary world: China's foreign aid in Africa. Whilst 
previous studies have made much account of China's massive concessional loan deals and 
the generous investments in natural resources, very little is known so far with regard to how 
China delivers its foreign aid, and even less is known about how this foreign aid works in 
African recipient countries. With a view to addressing this gap in our prior knowledge, and to 
shed light on its development in the near future, this study has delved into the development, 
the performance and the shortcomings of China's foreign aid over the past 60 years. Built on 
practical grounds, it has attached importance to both China's traditional foreign aid (the part 
of China's foreign aid that is primarily aimed at promoting Africa's economic and welfare 
development), as well as China's responsibility in making this foreign aid work under the 
diverse domestic conditions of African recipient countries. 
 
At the beginning of China's foreign aid in Africa (1955-1978), this study found that with the 
purpose of breaking out of the diplomatic isolation created by the capitalist countries, and 
consolidating China's newly founded communist regime, China's foreign aid emerged from a 
devastating domestic background left by the feudal regime. With a desire to build friendship 
with African countries, China's foreign aid settled on the principal aim of helping African 
countries achieve self-reliance after political independence. The goals then quickly began 
with an objective of building African industrial and agricultural foundations to help them 
achieve economic independence. During the implementation of this objective, not only 
China continuously reformed its foreign aid administration and operating mechanisms, but 
along with the increase in foreign aid recipient countries, it also expanded its foreign aid 
implementation approaches to include three funding methods (Grant, Interest-free Loan and 
Low-interest Loan), and four implementation methods (Complete Project Aid, Technical Aid, 
Goods and Materials Aid and Cash Aid). 
 
However, whilst this early development of China's foreign aid in Africa swiftly extended 
China's diplomatic relationships to 41 countries on the continent by the end of 1978 (and 
successfully brought it back to the UN in 1971), and made China's foreign aid capable of 
completing a number of complex projects, such as the single largest foreign aid project in the 
history of China's foreign aid in Africa – the Tanzam Railway, the majority of the industrial 
and agricultural foundations that China delivered to Africa during this period were mired in 
continued dilemmas. As a result of the decision-makers' personal preferences, a friendship 
determined foreign aid allocation and packaging; and the yet underdeveloped foreign aid 
capacity, the neglected political, social and institutional conditions of the African recipient 
countries widely drove these projects to classic foreign aid dependencies. Additionally, on 
the basis that China's foreign aid was primarily carried out as obligations to proletarian 
internationalism and ignored China's domestic economic situation, it also hampered China's 
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own development. 
 
During the initial reform of China's foreign aid in Africa (1979-1993), despite the frustrating 
foreign aid outcomes from the previous period and the domestic demand for economic 
development, China still came up with a necessary budget for foreign aid. Built on an 
underlying consideration of consolidating friendship with African countries, China's foreign 
aid was now driven by a second objective of reducing expenditure while consolidating 
foreign aid outcomes. With a view to preserving the assets for China's domestic economic 
development and to cope with African recipient countries' divergent local conditions, China's 
foreign aid at this stage was primarily focused on delivering landmark projects that were less 
demanding both financially and technically. Apart from further reforming the foreign aid 
administration and operating mechanisms to support the eventually paid attention to 
economic consideration (and therefore mobilising the newly established SOEs for foreign aid 
implementation), it also integrated Technical Aid with Management Cooperation to assist 
those industrial and agricultural projects that had been delivered earlier. 
 
Nevertheless, even though the initial reform of China's foreign aid in Africa helped China's 
diplomatic relationship expand to an additional 7 African countries, and to some extent 
balanced the political emphasis and economic considerations of China's foreign aid, it has 
only minimally impacted African recipient countries' development. Owing to the still 
friendship emphasised foreign aid planning approaches which essentially disregards the 
divergent development conditions of the African recipient countries, indeed, that was the 
emphasis that, "The Chinese government provides the best-quality equipment and materials 
manufactured by China…"1, that the landmark projects China delivered during this period 
were commonly only of short-term benefit at best. Further, given the persistent emphasis 
that, "the Chinese government strictly respects the sovereignty of recipient countries, and 
never attaches any conditions…"2; and the largely unimproved foreign aid capacity, despite 
the immediate contributions made by the Management Cooperation, it was also unable to 
sustain China's foreign aid outcomes in the long-term. 
 
Moving into the contemporary development of China's foreign aid in Africa (1994-present), 
China's foreign aid was first directed to search for mutual benefits via the implementation of 
the Concessional Loan. As a result of substantial economic development at the turn of the 
century and growing international responsibility, and following an intention to continuously 
develop friendships with African countries, China's foreign aid was then led to embrace a 
third objective – to improve people's livelihoods. By this time, China integrated its domestic 
economic and trade into overseas economic cooperation so as to fulfil both its political and 
economic pursuits. China thus adjusted its foreign aid implementation approaches, and 
inaugurated the twenty-four government institutions jointly participating in the Inter-agency 
Coordination Mechanism and established a number of dedicated databases to improve its 
foreign aid planning capacity. In the meantime, China also completely delegated the foreign 
aid implementation management to the subsidiary public institutions of the MOC and other 
                                                          
1
 The 6
th
 principle of The Eight Principles, see Appendix I. 
2
 The 2
nd
 principle of The Eight Principles, see Appendix I. 
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specialised institutions to cope with the increase in foreign aid. 
 
On the basis of this contemporary development in China's foreign aid in Africa has pushed 
forward the China-Africa relationship to a strategic ground, and has driven China's foreign aid 
to attend both Africa's social and infrastructure development. However, China's foreign aid 
currently is still struggling to materially benefit African recipient countries' development. On 
account of the problematic foreign aid planning approaches which continuously emphasis 
friendship, many China's people's livelihoods related projects delivered to Africa of late have 
been unsuited to the recipient countries' domestic conditions. Although the recent Human 
Resource Development Cooperation significantly improved China's capacity in transferring 
the required technical and management skills to recipient countries (in comparison to the 
late terminated Management Cooperation and the greatly scaled back Technical Aid), 
because of inept planning, they have been mostly uncoordinated with China's foreign aid 
projects. Furthermore, due to the limited foreign aid capacity, the implementation of China's 
foreign aid was also in decline in terms of quality. 
 
On the whole, after learning about the development of China's foreign aid and discovering 
its disappointing outcomes in assisting African recipient countries' development, this study 
has come to the conclusion that, whilst meeting China's national interests, China's foreign 
aid has only worked in African recipient countries to some extent. Despite the underlying 
consideration of building friendly foreign relationships which sustained and promoted this 
foreign aid even when China was in difficulties and in need itself, this friendship commitment 
has in general not been able to improve African recipient countries' abilities in achieving 
self-reliance. In the interest of really improving China's foreign aid so that it can really benefit 
African recipient countries' development, this study has identified two factors that demand 
China's immediate attention. They are as follows: 
 
Friendship – a factor that is frequently overlooked by Western scholars and one that is often 
patriotically interpreted by Chinese scholars – as a political interest sits at the top of China's 
national interests, and both guides China's foreign aid development and influences China's 
foreign aid outcomes. Even though the emphasis on friendship has brought China's foreign 
aid the uniqueness that is welcomed by almost all African recipient countries, and the 
planning framework that is unconstrained by other economic or political interests, it also 
substantially simplifies the decision-making process of China's foreign aid objectives and 
confuses China's foreign aid planning. Besides once sacrificed China's own development for 
the goal of building friendly foreign relationships, the emphasis on friendship has made 
China's foreign aid objectives unaligned to the immediate development concerns of the 
African recipient countries. Whilst causing China's foreign aid projects and programs to have 
to deal with complex local political, social and institutional situations, it has also made these 
projects and programs largely unsuited to the recipient countries' development conditions. 
 
Nevertheless, given that this emphasis on friendship does not interfere with the objective of 
promoting African recipient countries' economic and welfare development, as this study has 
found out, with a view to improving foreign aid outcomes, China at first needs to allow for 
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additional scientific research in the decision-making processes of foreign aid objectives. After 
identifying the priority development areas for each African recipient countries (rather than 
regarding African countries as a whole), scientific research also needs to be taken into 
account in the allocation and packaging of foreign aid projects and programs so that they 
accommodate the recipient countries' diverse domestic conditions. Particularly regarding the 
packaging of China's foreign aid projects and programs, apart from focusing on generating 
standards that the recipient countries are in a position to implement, and improving the 
efficiency of the current Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism to properly bring into play 
the advantages of the HRDC programs, the planning of self-sufficient foreign aid packages 
should also benefit the effectiveness and sustainability of China's foreign aid. 
 
People – the fundamental driving force behind every development – have been kept in the 
shade for too long in the study of China's foreign aid in Africa. Whilst it may be too basic to 
draw attention to in an examination of one of the most complex contemporary relations 
between states, it is nevertheless responsible for many shortcomings in China's foreign aid 
implementation. Not only has the shortage of appropriate foreign aid human resources 
made China's foreign aid continuously incompetent in carrying out successful technology and 
management transfers, it has also impaired China's capacity to conduct foreign aid research, 
supervision, projects and programs coordination, and has troubled the implementation 
process of China's foreign aid. Although China has been attempting to overcome this basic 
weakness by reforming its foreign aid administration – introducing provincial institutions to 
take part in foreign aid implementation (1970s), establishing SOEs to implement foreign aid 
projects and programs (1980s), and delegating foreign aid implementation management 
(2000s) – it has not been able to improve upon this difficult situation. 
 
In order to materially boost China's foreign aid capacity, this study suggests that China should 
further devolve its foreign aid management to public institutions. Since a dedicated foreign 
aid institution is highly unlikely to be established in the near future, China could alternatively 
pass on its foreign aid management to other government institutions so as to concentrate 
the MOC's capacity in foreign aid planning, and construction and enforcement of foreign aid 
rules and regulations. Moreover, China could sub-contract specific tasks such as auditing and 
research to specialised institutions to promote scientific research and transparency in China's 
foreign aid. In particular the immediate development of China's foreign aid, while expanding 
the foreign aid databases given their convenience under the current staffing arrangement of 
China's foreign aid, China should focus on advancing language training courses for existing 
foreign aid experts, or to including interpreters as an integral part of the expert teams. In the 
meantime, an improved coordination of HRDC programs and implementation of foreign aid 
projects should also benefit China's foreign aid outcomes. 
 
To conclude this study on China's foreign aid in Africa: friendship – a factor that, for the most 
part, is meaningless in the Western study of China's foreign aid – as a moral pursuit that is 
deeply rooted in Chinese culture, is driving the development of China's foreign aid in Africa 
and indeed, influencing China's foreign aid outcomes nonetheless. If China could bring about 
this friendship in a more considerate way in its foreign aid planning and implementation, and 
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of course, in improving its foreign aid capacity, China's foreign aid might make more impact 
upon African recipient countries' development. At the same time we remember Chairman 
Mao's emphasis that, "It was our African friends who brought us back to the UN, we 
shouldn't forget the helping hand lent by the third-world countries in any way", maybe we 
should remember something else that this first and foremost leader of the People's Republic 
also once pointed out: "As long as the line is correct, the future is bright"3. 
 
"方向搞对头, 一步一层楼" 
 
 
                                                          
3
 This is a widely quoted public interpretation of Chairman Mao's indication of "路线是个纲, 纲举目张" during the 
Cultural Revolution period (1967-1977), which directly translate as "once the key link is grasped, everything else 
falls into place". The original indication was made by Chairman Mao during his visit to the southern provinces in 
August 1971. See XUE, Q. 2013b. Mao Tes-tung Southern Decision [eBook version]. Beijing: Sino-culture Press. 
Available at: http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2013/1029/c85037-23365193-2.html [Accessed: 14 July 2015]. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix I 
 
China's Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries 
(January 1964), "对外经济技术援助援助八项原则". 
 
1. The Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual 
benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral 
alms but as something mutual. 
 
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects the 
sovereignty of recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any 
privileges. 
 
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans, and extends 
the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden on recipient 
countries as far as possible. 
 
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese government is not to make 
recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of 
self-reliance and independent economic development. 
 
5. The Chinese government does its best to help recipient countries complete projects which 
require less investment but yield quicker results, so that the latter may increase their income 
and accumulate capital. 
 
6. The Chinese government provides the best-quality equipment and materials 
manufactured by China at international market prices. If the equipment and materials 
provided by the Chinese government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the 
Chinese government undertakes to replace them or refund the payment. 
 
7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that the 
personnel of the recipient country fully master the technology. 
 
8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in recipient countries will have the 
same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not 
allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities. 
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Appendix II 
 
The Four Principles of Economic and Technical Cooperation between China and African 
Countries (January 1983)1, "中非经济技术合作四项原则". 
 
1. In carrying out economic and technological cooperation with African countries, China 
abides by the principles of unity and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, respects their 
sovereignty, does not interfere in their internal affairs, attaches no political conditions and 
asks for no privileges whatsoever. 
 
2. In China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries, full play will be 
given to the strong points and potentials of both sides on the basis of their actual needs and 
possibilities, and efforts will be made to achieve good economic results with less investment, 
shorter construction cycles and quicker returns. 
 
3. China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries takes a variety of 
forms suited to the specific conditions, such as offering technical services, training technical 
and management personnel, engaging in scientific and technological exchanges, undertaking 
construction projects, entering into cooperative production and joint ventures. With regard 
to the cooperative projects it undertakes, the Chinese side will see to it that the signed 
contracts are observed, the quality of work guaranteed and stress laid on friendship. The 
experts and technical personnel dispatched by the Chinese side do not ask for special 
treatment. 
 
4. The purpose of China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries is 
to contribute to the enhancement of the self-reliant capabilities of both sides and promote 
the growth of the respective national economies by complementing and helping each other. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 Beijing Review, 1983, p.19, cited in p.314, BRAUTIGAM, D. 2009. The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in 
Africa, New York: Oxford University Press. 
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Appendix III 
 
Five Measures Announced by the Chinese Government at the UN High-Level Meeting on 
Financing for Development (September 2005), "中国政府在联合国发展筹资高级别会议上宣
布的 5项举措". 
 
1. China has decided to accord zero tariff treatment to some products from all the 39 least 
developed countries (LDCs) having diplomatic relations with China, which covers most of the 
China-bound exports from these countries. 
 
2. China will further expand its aid programs to the heavily-indebted poor countries (HIPCs) 
and LDCs, and, through bilateral channels, write off or forgive in other ways, within the next 
two years, all the overdue parts as of the end of 2004 of the interest-free or low-interest 
governmental loans owed by all the HIPCs having diplomatic relations with China. 
 
3. Within the next three years, China will provide USD 10 billion in concessional loans and 
preferential export buyer's credit to other developing countries to improve their 
infrastructure and cooperation between enterprises on both sides. 
 
4. China will, in the next three years, increase its assistance to other developing countries, 
African countries in particular, by providing them with anti-malaria drugs and other 
medicines, helping them set up and improve medical facilities and training medical staff. 
Specific programs will be implemented through such mechanisms as the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation as well as bilateral channels. 
 
5. China will train 30,000 personnel of various professions from other developing countries 
within the next three years so as to help them speed up their human resources 
development. 
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Appendix IV 
 
The Eight-Point Plan China Pledged at the FOCAC Beijing Summit (November 2006), "中国政
府在中非合作论坛北京峰会上宣布的 8项举措". 
 
1. Increase assistance to African countries, and by 2009 double the size of its assistance to 
African countries in 2006. 
 
2. Provide USD 3 billion in concessional loans and USD 2 billion in preferential export buyer's 
credit to African countries in the next three years. 
 
3. Set up the China-Africa Development Fund, the total amount of which will gradually reach 
USD 5 billion, to give encouragement and support to Chinese companies investing in projects 
in Africa. 
 
4. Help the African Union to build a convention center in order to support African countries 
in their efforts to strengthen themselves through unity and speed up African integration. 
 
5. Cancel the repayment of interest-free government loans that had become due by the end 
of 2005 to China by Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) and Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) in Africa that have diplomatic ties with China. 
 
6. Further open the Chinese market to Africa, expand the scope of imports from African LDCs 
having diplomatic ties with China entitled to zero duty treatment from 190 tariff lines to over 
440 tariff lines. 
 
7. Set up three to five overseas economic and trade cooperation zones in African countries in 
the next three years. 
 
8. Train 15,000 professionals for African countries in the next three years; send 100 senior 
agro-technology experts to Africa; set up in Africa 10 agro-technology demonstration centers 
with special features; assist African countries in building 30 hospitals and provide African 
countries with a grant of 300 million Yuan that is used to supply anti-malaria drugs like 
artemisinin and build 30 centers for prevention and treatment of malaria; dispatch 300 youth 
volunteers to African countries; help African countries set up 100 rural schools; increase the 
number of Chinese government scholarships for African students from the current 2,000 per 
year to 4,000 per year by the end of 2008. 
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Appendix V 
 
Six Measures for Foreign Aid Pledged by the Chinese Government at the 2008 UN High-Level 
Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals (September 2008), "中国政府在 2008年联合
国千年发展目标高级别会议上宣布的 6项对外援助措施". 
 
1. In the coming five years, China will double the number of agricultural technology 
demonstration centers it builds for other developing countries to 30, increase the number of 
agricultural experts and technicians it sends overseas by 1,000 to double the present figure, 
and provide agricultural training opportunities in China for 3,000 people from other 
developing countries. 
 
2. China will contribute USD 30 million to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization to 
establish a trust fund for projects and activities designed to help other developing countries 
enhance agricultural productivity. 
 
3. China will increase exports and aid to countries facing food shortages. 
 
4. In the coming five years, China will give 10,000 more scholarships to other developing 
countries and offer training programs exclusively for 1,500 principals and teachers from 
African countries. China will ensure that the 30 hospitals it builds for African countries are 
properly staffed and equipped, and train 1,000 doctors, nurses and managers for the 
recipient countries. 
 
5. China will cancel the outstanding interest-free loans extended to LDCs that mature before 
the end of 2008, and give zero-tariff treatment to 95% of products from the relevant LDCs. 
 
6. In the coming five years, China will develop 100 small-scale clean energy projects for other 
developing countries, including small hydropower, solar power and bio-gas projects. 
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Appendix VI 
 
The New Eight-Point Plan China Pledged at the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference 
(November 2009), "中国政府在中非合作论坛第四届部长级会议上宣布的新 8项举措". 
 
1. China proposes the establishment of a China-Africa partnership in addressing climate 
change and the holding of senior official consultations on a non-regular basis, and 
strengthening of cooperation in satellite weather monitoring, development and use of new 
energy, prevention and control of desertification, and urban environmental protection. The 
Chinese government decides to assist African countries with 100 clean energy projects in the 
fields of solar energy, bio-gas and small hydropower stations. 
 
2. To intensify cooperation in science and technology, China proposes to launch the 
China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Plan, carry out 100 joint research 
demonstration projects, invite 100 African post-doctoral students to conduct scientific 
research in China and subsidize them when they return to their home countries to work. 
 
3. In order to improve African countries' capacity in financing, the Chinese government will 
provide USD 10 billion in concessional loans to African countries. China supports the 
establishment by Chinese financial institutions of a special loan of USD 1 billion for the 
development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Africa. The Chinese government 
will cancel debts of interest-free government loans that mature by the end of 2009 owed by 
all HIPCs and the LDCs in Africa having diplomatic relations with China. 
 
4. China will further open its market to African countries. It will gradually give zero-tariff 
treatment to 95% of exports from the LDCs in Africa having diplomatic relations with China. 
As the first step, China grants zero-tariff treatment to 60% of the exported commodities from 
those countries in 2010. 
 
5. In order to further strengthen agricultural cooperation and improve African countries' 
capacity for food security, China will increase to 20 the total number of agro-technology 
demonstration centers built for African countries, send 50 agro-technology teams to Africa 
and help train 2,000 agro-technicians for African countries. 
 
6. China will continue to deepen China-African cooperation in medical care and public health 
service. It will provide 500 million Yuan worth of medical equipment and malaria-fighting 
materials to 30 hospitals and 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers which have been 
built with China's assistance, and help African countries train a total of 3,000 doctors and 
nurses. 
 
7. In order to further enhance cooperation in human resource development and education, 
China will help African countries to build 50 China-Africa friendship schools and train 1,500 
school principals and teachers; increase the number of Chinese government scholarships for 
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African students to 5,500 by 2012; and train a total of 20,000 professionals in various sectors 
for African countries in the next three years. 
 
8. To enlarge people-to-people exchanges, China proposes to implement a China-Africa Joint 
Research and Exchange Plan to strengthen cooperation and exchanges between scholars and 
think tanks, which will also provide intellectual support for better policy-making regarding 
cooperation between the two sides. 
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Appendix VII 
 
Six Measures for Foreign Aid Pledged by the Chinese Government at the 2010 UN High-Level 
Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals (September 2010), "中国政府在 2010年联合
国千年发展目标高级别会议上宣布的 6项对外援助措施". 
 
1. Helping improve the people's livelihood in developing countries is the primary objective of 
China's foreign aid. To date, China has built over 150 schools, nearly 100 hospitals, more than 
70 drinking water facilities and 60-plus stadiums for other developing countries. China has 
sent more than 20,000 medical personnel to nearly 70 countries, offering treatment to 
hundreds of millions of patients. In the coming five years, China will take the following steps 
in support of a better livelihood for people in other developing countries: building 200 
schools; dispatching 3,000 medical experts, training 5,000 local medical personnel, and 
providing medical equipment and medicines to 100 hospitals, with priority being given to 
women's and children's health, and the prevention and treatment of malaria, tuberculosis 
and AIDS; building 200 clean energy and environmental protection projects; and increasing 
assistance to small-island developing states in the fields of disaster prevention and mitigation 
to help build their capacity for countering climate change. China will, within the next three 
years, donate USD 14 million to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 
 
2. Reducing and cancelling the debts of the LDCs. By the end of 2009, the Chinese 
government had cancelled debts worth 25.6 billion Yuan owed to it by 50 HIPCs and LDCs. 
Moreover, China will cancel their debts associated with the outstanding governmental 
interest-free loans that mature in 2010. 
 
3. Deepening financial cooperation with developing countries. To help other developing 
countries counter the adverse effects of the international financial crisis, China has provided 
USD 10 billion in concessional loans to African countries and USD 15 billion in credit support 
to ASEAN countries, including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Indonesia. China has 
contributed an additional USD 50 billion to the IMF, with an explicit request that the fund 
should be used, first and foremost, to help LDCs. China will continue to extend financial 
support of a certain scale to developing countries in the form of concessional loans and 
preferential export buyer's credit. 
 
4. Broadening economic and trade ties with developing countries. China has worked 
consistently to create conditions for developing countries to increase their exports to China 
through tariff relief and other measures. China has made a commitment to phasing in 
zero-tariff treatment to 95% of products from relevant LDCs. Since July 2010, China has given 
zero-tariff treatment to imported products from 33 LDCs covering more than 4,700 tariff 
lines, accounting for the overwhelming majority of the products from these countries. In the 
future, the Chinese government will give zero-tariff treatment to more products and let more 
countries benefit from this arrangement, while continuing to encourage Chinese companies 
to expand investment in developing countries. 
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5. Strengthening agricultural cooperation with developing countries. China has completed 
more than 200 agricultural cooperation projects in developing countries, and sent a large 
number of agro-technology experts to those countries, giving a strong boost to their 
agricultural development. In the next five years, China will dispatch 3,000 agricultural experts 
and technical staff abroad, provide 5,000 agriculture-related training opportunities in China, 
and give priority to cooperation with other developing countries in agricultural planning, 
hybrid rice cultivation, aquaculture, farmland water conservancy and agricultural machinery 
development. 
 
6. Helping developing countries enhance their human resources. China has held over 4,000 
training courses and trained 120,000 managerial and technical personnel in various 
professions for developing countries, helping recipient countries build human resources, 
which are their most valuable assets. In the next five years, China will train another 80,000 
professionals in various fields for developing countries. It will also increase the number of 
scholarships and on-the-job master's degree programs for people from developing countries, 
and provide training opportunities in China to 3,000 school principals and teachers. 
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Appendix VIII 
 
2011 Medical Training Programs (Ghana) 
 
 
 
  
169 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
ALDEN, C. 2007. China in Africa, London: Zed Books. 
ANDERSON, M. 2014. African Presidents 'Use China Aid for Patronage Politics' [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/nov/19/african-presidents-
china-aid-patronage-politics [Accessed: 3 January 2016]. 
ANON. 1955. Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn//pds/ziliao/1179/t191828.htm [Accessed: 4th June 
2010]. 
ANON. 1988a. Complexe Textile de Bujumbura Kept On Making Profit. International 
Economic Cooperation, 12-13. 
ANON. 1988b. The Improvement of Segou Textile Combine After One Year of Management 
Cooperation. International Economic Cooperation, 22-24. 
ANON. 1988c. The Improving Outcomes of the Tanzam Railway. International Economic 
Cooperation, 7-9. 
ARNOLD, G. 1985. Aid and the Third World: The North-South Divide, London: Robert Royce 
Ltd. 
ASKOURI, A. 2007. China's Investment in Sudan: Displacing Villages and Destroying 
Communities. In: MANJI, F. & MARKS, S. (eds.) African Perspectives on China in Africa. 
Oxford: Fahamu. 
BAILEY, M. 1976. Freedom Railway: China and the Tanzania-Zambia Link, London: Rex 
Collings. 
BIN, K. 2008. The Balance of "Righteousness" and "Interests" and the Evolution of China's 
Foreign Aid Xiangchao, 36-38. 
BOBIASH, D. 1992. South-south Aid: How Developing Countries Help Each Other, London: 
Macmillan. 
BRAUTIGAM, D. 1998. Chinese Aid and African Development : Exporting Green Revolution, 
Basingstoke; New York: Macmillan; St. Martin's Press. 
BRAUTIGAM, D. 2008. China's Foreign Aid in Africa: What Do We Know? In: ROTBERG, R. I. 
(ed.) China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence. Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
BRAUTIGAM, D. 2009. The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
BRAUTIGAM, D. 2011a. Aid 'With Chinese Characteristics': Chinese Foreign Aid and 
Development Finance Meet the OECD‐DAC Aid Regime. Journal of International 
Development, 23, 752-764. 
BRAUTIGAM, D. 2011b. U.S. and Chinese Efforts in Africa in Global Health and Foreign Aid: 
Objectives, Impact, and Potential Conflicts of Interests. In: BOYNTON, X. L. (ed.) 
China's Emerging Global Health and Foreign Aid Engagement in Africa. Washington 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
BROWN, D. L. & WOODS, N. 2007. Making Global Self-regulation Effective in Developing 
170 
 
Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
BUCKLEY, L. Eating Bitter to Taste Sweet: An Ethnographic Sketch of A Chinese Agriculture 
Project in Senegal. International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, 6-8 April 2011 
Sussex. 
CAMPOS, I., CHEGE, M., UTOMI, P. & VINES, A. 2008. U.S. and Chinese Engagement in Africa: 
Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation. In: COOKE, J. (ed.). 
Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
CAO, J. 2014. Legislating China's Foreign Aid. International Economic Cooperation, 77-82. 
CAO, Q.-E. 2013. Probing Into China's Policy of Sending Young Volunteers to Africa. Journal of 
Henan University of Technology (Social Science), 46-48. 
CCCPC. 1958. Report on Strengthening Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation (Chen Yi, 
Li Fuchun). In: CCCPC PARTY LITERATURE RESEARCH OFFICE (ed.) Important File 
Selection Since the Establishment of the People's Republic of China, 11, [Online], 
Beijing: Central Committee Literature Press. Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66665/4493219.html [Accessed: 22 
May 2011]. 
CCCPC PARTY LITERATURE RESEARCH OFFICE (ed.) 1982a. Important File Collection Since The 
3rd Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, Beijing: People's Press. 
CCCPC PARTY LITERATURE RESEARCH OFFICE (ed.) 1982b. Important File Selection Since The 
3rd Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, Beijing: People's Press. 
CCCPC PARTY LITERATURE RESEARCH OFFICE (ed.) 1990. Anthology of Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy, 
Beijing: CCCPC Party Literature Press. 
CDB 2009. Special Loan for the Development of African SMEs. Beijing: China Development 
Bank. 
CECEP. 2011. China-Ghana Friendship Hospital [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.cecep.cn/tabid/792/sourceId/2893/infoid/8202/Default.aspx [Accessed: 
31 May 2012]. 
CHAPONNIERE, J.-R. 2009. Chinese Aid to Africa, Origins, Forms and Issues. In: DIJK, M. P. V. 
(ed.) The New Presence of China in Africa. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
CHEN, C.-C. & LEE, Y.-T. (eds.) 2008. Leadership and Management in China: Philosophies, 
Theories, and Practices: Cambridge University Press. 
CHEN, D. 2007. Exploring in 1964: Zhou Enlai Flies to Africa, Beijing: PLA Literature and Art 
Publishing House. 
CHEN, X. 2012. China, What Can You Do About the Tanzam Railway? World Affairs, 50-58. 
CHEN, Y. 2008. The formation and Importance of Jiang Zemin's "Going Out" Strategy [Online]. 
Available at: http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/138172/138202/8311431.html 
[Accessed: 22 June 2012]. 
CHENG, T. 1996. Ideas from Designing Ghana National Theatre. New Architecture, 3-7. 
CHENG, W., LIU, A. & DONG, W. 2015. Assessment on China's Foreign Aid Educational 
Programs in Africa. Higher Agricultural Education, 29-32. 
CHIN, G. T. & FROLIC, B. M. 2007. Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: 
The China Case (Summary). IDRC/CRDI. 
CONDON, M. 2012. China in Africa: What the Policy of Nonintervention Adds to the Western 
Development Dilemma. PRAXIS: The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, 27, 5-25. 
171 
 
CORKIN, L. & BURKE, C. 2006. China’s Interest and Activity in Africa’s Construction and 
Infrastructure Sectors. Report prepared for DFID China. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch 
University. 
COTULA, L., VERMEULEN, S., LEONARD, R. & KEELEY, J. 2009. Land Grab or Development 
Opportunity? Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa. 
London/Rome: International Institute for Environment and Development, Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. 
CPC. 1960. The Soviet Union Withdrew All of Its Experts [Online]. Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/4162/64165/67447/67995/4590633.html [Accessed: 2 
November 2010]. 
DASGUPTA, S. 2015. UN Fears Rights Violations in China-backed Projects [Online]. Available 
at: 
http://www.voanews.com/content/un-concerned-about-rights-violations-in-china-b
acked-development-projects/2851032.html [Accessed: 1 January 2016]. 
DAVIES, M., EDINGER, H., TAY, N. & NAIDU, S. 2008. How China Delivers Development 
Assistance to Africa. Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of 
Stellenbosch. 
DE BARY, W. T. (ed.) 2008. Sources of East Asian Tradition: Premodern Asia, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
DENG, H. 2009. A Review of Foreign Research of Foreign Aid Theories. Social Sciences Abroad, 
82-89. 
DING, S. 2010. Major Power's Foreign Aid: An Insight from Social Exchange Theory, Beijing: 
Social Sciences Academic Press. 
DONNAN, S. 2015. China's Aid Splurge Fails to Bridge Credibility Gap in Africa [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c0455a56-7d8f-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#axzz3w
Bh0f3zr [Accessed: 9 November 2015]. 
DREHER, A. & FUCHS, A. 2012. Rogue aid? The Determinants of China's Aid Allocation. 
Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers, No. 93. 
Gottingen: University of Gottingen. 
EASTERLY, W. 2006. The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Eest Have 
Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
ENO, R. 2015. The Analects of Confucius [2.2]. Available at: 
http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf [Accessed: 
20 July 2015]. 
FENG, H. 2007. Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-making: Confucianism, 
Leadership and War: Routledge. 
FENG, Z. 1987. Factory in Rwanda, Chinese People's Heart. International Economic 
Cooperation, 39-40. 
FMPRC. 2005. Ghana National Theatre [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/gjhdq_603914/gj_603916/fz_605026/1206_605
486/1206x2_605506/t441910.shtml [Accessed: 3 March 2011]. 
FMPRC. 2009. Opening of Foreign Aid Anti-malaria Centre [Online]. Available at: 
172 
 
http://gh.chineseembassy.org/chn/xwdt/t623239.htm [Accessed: 23 August 2011]. 
FOCAC 2012a. Open Up New Prospects for A New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership. 
The 5th Ministerial Conference. FOCAC. 
FOCAC 2012b. President Hu Proposes Measures in Five Priority Areas to Boost China-Africa 
Ties. The 5th Ministerial Conference. FOCAC. 
FOCAC 2012c. President Hu: Important Progress Made in Realizing China-Africa New 
Strategic Partnership. The 5th Ministerial Conference. Beijing: FOCAC. 
GHANA HEALTH NEST. 2013. Health Minister moves to solve problems facing LEKMA Hospital 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://ghanahealthnest.com/2013/02/01/health-minister-moves-to-solve-problems-
facing-lekma-hospital/ [Accessed: 8 December 2014]. 
GIETC. Ghana National Theatre Project [Online]. China Guangzhou International Economic 
and Technical Cooperation Company. Available at: 
http://www.gzietcot.com/023.html [Accessed: 11 November 2010]. 
GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. Chronicle of Fujian Provincial Foreign Trade [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.fjsq.gov.cn/showtext.asp?ToBook=217&index=134 [Accessed: 3 March 
2012]. 
GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. Shanghai City Foreign Aid [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node68143/node68152/node68239/n
ode68247/userobject1ai65798.html [Accessed: 4 April 2012]. 
GOVERNMENT OF CHINA 2006. China's African Policy Paper, Beijing: People's Press. 
GOVERNMENT OF CHINA 2011. China's Foreign Aid, Beijing: People's Press. 
GRIMM, S., HOB, H., KNAPPE, K., SIEBOLD, M., SPERRFECHTER, J. & VOGLER, I. 2010. 
Coordinating China and DAC Development Partners: Challenges to the Aid 
Architecture in Rwanda. Studies. Bonn. 
GRIMM, S., RANK, R., SCHICKERLING, E. & MCDONALD, M. 2011. Transparency of Chinese Aid: 
An Analysis of the Published Information on Chinese External Financial Flows. 
Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University. 
GRIMM, S. 2014. China-Africa Cooperation: Promises, Practice and Prospects. Journal of 
Contemporary China, 23, 993-1011. 
GULOBA, M., KILIMANI, N. & NABIDDO, W. 2010. The Impact of China-Africa Aid Relations: 
The Case of Uganda. AERC Collaborative Research China-Africa Project. African 
Economic Research Consortium. 
GUO, H. 1965. A Story About the Guinea Cigarette and Match Factory. World Affairs, 28-29. 
GUO, Y. 2014. What Legislation Do China's Foreign Aid Currently Have? [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1284956 [Accessed: 16 January 2015]. 
HE, D. 2013. "The Failing" Friendship Textile Mill. China Textile, 35. 
HE, W. 2010. China's Aid to Africa Development Feature, Functions and Challenges. West Asia 
and Africa, 12-19. 
HE, Y. 2011. The Establishment and Improvement of China's Foreign Aid Administration. 
Huxiang Forum, 74-78. 
HESS, S. & AIDOO, R. 2010. Beyond the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China's African Policy. 
African and Asian Studies, 9, 356-383. 
HON, T., JANSSON, J., SHELTON, G., LIU, H., BURKE, C. & KIALA, C. 2010. Evaluating China’s 
173 
 
FOCAC Commitments to Africa and Mapping the Way Ahead. Prepared for the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University. 
HU, J. & HUANG, M. 2012. The Status and Reform of China's Foreign Aid Management 
System. International Economic Cooperation, 55-58. 
HU, M. & LIU, H. 2009. Ideology First or Livelihood Improvement First? A Comparison 
Between the "Democracy Aid to Africa" of the West and "Livelihood Aid to Africa" of 
China. World Economics and Politics, 17-24. 
HU, Z. 2000. The Past, Present and Future of the Tanzam Railway. Railway Economics 
Research, 47-48. 
HUANG, J. 2004. Report of Magbass Sugar Complex. Saccharum, 11, 58-60. 
HUANG, M. 2007. China's Foreign Aid: The Current Model and Trends. International 
Economic Cooperation, 4-11. 
HUANG, M. 2010. Introduction to the development of China's Foreign Preferential Loan and 
its Prospects. International Economic Cooperation, 47-53. 
HUANG, M. & HU, J. 2009. The Formation and Development of Chinese Foreign Aid 
Management. International Economic Cooperation, 33-40. 
HUANG, M. & LANG, J. 2010. An Analysis on Chinese Economic Aid to African Countries and 
Corresponding Challenges. International Economic Cooperation, 34-40. 
HUANG, M. & XIE, Q. 2013. The Arrangement and Management of China's Foreign Aid 
Projects. International Economic Cooperation, 63-66. 
JIANG, H. 2013. Agricultural Aid to Africa (1971-1983): A Case Study of China's Aid Model and 
Effectiveness in Africa. Foreign Affairs Review, 30-49. 
JIANG, X. 2014. Characteristics of China-Africa Health Collaboration: The Case of Democratic 
Republic of Congo. China Health Policy Research, 7, 64-68. 
JIN, D. 1987. Management Cooperation Succeeded The Tanzam Railway Is in Profit. 
International Economic Cooperation, 11-12, 15. 
JIN, H. (ed.) 1996. China's Railway Foreign Aid, Beijing: China Railway Publishing House. 
KAPLINSKY, R. & MORRIS, M. 2006. Dangling by A Thread: How Sharp Are the Chinese 
Scissors? Paper prepared for DFID Trade Division. Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies. 
KAPLINSKY, R., MCCORMICK, D. & MORRIS, M. 2007. The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Working Paper. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
KELLER, S. 2009. Against Friendship Between Countries. Journal of International Political 
Theory, 5, 59-74. 
KISHI, R. & RALEIGH, C. 2015. When China Gives Aid to African Governments, They Become 
More Violent [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/02/when-china-
gives-aid-to-african-governments-they-become-more-violent/ [Accessed: 4 January 
2016]. 
KRAGELUND, P. 2008. The Return of Non-DAC Donors to Africa: New Prospects for African 
Development? Development Policy Review, 26, 555-584. 
LAI, X. 1995. Aid Project Waiting for Reform: An Analysis on Magbass Sugar Complex. 
International Economic Cooperation, 7-9. 
LANCASTER, C. 1999. Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done, Chicago; London: 
174 
 
University of Chicago Press. 
LANCASTER, C. 2006. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
LANCASTER, C. 2007. The Chinese Aid System. Center for Global Development. 
LAW, Y. F. 1984. Chinese Foreign Aid: A Study of Its Nature and Goals with Particular 
Reference to the Foreign Policy and World View of the People's Republic of China, 
1950-1982: Breitenbach. 
LEBOW, R. N. 2007. Classical Realism. In: DUNNE, T., KURKI, M. & SMITH, S. (eds.) 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
LENGAUER, S. 2011. China's Foreign Aid Policy: Motive and Method. Culture Mandala: The 
Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, 9, 35-81. 
LI, A. 2006a. The Adjustment and Change of China's African Policy. West Asia and Africa, 
11-20. 
LI, A. 2008a. In Defense of China: China's African Strategy and State Image. World Economics 
and Politics, 6-15. 
LI, A. 2009. The History, Scale and Impact of Chinese Medical Teams. Foreign Affairs Review, 
25-45. 
LI, A. 2012. The Origin of the FOCAC. Foreign Affairs Review, 15-32. 
LI, B., DONG, X. & ZHU, H. 2010. Investigating the Factors that Affected the Road and Bridge 
Construction in Northern Rural Ghana. Anhui Architecture, 123-125. 
LI, J. 2003. China's Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries. Journal of China Foreign 
Affairs University, 80-84. 
LI, K. 2014. The Necessity of Legislating Our Foreign Aid. International Economic Cooperation, 
37-40. 
LI, L. 2000. Being A Project Manager In Ghana. International Economic Cooperation, 35-38. 
LI, L. 2006b. Today and the History of Political Relationship between China and Africa. West 
Asia and Africa, 16-19. 
LI, S. 2008b. Research Methods for Studying International Relations, Beijing: China Social 
Sciences Press. 
LI, W. 2010. An Analysis of the Evolution of PRC's Policy for the Foreign Economic & Technical 
Support. Party History Research & Teaching, 19-29. 
LI, X., TANG, L. & WU, J. 2009. International Development Assistance: Evolution, Management 
and Institutions, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press. 
LI, X. & WU, J. 2009. A Study of China's ODA to Africa. China Agricultural University Journal of 
Social Sciences Edition, 26, 45-54. 
LI, Y. 1999. China's Foreign Aid In the Integration of the World Economy. Journal of Beijing 
International Studies University, 91-95. 
LIN, M. 1995. The New Guidance of Foreign Aid. international Economic Cooperation, 23. 
LIN, M. 1997. The Reform and Practice of Foreign Aid Methods. International Economic 
Cooperation, 4-7. 
LIU, B. 2004. The Completion of Our Foreign Aid Projects In Sudan. Arab World Studies, 
31-33. 
LIU, H. 2008a. China-Africa Relations. In: WANG, Y. (ed.) Transformation of Foreign Affairs 
175 
 
and International Relations in China, 1978-2008. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic 
Press. 
LIU, H. 2008b. Thirty Years of Sino-African Relations A Pivot in Reshaping the Structure of 
China's Relations with the Outside World. World Economics and Politics, 80-88. 
LIU, L. 2005. Foreign Aids from the Perspective of International Political Studies. Teaching 
and Research, 83-88. 
LIU, X. 1998. 20 Years of Foreign Aid Reform. International Economic Cooperation, 30-31. 
LIU, Z. 2009. From Unilateral Aid to Mutual Profit - The Economic Relationship between 
China and Developing Countries in these 60 Years. Social Science in Ningxia, 49-54. 
LU, C. 2009. Political Friendship Among Peoples. Journal of International Political Theory, 5, 
41-58. 
LU, C., ZHU, D. & HUANG, M. 2014. The Trend of International Development Assistance and 
the Reform of China's Foreign Aid System. International Economic Cooperation, 
41-46. 
LU, M. 2006. Mao's Contribution to China-Africa Relationship. In: LU, M., HUANG, S. & LIN, Y. 
(eds.) If Concentric Gold: The Glorious History of China-Africa Friendly Relations. 
Beijing: World Affairs Press. 
LU, X. 1988. Exploring Multiple Approach, Strengthening Foreign Aid Effectiveness. 
International Economic Cooperation, 3-6. 
LU, X. (ed.) 2012. China-Africa Health Collaboration in the Era of Global Health Diplomacy, 
Beijing: World Affairs Press. 
LUM, T., FISCHER, H., GOMEZ-GRANGER, J. & LELAND, A. 2009. China's Foreign Aid Activities 
in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Congressional Research Service. 
LUO, J. & LIU, H. 2007. Discussing the Periodical Evolution and Its Meanings of China's 
Foreign Aid to Africa. West Asia and Africa, 25-30. 
MALONE, A. 2008. How China is Taking Over Africa, and Why the West Should Be VERY 
Worried [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1036105/How-Chinas-taking-Africa-West-V
ERY-worried.html [Accessed: 3 January 2016]. 
MANNING, R. 2006. Will "Emerging Donors" Change the Face of International Cooperation? 
Development Policy Review, 24, 371-385. 
MAO, X. 2011. The Road of China's Foreign Aid to Africa. Economy, 54-57. 
MAO, X. 2012. Review and Innovation of China's Foreign Aid Approach. International 
Economic Cooperation, 89-91. 
MARKS, S. 2007. Introduction. In: MANJI, F. & MARKS, S. (eds.) African Perspectives on China 
in Africa. Oxford: Fahamu. 
MARKS, S. 2010. China in Africa: Realism Conquers Myth [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/books/63128 [Accessed: 16 May 
2012]. 
MCGREAL, C. 2007. Chinese Aid to Africa May Do More Harm than Good, Warns Benn 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/08/development.topstories3 
[Accessed: 3 January 2016]. 
MOC. 2003a. Completion of the Cotonou Friendship Stadium Rehabilitation [Online]. 
176 
 
Available at: http://bj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ddfg/200301/20030100064958.html 
[Accessed: 11 May 2012]. 
MOC. 2003b. Completion of the National Stadium Rehabilitation [Online]. Available at: 
http://sl.mofcom.gov.cn/sys/print.shtml?/jmjg/law/200304/20030400085526 
[Accessed: 10 May 2012]. 
MOC. 2004. The Achievement of the Rwanda Cement Factory [Online]. Available at: 
http://rw.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/200407/20040700250234.shtml [Accessed: 4 
April 2012]. 
MOC. 2009a. The Agreement of Foreign Aid Hospital Project [Online]. Available at: 
http://gh.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/slfw/200901/20090105992495.html [Accessed: 28 
April 2012]. 
MOC. 2009b. Chen Deming Promises to Implement the Eight New Measures Immediately. 
Available at: 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/200911/20091106608673.shtml [Accessed: 
7 August 2012 ]. 
MOC. 2010a. The Agreement of the People's Palace Upgrade Program [Online]. Available at: 
http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201009/20100907168362.shtml [Accessed: 2 
June 2012]. 
MOC. 2010b. The Agreement of Uganda Stadium Rehabilitation [Online]. Available at: 
http://jjhzj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ldhd/shaanxi/bx/201002/20100206773485.shtml 
[Accessed: 10 May 2012]. 
MOC. 2012. The Agreement of Three Foreign Aid Projects [Online]. Available at: 
http://cd.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201205/20120508152040.shtml [Accessed: 2 
June 2012]. 
MODERN GHANA. 2012. New Appointments At National Theatre [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.modernghana.com/music/19536/3/new-appointments-at-national-thea
tre.html [Accessed: 8 December 2014]. 
MODERN GHANA. 2013. Lekma Hospital Still Losing Focus... As Malaria Research Facility 
Turns Net Distributors [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.modernghana.com/news/461097/1/lekma-hospital-still-losing-focus.ht
ml [Accessed: 8 December 2014]. 
MOFCOM 1995. Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1994, Beijing: 
China Society Press. 
MOFCOM. 2007. Jia Qinglin Visits Ghana [Online]. Available at: 
http://gh.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/tzwl/200704/20070404595481.shtml 
[Accessed: 3 March 2011]. 
MONSON, J. 2009. Africa's Freedom Railway: How A Chinese Development Project Changed 
Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
MORGENTHAU, H. 1962. A Political Theory of Foreign Aid. American Political Science Review, 
56, 301-309. 
MOYO, D. 2009. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is A Better Way for Africa, 
London: Penguin Books. 
NAIM, M. 2007. Rogue Aid. Foreign Policy, 159, 95-96. 
NIU, C. 2011. Evaluation of Sino-AFrca Educational Cooperation Based on the Effectiveness of 
177 
 
Education Aid: the Case Study of Sino-Cameroonian Cooperation. Comparative 
Education Review, 43-47. 
NOUR, S. M. 2010. The Impact of China-Africa Aid Relations: The Case of Sudan. Policy Brief. 
African Economic Research Consortium. 
PAUL, E. 2006. A Survey of the Theoretical Economic Literature on Foreign Aid. Asian‐Pacific 
Economic Literature, 20, 1-17. 
PAULO, S. & REISEN, H. 2010. Eastern Donors and Western Soft Law: Towards A DAC Donor 
Peer Review of China and India? Development Policy Review, 28, 535-552. 
PEHNELT, G. 2007. The Political Economy of China's Aid Policy in Africa. Jena Economic 
Research Papers, 1-18. 
PONCET, S. 2012. Foreign Aid with Chinese Characteristics. Defining the Post-2015 
Development Goals. Paris: FERDI. 
QI, G. 1995. Further Reform of China's Foreign Aid in New Situation. International Economic 
Cooperation, 4-5. 
RIDDELL, R. 1987. Foreign Aid Reconsidered, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
RIDDELL, R. 2008. Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
ROTBERG, R. I. 2008. China's Quest for Resources, Opportunities, and Influence in Africa. In: 
ROTBERG, R. I. (ed.) China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
SARPON, Y. 2014. Save Ghana's National Theatre Now [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=297237 
[Accessed: 2 December 2014]. 
SHEN, G. C. & FAN, V. Y. 2014. China's Provincial Diplomacy to Africa: Applications to Health 
Cooperation. Contemporary Politics, 20, 182-208. 
SHI, G. 2000. To Intensify China-Africa Cooperation for a Brilliant Future - Speech by Minister 
Shi Guangsheng of MOFTEC in the "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation" [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24974.htm [Accessed: 10 July 
2012]. 
SHI, L. 1989. Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries [eBook version]. Beijing: China 
Social Sciences Press. Available at: 
http://www.1921.org.cn/tushu.php?ac=inlist4&bid=1054 [Accessed: 2 November 
2010]. 
SHINN, D. H. Comparing Engagement with Africa by China and the United States. China in 
Africa Symposium: African Studies Program, East Asian Studies center and the Center 
for International Business Education and Research, 6-7 March 2009 Bloomington 
Indiana. Indiana University. 
SHINN, D. H. & EISENMAN, J. 2012. China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
SHU, Y. 2010. China's Aid to Africa: History, Theory and Features. Journal of Shanghai Normal 
University (Philosophy & Social Science Edition), 39, 83-89. 
SIERRA LEONE NEWS HUNTERS. 2012. 7 Villages Disgruntled Over Magbass Sugar Project 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://www.sierraleonenewshunters.com/content/7-villages-disgruntled-over-magb
ass-sugar-project [Accessed: 8 December 2014]. 
178 
 
STOKKE, O. 1989. Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid 
Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, Uppsala: The 
Nordic Africa Institute. 
STOKKE, O. 2013. Aid and Political Conditionality, London: Routledge. 
SUN, L. 2007. National Interests and China's Foreign Aid. Times Finance, 9-10. 
TANG, L., LI, X. & QI, G. 2014. China's Agricultural Aid to Africa. China International Studies, 
29-40. 
TAYLOR, I. 2006. China and Africa : Engagement and Compromise, London: Routledge. 
TAYLOR, I. 2008. Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights. African Affairs, 
107, 63-87. 
THE NEW CITIZEN. 2014. Over Non-compliance... EPA Complains Sierra Fisheries, Others 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://www.newctzen.com/index.php/11-news/1140-over-non-compliance-epa-com
plains-sierra-fisheries-others [Accessed: 8 December 2014]. 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION. Witness to Truth: Final Report of the TRC 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-3a/item/volume-thre
e-a-chapter-one?category_id=3 [Accessed: 11 July 2012]. 
UN. 1971. The United Nations General Assembly Session 26 Resolution 2758: Restoration of 
the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758(XXVI) 
[Accessed: 5 November 2010]. 
WALTZ, K. N. 2010. Theory of International Politics, Long Grove: Waveland Press. 
WANG, B. N. A. 2010. China-Africa Political and Economic Relations in the 21st Century: An 
Analysis of China's New Involvement into Africa. PhD, Jilin University. 
WANG, K. 2004a. Western Countries Foreign Aid: A Study of Theory & Practice. Teaching and 
Research, 45-51. 
WANG, K., GIMBEL, S., MALIK, E., HASSEN, S. & HAGOPIAN, A. 2012. The Experience of 
Chinese Physicians in the National Health Diplomacy Programme Deployed to Sudan. 
Global Public Health, 7, 196-211. 
WANG, Q. 2004b. The Addis Ministerial Conference Addressing Sino - African Cooperative 
Operation. West Asia and Africa, 42-45. 
WANG, W. 2014. The Legislation Regarding Complete Project Aid. Legal System and Society, 
231-232. 
WANG, W. & ZHU, H. 2008. On China's Aids to Foreign Countries Since the Reform and 
Opening Up. Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories, 45-49. 
WHITE, J. A. 1974. The Politics of Foreign Aid, London: Bodley Head. 
WOODS, N. 2008. Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent 
Revolution in Development Assistance. International Affairs, 84, 1205-1221. 
WU, J. 2008. With Prime Minister Zhou Negotiating the Construction of the Tanzam Railway. 
Hundred Year Tide, 25-29. 
WU, Y. 1994. Opportunities and Prospects: A Framework for Foreign Economic Development 
Strategy. International Economic Cooperation, 4-8. 
XIAO, Z. & ZHANG, D. 2002. On China's Economical & Technical Assistance to Foreign 
179 
 
Countries during 50 Years or More. Journal of University of Science and Technology 
Beijing (Social Science Edition), 18, 80-83. 
XINHUA. 1956a. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's Speech on the Current Situation. People's Daily, 
29 June. 
XINHUA. 1956b. Sun Yat-Sen Memorial. People's Daily, 12 November. 
XINHUA. 1963. A Conversation Between Chairman Mao and African Friends. People's Daily, 9 
August. 
XINHUA. 1964. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's Report on the Work of the Government - 
Delivered at the First Session of the Third National People's Congress. People's Daily, 
31 December. 
XINHUA. 1983. Prime Minister Zhao Visits Ten Nations in Africa. People's Daily, 15 January. 
XINHUA. 2004. Wen Speaks at the Conference on China's Economic Diplomacy in Developing 
Countries. People's Daily, 2 September. 
XINHUA. 2005. Chairman Hu Jintao Delivers An Important Speech on the UN Summit. 
People's Daily, 16 September. 
XINHUA. 2006a. Hu Jintao Speaks at Central Meeting on Foreign Affairs Work. People's Daily, 
23 August. 
XINHUA. 2006b. The New Beginning of China-African Relationship. People's Daily, 17 
November. 
XINHUA. 2008. Wen Speaks at the UN High-Level Meeting on the Millennium Development 
Goals. People's Daily, 26 September. 
XINHUA. 2009. Hu Jintao Attends the Groundbreaking Ceremony for the Bamako No. 3 
Bridge. People's Daily, 14 February. 
XINHUA. 2010. National Conference on Foreign Aid Convened in Beijing, Wen Delivers an 
Important Speech. People's Daily, 15 August. 
XINHUA. 2011. China's Aid to Africa for Friendship, Not Resources: MOC. People's Daily, 26 
April. 
XUE, H. 2011. Foreign Aid: the Decisions of Many Leaders. World Affairs, 14-16. 
XUE, L. 2013a. Rethinking China's Strategy of Foreign Aid to Africa Before the Reform. Issues 
of Contemporary World Socialism, 103-115. 
XUE, Q. 2013b. Mao Tes-tung Southern Decision [eBook version]. Beijing: Sino-culture Press. 
Available at: http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2013/1029/c85037-23365193-2.html 
[Accessed: 14 July 2015]. 
YAN, H. & SAUTMAN, B. 2013. “The Beginning of a World Empire”? Contesting the Discourse 
of Chinese Copper Mining in Zambia. Modern China, 39, 131-164. 
YAN, X. 1987. Improving the Friendship Relations between China and Africa. Inside Global 
Economics and Politics, 52-56. 
YAN, X. & SUN, X. 2001. Practical Methods of International Studies, Beijing: Renmin Press. 
YANG, H. & CHEN, K. 2010. China's Foreign Aid: Achievements, Lessons and Benign 
Development. World Outlook, 46-56. 
YOUDE, J. 2010. China's Health Diplomacy in Africa. China: An International Journal, 8, 
151-163. 
YU, D. & YUAN, L. 2010. A Review on China's Sports Foreign Aid History. Journal of Beijing 
Soprt Univeristy, 39-45. 
180 
 
YU, G. T. 1971. Working on the Railroad: China and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Asian 
Survey, 11, 1101-1117. 
YUAN, X. & YANG, Y. 2003. China's Foreign Aid: The Character Changes of Government in 
Delivering Foreign Aid. In: XIAO, J. & TANG, X. (eds.) Great Diplomacy. Beijing: 
Current Affairs Publishing House. 
YUN, Z. & HAN, J. 1997. A Comparative View of Our Concessional Loans. International 
Economic Cooperation, 36-38. 
ZHANG, H. 2006a. History of China's Aid Policies and Its role in Sino-Africa relations. Asia & 
Africa Review, 44-49. 
ZHANG, H. 2006b. Review of China's Economic Policy Towards Africa. Overseas Investment 
and Export Credit, 1-8. 
ZHANG, H. 2007. China's Aid to Africa: Oil Oriented or Not. World Economy Study, 76-80. 
ZHANG, H., YUAN, J. & KONG, Y. 2010. A Study on the Linkage between China's ODA and FDI 
to Africa. World Economy Study, 69-74. 
ZHANG, M. 2009. Research on the Adjustments of China's Foreign Aid [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsyj/yjjg/zggsyjxh_1/gsnhlw_1/baguoshixslwj/201110/t201
11018_162332.html [Accessed: 6 July 2012]. 
ZHANG, Q. 2001. A Common Policy Towards Unalike Countries - A Preliminary Analysis of 
China's Policy Towards Developing Countries. Contemporary China History Studies, 
36-46. 
ZHANG, Q. 2010. From Internationalism to Mutual Benefit: the Evolution of China's Foreign 
Aid Policy. Motherland, 24-25. 
ZHANG, S., PU, J., ZHAO, Y., YAO, G., YANG, M., XIE, J. & LI, D. 2013. A Review of the 50 Years 
of China's Medicine and Public Health Aid. People's Military Surgeon, 1458-1459. 
ZHANG, X. 2006c. Zambian Economy and the Tanzam Railway. International Economic 
Cooperation, 63-65. 
ZHANG, Y. 2011. China's "One-Sided" Diplomatic Strategy and its Foreign Aid. Journal of 
University of International Relations, 1, 20-26. 
ZHANG, Y. 2012a. The Multidimensional Perspective of Foreign Aid Research. The Journal of 
Harbin Committee School of the CCP, 85-88. 
ZHANG, Y. 2012b. Research of China Foreign Aid 1950-2010, Beijing: Jiuzhou Press. 
ZHANG, Y. & QIN, W. 2012. An Analysis of Foreign Aid by the Chinese Government in the 
Concept of Traditional Cultural Factors. Journal of Yuncheng University, 55-58. 
ZHANG, Z. 1994. New Foreign Aid Policy, Open Up New Situation. In: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION (ed.) Almanac of China's Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade 1994. Beijing: China Society Press. 
ZHAO, C. & XUE, Y. 2010. Exploring China's Foreign Aid in the New Situation. Socialism 
Studies, 139-143. 
ZHAO, Z. 1986. Government Report (1984). In: CCCPC PARTY LITERATURE RESEARCH OFFICE 
(ed.) Important File Selection Since The Twelfth CPC Central Committee. Beijing: 
People's Press. 
ZHENG, K. 2000. The Adjustment of China's African Policy in the Early 80s, Beijing: Beijing 
University Press. 
ZHOU, H. (ed.) 2002. Foreign Aid and International Relations, Beijing: China Social Science 
181 
 
Press. 
ZHOU, H. 2008a. China's Foreign Aid and 30 years of Reform. World Economics and Politics, 
33-43. 
ZHOU, H. 2008b. China's New Foreign Aid. In: WANG, Y. (ed.) Transformation of Foreign 
Affairs and International Relations in China, 1978-2008. Beijing: Social Sciences 
Academic Press. 
ZHOU, X. 2007. 40 Years of Sino-Soviet Relationship. Hundred Year Tide, 12-18. 
ZOU, C. 1995. Further Reforming Our Foreign Aid. People's Daily, 18 October. 
 
 
